Total Espionage doctrine
Total Espionage doctrine is a specific approach to intelligence gathering, implicating as many variable sources as possible. It combines political, economic, financial, military and industrial espionage. Like other types of espionage, it is subdivided into active and passive espionage. In its original meaning, it applies to human intelligence. It characterizes authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In the 20th century total espionage was practiced by Japan, Germany and the Soviet Russia. During the Cold War, the Soviet propaganda often accused the United States of total espionage.
Kurt Reiss
Total espionage doctrine was first defined by Kurt Riess in his 1941 book Total Espionage: Germany's Information and Disinformation Apparatus 1932-40. German intelligence used Germans residing or travelling abroad, as well as foreign sympathizers, to collect all sorts of information – political, scientific, economic, etc. Tourists, scientists, actors, university professors, sailors, auto-mechanics, diplomats, journalists, NGO's and business corporations were instrumentalized to gather intelligence and to sabotage the enemy. One important instrument of intelligence gathering was The Organization of Germans Living Abroad, directed by Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, a special assistant to the German Counter-Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg. Vast network of spies was developed by Goebbels' Counter-Action Department jointly with the War Ministry Intelligence Service. This department was also in charge of controlling German-language newspapers in non-German-speaking countries. According to Riess, "by 1937 Goebbels controlled some 330 German newspapers in non-German-speaking countries. This figure did not include the large number of newspapers in Switzerland, Alsace, and Czechoslovakia, nor the newspapers in other languages". The goal of this control was not only propaganda, but espionage.Even though Hitler's total espionage was a prerequisite of total war, Germany's failure to defeat the Soviet Union quickly was, according to Riess, a result of its inability to build a sound espionage network there.