Pakistan–United States relations


and the United States established relations on 15 August 1947, a day after the independence of Pakistan, when the United States became one of the first nations to recognise the country.
The relationship between the two nations has been described as a "roller coaster" characterised by close coordination and lows marked by deep bilateral estrangement. Despite its troubled history, the Pakistani military once occupied an important place in American geopolitical strategy, and has been a major non-NATO ally since 2002. After Pakistan's participation in the Afghan peace process and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in 2021, a sizeable number of US policy makers are revisiting the United States' relations with Pakistan. At the same time, the strategic convergence of the United States and India has also brought greater pressure on Pakistani diplomacy.

Background

During the Cold War, Pakistan allied itself with the Western Bloc led by the United States against the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union, with the former advocating the economic system of capitalism while the latter advocated socialism. Following the 1958 Pakistani military coup, president Muhammad Ayub Khan established a strong military alliance with the United States. During the Bangladesh Liberation War and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the United States aided Pakistan against the Provisional Government of Bangladesh and India. After the Pakistani defeat, Pakistan's leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an anti-American, improved relations with the Soviets. In 1977, Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup led by Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan and the United States cooperated in the funding and financing of the anti-communist Afghan Mujahideen and then in the ensuing First Afghan Civil War. The United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan on various occasions to force Pakistan to comply with its strategic interests since 1965, with Pakistan's willingness to participate with the United States in the wars in Somalia and Bosnia, relations improved. However, the United States again suspended aid and imposed sanctions along with India in 1998, only to be lifted once again with the United States engagement in Afghanistan in 2001. Factors involving in the contingency operations, distrust, and different priorities of both nations in the Afghan War led to serious criticism as both sides began to criticize each other's strategy to achieve common goals in the war on terror. The United States continues to blame Pakistan's military for supporting non-state actors, including the Taliban. Furthermore, drone strikes by both nations, a friendly fire incident at Salala, and an incident involving the arrest of a spy in Lahore further complicated relations for the worse.
File:-UNGA.jpg|thumb|right|Former PM Imran Khan and Donald Trump during 2019 UNGA.

Third-party factors in Pakistan–U.S. relations

The U.S.'s troubled relationship with Pakistan continues to be eroded by crisis after crisis. It has been alleged that the ISI of Pakistan pays journalists to write articles hostile to the United States in the early 2010s. Despite this, both Pakistan and the United States continue to seek a productive relationship to defeat terrorist organizations in the war on terror. But in recent years, "Islamabad has arguably lost some of its strategic significance in the West following the US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan". Pakistan once provided NATO with a supply route to Afghanistan, a link that dominated bilateral relations during the war. However, with the end of the war and the withdrawal of US troops from the region in the early 2020s, Pakistan's influence on the US disappeared and the US no longer needed it to engage with Afghanistan.
Pakistan's decades-long rivalry and conflict with the U.S. strategic partner India in the context of Kashmir and all-weather strategic cooperation with China in the context of great power competition between the United States and China poses difficulties for the country's efforts to improve relations with the U.S.

Diaspora

There are an estimated 554,202 self-identified Pakistani Americans living in the United States and about 52,486 Americans residing in Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan also hosts one of the largest embassies of the United States in Islamabad, and the largest consulate-general, in terms of both personnel and facilities, in the city of Karachi.

