Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, was an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement was finalized in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 together with the European Union.
Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework, which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to constrain its nuclear program by limiting fuel cycle activities that could lead to the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. The JCPOA restricted the number and type of centrifuges in operation, the level of uranium enrichment, and the size of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. Key facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Arak were repurposed for civilian uses such as medical and industrial research. Iran agreed to accept more intrusive IAEA monitoring measures of its fuel-cycle related activities. In exchange for complying with these restrictions, Iran received relief from nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the EU, and the United States, but many U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear issue—targeting Iran's missile program, support for militant groups, and human rights record—remained in place, limiting the economic effect of sanctions relief. The agreement also set a timetable to lift the UN arms embargo, contingent on Iran's continued compliance with civilian nuclear commitments.
The agreement took effect on 20 January 2016. It was criticized and opposed by Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iranian principlists, and some in the United States.
The United States withdrew from the pact in 2018, imposing sanctions under its maximum pressure campaign. The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null. On 18 October 2025, in the aftermath of the June 2025 Iran–Israel war, Iran officially announced the termination of the agreement after 10 years.
Background
Nuclear technology
A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 and plutonium 239. Both uranium 233 and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 and only 0.7%.To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.
Iranian nuclear activity, 1970–2006
Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970.After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.
In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China, Pakistan, and Russia, and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment.
In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility. In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. IAEA inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples.
In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement. Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N. S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. took no part. In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution".
In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason. Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan.
In February 2006, Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1. That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution, demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. S.C. resolution 1737 was adopted in December; followed by others. The legal authority for IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter. The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities.
In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution.
S.C. resolutions, 2007–2013
Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929. In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended.
A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate and U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons".
In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom. Israel threatened military action.
Joint Plan of Action (2013)
In March 2013, the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William Burns and Jake Sullivan and Ali Asghar Khaji. In June, Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. In August, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1.In September, Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.
On 24 November, after several rounds of negotiations, the interim Joint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of a short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.
A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant. Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex.
Negotiations (2014–2015)
JCPOA was the culmination of a 20-month negotiation. The parties extended their talks, first to 24 November 2014 and then to 1 July 2015.A framework was agreed on 2 April 2015 at Lausanne. Under this framework Iran tentatively agreed to accept restrictions, all of which would last a decade or longer, and to submit to increased inspections. Negotiations continued, ending in Vienna at the Palais Coburg. On 14 July 2015, all parties agreed.
The agreement reflects the impact of a June 2015 public letter by a bipartisan group of U.S. diplomats, experts, and others that outlined concerns about various provisions and called for strengthening the agreement. After the agreement was reached, one of the negotiators, Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official, said: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."
An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace claimed that the final agreement was based upon "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and including especially the IAEA safeguards system".