Nuclear facilities in Iran
comprises a number of nuclear facilities, including nuclear reactors and various nuclear fuel cycle facilities.
Anarak
Anarak, near Yazd, has a nuclear waste storage site.Arak
The Arak area in northwestern Iran has several industrial complexes, some with ties to the nuclear program, in particular the IR-40 reactor under construction and a heavy water production plant, both nearby to the north-west of the city of Arak. In the late 1990s, one of these complexes may have manufactured a high-explosive test chamber transferred to [|Parchin], which the International Atomic Energy Agency has asked to visit. The Arak area is also thought to hold factories capable of producing high-strength aluminum rotors for IR-1 centrifuges. The design of the reactor in Arak is very similar to those used to make plutonium-239 for the production of nuclear weapons, and the reactor itself was said to have been capable of producing enough plutonium for two nuclear weapons per year.Arak was one of the two sites exposed by a spokesman for the People's Mujahedin of Iran in 2002. In August 2006, Iran announced the inauguration of the Arak plant for the production of heavy water. According to Iran this reactor is intended to replace the life-expired 1967 Tehran Nuclear Research Center research reactor, mainly involved in the production of radioisotopes for medical and agricultural purposes. The spent fuel of the reactor contains plutonium suitable for making the core of a nuclear bomb; which would be lighter, cheaper and more powerful that than that made of highly enriched uranium.
In 2009, Iran granted the IAEA access to the facility, but did not allow them to see its detailed plans, thereby keeping its purpose unclear. It was assessed by the P5+1, charged with negotiating with Iran over their nuclear program, that the completed reactor was capable of producing 9–10 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for up to two nuclear weapons, annually. Between 2011 and November 2013 the IAEA was denied access to the heavy water plant which had become operational.
In 2014, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Arak reactor was to be redesigned and deemed incapable of producing large amounts of weapons grade plutonium. This was to be achieved by modifying the calandria, a metal lattice which holds specialized tubes that contain the fuel assemblies and allow the heavy water to go through them, holding natural uranium fuel which is best suited to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The modification involved filling the tubes with cement and installing a newly designed core that would not operate on natural uranium. The new design would operate on low-enriched uranium and would allow the reactor the continued production of radio isotopes for medical purposes without making weapons-grade plutonium as a by-product.
In January 2016, Iran reported that they had removed the original calandria from the core of the reactor, but Iranian officials stated that only the "cavities, and not its heart" had been filled with concrete. Also in January 2016, Iran propagated a photo-shopped image of the reactor completely filled with cement, even though it had explicitly refused to carry out such an action, and this caused great confusion as to what had been done. Despite the preventative procedures, in February, and again in November of that same year, Iran exceeded its allowed limit of stockpiled heavy water. Iran also transferred over 80 metric tonnes of Heavy Water beyond its borders to Oman, thereby maintaining control over these resources without technically breaching the agreement.
In 2017, the facility was renamed the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor. In January 2019, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi gave an interview on Iran’s Channel 4 TV in which he stated that Iran had covertly imported a second set of tubes, identical to those which were filled with cement, allowing Iran to build a duplicate of the original calandria for the Arak reactor. Iran notified the IAEA that it intended to bring the reactor online in 2026.
Ardakan
The possible existence of a nuclear-related facility near Ardakan was first reported in July 2003, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran. In September 2003, Mohammad Ghannadi-Maragheh, Vice President for Nuclear Fuel Production of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that the facility was a uranium mill, with an annual capacity of 120,000 metric tonnes of ore and an annual output of 50 metric tons of uranium.Iran told the International Atomic Energy Agency that the facility would be hot tested July 2004, producing 40 to 50 kg of Yellowcake, but as of 2008 Iran had provided no further information to the IAEA on its operation.