History

1947–1958: Relations between the United States and the newly-independent state

Following Pakistan's creation from the British Indian Empire, the nascent state struggled to position itself as a non-aligned member of the international community. Pakistan's pro-communist forces commanded considerable support in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan, the pro-Soviet Pakistan Socialist Party remained largely marginalized. The pro-American Pakistan Muslim League dominated much of West Pakistan's political landscape, particularly in the prosperous region of Punjab, while its base of support in East Pakistan was far more modest.
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, however, attempted to establish friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States in hopes that Pakistan could benefit from an alliance with both superpowers. Both the Military of Pakistan and Foreign Service of Pakistan raised doubts as to whether the Soviets had the political will and capacity to provide military, technical, and economic aid to a similar degree that they had begun to offer to Pakistan's socialist neighbor, India. Pakistan nevertheless requested military aid from the USSR, which was predictably rebuffed as the Soviet Union had previously oriented itself with India. The government's overtures to the Soviet Union were not favorably regarded by Pakistan's conservative middle classes, who regarded the USSR as an atheist and socialist ally of India.
In 1950, the United States extended an overture to Pakistan by inviting Prime Minister Khan for an official state visit. As the USSR had rebuffed capitalist Pakistan and aligned itself with Pakistan's rivals, the country's policy crafters found that maintaining friendly relations with both superpowers was impossible. Prime Minister Khan accepted the American invitation and paid an official 23-day state visit to the United States beginning on May 3, 1950. The event was highly politicized in Pakistan, and outraged the country's leftists, and was seen as the seminal event that lead to warm diplomatic ties for several decades. However, it is alleged that during PM Khan's first visit to the US, president Truman requested Pakistan's premier to let the CIA formulate a base in Pakistan, strictly to keep an eye on the activities of Soviet Union – a request which was not granted by Khan.
Throughout the period between 1950 and 1953, several major Pakistan political and military figures paid visits to the United States. During this time, Army commander Ayub Khan paid visits to the United States – a figure who would later institute a strongly pro-American military government. Foreign Minister Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Secretary Ikram-Ullah Khan, Finance Minister Malik Ghulam Muhammad, and Defense Secretary Iskandar Mirza all paid official state visits to the United States.
Defense ties between the two countries strengthened almost immediately following Khan's visit to the United States. Personal goodwill towards Pakistan was evident even when Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated in 1951. Under the government of Khawaja Nazimuddin, Pakistani and American officials developed positive attitudes towards one another. Such personal goodwill was evident when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, while arguing for wheat aid to Pakistan in 1953, told the sub-committee on Agriculture and Forestry during hearings that, "the people of Pakistan had a splendid military tradition," and that in Karachi he had been met by a guard of honour which was the "finest" he had ever seen". Close ties between the countries were further consolidated by a mutual defense treaty signed in May 1954, after which hundreds of Pakistani military officers began to regularly train in the United States. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group was also established in Rawalpindi, then capital of Pakistan. Pakistani officers were not only trained in military tactics, but also taught leadership, management, and economic theory.
In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower requested permission from Pakistan's new Prime Minister, Huseyn Suhravardie, to lease the Peshawar Air Station, which was to be used in intelligence gathering of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. The request was granted, and soon the United States built an airstrip, command and control station at the site before initiating operations. The base was regarded as top-secret, and even the high-ranking Pakistani public officials such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were refused entry to the facility.
American interest in Pakistan as an ally against the spread of communism primarily was focused on maintaining excellent ties with Pakistan's military establishment. Prime Minister Huseyn Suhrawardy paid several official visits to the United States – typically with his Army commander, Ayub Khan, at his side. After a military coup d'état in 1958, Ayub Khan argued that left wing activists could seize power in Pakistan, thereby jeopardizing American interests in the region. He successfully convinced American officials that the Pakistani military was the strongest and most capable institution to govern the country.

1958–1971: relations during the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan

During the rule of Ayub Khan, Pakistan enjoyed a close relationship with the United States. Ayub Khan was strongly pro-American, and on a visit to the United States in 1954, before Khan was head of state, he famously told American Brigadier-General Henry A. Byroade, "I didn't come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let's make a decision". His view of the United States had remained positive by the time he seized power. During the 1960s, Pakistan's population was generally pro-American and also held a positive view of the United States.
In 1960, Ayub Khan granted permission for the United States to fly its first spy missions to the Soviet Union from the Peshawar Air Base, which had been recently upgraded with American funds. In May 1960, the U-2 incident took place, in which pilot Gary Powers was captured by the USSR. The CIA notified Ayub Khan of the incident while he was in London for a state visit: he reportedly shrugged his shoulders and stated that he had expected such an incident would eventually happen.
In 1961, Khan paid his first visit to the United States as head of state. American goodwill towards Khan was evident by an elaborate state dinner held at Mount Vernon, and a ticker tape parade for Khan in New York City.
American military aide was concentrated in West Pakistan, with economic benefits were controlled by and almost exclusively used by West Pakistan. East Pakistani anger towards an absence of economic development was directed towards the United States, as well as West Pakistan. The East-Pakistan parliament passed a resolution denouncing the 1954 military pact with the United States.
Economic aid to Pakistan was further increased by the United States through the consortium companies. West Pakistan's high rate of economic growth during this time period brought wide regard to Pakistan as a model of successful implementation of capitalism in a developing country; in 1964, GDP growth was 9.38%.
In 1962, relations began cooling. In the aftermath of India's major defeat in the Sino-Indian War, the United States shipped arms to India. It did not provide notice to Pakistan and ignored Pakistan's concerns that these arms might be used by India against Pakistan. Additionally, Ayub Khan was disappointed that Pakistan's decision not to take advantage of Indian vulnerabilities during its war with China was not rewarded with serious United States efforts in negotiations to settle the Kashmir dispute.
Convinced that diplomatic solutions would not favor Pakistan, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar against India, which escalated to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which resulting in a stalemate. Economic growth in 1965 was a mere 0.88%. The economy rapidly rebounded with a GDP growth of 2.32% in 1966, and 9.79% in 1969. However, given the huge economic cost of the war without any clear victory, Khan surrendered his presidential powers to army commander Yahya Khan in 1969.
American President Lyndon Johnson cultivated warm personal relations with Indian and Pakistani leaders, This policy had unintended negative consequences. Since 1954, the American alliance with Pakistan caused India to move closer to the Soviet Union. Johnson hoped that a more evenhanded policy towards both countries would soften the tensions in South Asia, and bring both nations closer to the United States. With a major presence already in Vietnam, Johnson ended the traditional American division of South Asia into 'allies' and 'neutrals'. He had a plan to develop good relations with both India and Pakistan, supplying arms and money to both, and to maintain neutrality from their intense border feuds. The result was that his even-handedness pushed Pakistan closer to Communist China and India closer to the Soviet Union.