Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, particularly those not recognized as nuclear-weapon states by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Nuclear proliferation occurs through the spread of fissile material, and the technology and capabilities needed to produce it and to design and manufacture nuclear weapons. In a modern context, it also includes the spread of nuclear weapons to non-state actors. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international relations, or infringe upon the principle of state sovereignty. Conversely, supporters of deterrence theory argue that controlled proliferation decreases conflict rates via nuclear peace.
Nuclear weapons were initially researched during World War II, jointly by the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, and separately by Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and France. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. After surrendering, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. A nuclear arms race followed, with further countries developing and testing nuclear weapons. The US primarily competed with the Soviet Union, which carried out their first test in 1949. Seven other countries developed nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The UK and France, both NATO members, developed fission and fusion weapons throughout the 1950s, and 1960s, respectively. China developed both against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet split.
Five countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States have acquired, or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons: Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. While South Africa dismantled its program and acceded, the other four states are not members of the NPT. One critique of the NPT is that the treaty is discriminatory in the sense that only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 are recognized as nuclear weapon states while all other states are treated as non-nuclear-weapon states who can only join the treaty if they forswear nuclear weapons.
Many other states pursued a nuclear weapons program without attaining weapons. These include Yugoslavia, South Korea, Libya, Brazil, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Some states, such as modern Iran and Japan, are suggested to maintain nuclear latency, the capacity to rapidly develop nuclear weapons on demand. Proliferation is tied to the development of civilian nuclear power, as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities have dual use for producing both civilian and weapons-grade fissile material. It is also tied to the proliferation of nuclear weapons delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles.
History of nuclear non-proliferation efforts
Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores, and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility in Norway thought to be used for a German nuclear program. These efforts began immediately after the discovery of nuclear fission and its military potential. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material.
Baruch's plea for the destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of his address to the UN, Baruch said, "Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.... We must answer the world's longing for peace and security." With this remark, Baruch helped launch the field of nuclear ethics, to which many policy experts and scholars have contributed.
Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.
Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations had acquired nuclear weapons. Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373, and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, D.C., London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.
Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution are controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.
Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium and plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.
Dual-use technology
refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle allow diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran's nuclear activities is a case in point.Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks. A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous". For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “good governance” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:
These characteristics include low degrees of corruption, high degrees of political stability, high governmental effectiveness scores, and a strong degree of regulatory competence.
International Cooperation
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States.Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India. North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but on 9 October 2006 North Korea said it tested a nuclear device, for which it was sanctioned by the UN Security Council.