Bonab
The Atomic Energy Research Center at Bonab is investigating the applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. It is run by the AEOI.Bushehr
The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is located south-east of the city of Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf. Construction started in 1975 but was halted in July 1979 following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The reactor was damaged by Iraqi air strikes during the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-1980s. Construction resumed in 1995, when Iran signed a contract with Russian company Atomstroyexport to install into the existing Bushehr I building a 915 MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor. In December 2007 Russia started delivering nuclear fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The construction was completed in March 2009.On 13 August 2010, Russia announced that fuel would be loaded into the plant beginning on 21 August, which would mark the beginning of the plant being considered a nuclear facility. Within six months after the fuel loading, the plant was planned to be fully operational. Tehran and Moscow have established a joint venture to operate Bushehr because Iran has not yet had enough experience in maintaining such installations. However, Iran may begin almost all operational control of the reactor within two or three years.
On 23 September 2013, operational control of Bushehr was transferred to Iran. and in November 2014 Iran and Russia signed an agreement to build two new nuclear reactors at the Bushehr site, with an option of six more at other sites later. Construction formally started on 14 March 2017.
Chalus
In 1995, Iranian exiles living in Europe claimed Iran was building a secret facility for building nuclear weapons in a mountain 20 kilometres from the town of Chalus. In October 2003 Mohamed ElBaradei announced that "In terms of inspections, so far, we have been allowed to visit those sites to which we have requested access". It therefore appears the allegations about the Chalus site were unfounded.Darkovin
Iran declared on 6 March 2007 that it has started construction of a domestically built nuclear power plant with capacity of 360 MW in Darkovin, in southwestern Iran.Fordow
The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is a nuclear facility dug deep into a mountain near the city of Qom, and located approximately 160 km south of Tehran. Originally an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps missile base, it was later converted into an underground uranium enrichment facility. After Natanz, Fordow is the second pilot enrichment plant belonging to Iran, and is considered Iran's best sheltered nuclear site as it is believed to be buried up to 80m deep and has been described as being about three floors below ground. Despite early compliance with the JCPOA according to which Iran was to refrain from Uranium enrichment, it was discovered in 2023 that the facility was modified to continue the enrichment process, and uranium enriched to 83.7%, just short of the 90% required for a nuclear weapon, was located at the site.Existence of the then-unfinished Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant was disclosed to the IAEA by Iran on 21 September 2009, but only after the site became known to Western intelligence services. Western officials strongly condemned Iran for not disclosing the site earlier; U.S. President Barack Obama said that Fordow had been under U.S. surveillance. In its initial declaration, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3,000 centrifuges. The facility consists of two enrichment halls containing the centrifuges.
Iran argues that this disclosure was consistent with its legal obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which Iran claims requires Iran to declare new facilities 180 days before they receive nuclear material. The IAEA stated that Iran was bound by its agreement in 2003 to declare the facility as soon as Iran decided to construct it. Later, in September 2011, Iran said it would move its production of 20% LEU to Fordow from Natanz, and enrichment started in December 2011. The Fordow plant was constructed at a depth of 80–90 m under the rocks. According to the Institute for Science and International Security. In July 2015, Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which dictated that Iran was to cease all uranium enrichment for 15 years, with the exception of limited stable isotope production, and was to convert the facility into a scientific research center.
According to the IAEA, Iran initially complied, however, a surprise inspection in February 2023 revealed that Iran had violated the agreements by covertly modifying the facility's design to enable further uranium enrichment. In March 2023, the IAEA reported that it had discovered uranium which had been enriched to 83.7% purity in Fordow, while research reactors require enrichment of only 20%, and a nuclear weapon requires enrichment of 90%. By August 2024, Iran had increased the number of centrifuges in Fordow and had installed at least 10 cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges, enabling further uranium enrichment.
On 22 June, 2025, at around 2:30 AM local time, Fordow was attacked by the US Air Force. It was reported that six B-2 'Spirit' bombers dropped 12 GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs at the plant.
On 26 September, 2025, commenting to Reuters for the first time about the US attack on Fordow, Rafael Grossi confirmed that "almost all sensitive equipment" at the site had been destroyed. However, he added that if Iran chose to further enrich their existing stockpile of uranium to 90 percent, it would only take them a few weeks to complete the process.