Battle of the Mediterranean
The Battle of the Mediterranean was the naval campaign fought in the Mediterranean Sea during World War II, from 10 June 1940 to 2 May 1945.
For the most part, the campaign was fought between the Italian Royal Navy, supported by other Axis naval and air forces, those of Nazi Germany and Vichy France, and the British Royal Navy, supported by other Allied naval forces, such as those of Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, and Greece.
American naval and air units joined the Allied side on 8 November 1942. The Vichy French scuttled the bulk of their fleet on 27 November 1942, to prevent the Germans seizing it. As part of the Armistice of Cassibile in September 1943, most of the Italian Navy became the Italian Co-belligerent Navy, and fought alongside the Allies.
Each side had three overall objectives in this battle. The first was to attack the supply lines of the other side. The second was to keep open the supply lines to their own armies in North Africa. The third was to destroy the ability of the opposing navy to wage war at sea. Outside of the Pacific theatre, the Mediterranean saw the largest conventional naval warfare actions during the conflict. In particular, Allied forces struggled to supply and retain the key naval and air base of Malta.
By the time of the Armistice of Cassibile, Italian ships, submarines and aircraft had sunk Allied surface warships totalling 145,800 tons, while German forces had sunk 169,700 tons, for a total of 315,500 tons. In total the Allies lost 76 warships and 46 submarines. The Allies sank 83 Italian warships totalling 195,100 tons and 83 submarines.German losses in the Mediterranean from the start of the campaign to the end were 17 warships and 68 submarines.
Main Combatants
British Mediterranean Fleet
The Mediterranean was a traditional focus of British maritime power. Outnumbered by the forces of the Regia Marina, the British plan was to hold the three key strategic points of Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal. By holding these points, the Mediterranean Fleet held open vital supply routes. Malta was the lynch-pin of the whole system. It provided a needed stop for Allied convoys and a base from which to attack the Axis supply routes.Mediterranean strategy
The Mediterranean strategy of Winston Churchill and Alan Brooke was the British policy of opening the Mediterranean to British and allied ships and knocking Italy out of the war before invading Europe, as it would save a million tons of shipping per year in having to send ships to Egypt and the Middle East via the route around Africa. See also Percentages agreement. Churchill also wanted to invade the Balkans.Italian Royal Fleet
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini saw the control of the Mediterranean as an essential prerequisite for expanding his "New Roman Empire" into Nice, Corsica, Tunis and the Balkans. Italian naval building accelerated during his tenure. Mussolini described the Mediterranean Sea as Mare Nostrum "."The warships of the Regia Marina had a reputation for being well-designed. Italian small attack craft lived up to expectations and were responsible for many successful actions in the Mediterranean. But some Italian cruiser classes were deficient in armour and all Italian warships lacked radar although its lack was partly offset by Italian warships being equipped with good rangefinder and fire-control systems for daylight combat. Only by the spring of 1943, barely five months before the armistice, twelve Italian warships were equipped with Italian-designed EC-3 ter Gufo radar devices. In addition, whereas Allied commanders at sea had discretion to act on their own initiative, the actions of Italian commanders were closely and precisely governed by Italian Naval Headquarters.
The Regia Marina also lacked a proper fleet air arm. The aircraft carrier was never completed and most air support during the Battle of the Mediterranean was supplied by the land-based Regia Aeronautica. Another major handicap for the Italians was the shortage of fuel. As early as March 1941, the overall scarcity of fuel oil was critical. Coal, gasoline and lubricants were also locally hard to find. During the Italian war effort, 75% of all the fuel oil available was used by destroyers and torpedo boats carrying out escort missions.
However, the most serious problem for the Axis forces in North Africa was the limited capacity of the Libyan ports. Even under the best conditions, this restricted supplies. Tripoli was the largest port in Libya and it could accommodate a maximum of five large cargo vessels or four troop transports. On a monthly basis, Tripoli had an unloading capacity of. Tobruk added only another. Bardia and other smaller ports added a little more.
In general, the Axis forces in North Africa exceeded the capacity of the ports to supply them. It has been calculated that the average Axis division required of supplies per month. If the Italians had a fault in respect to logistics during the Battle of the Mediterranean, it was that they failed to increase the capacity of Tripoli and the other ports before the war.
French Fleet
In January 1937, France began a programme of modernisation and expansion. This soon elevated the French Fleet to the fourth-largest in the world.By agreement with the British Admiralty, the strongest concentration of French vessels was in the Mediterranean. Here, the Italian Fleet posed a threat to the vitally important French sea routes from Metropolitan France to North Africa and to the British sea routes between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.
Vichy French Fleet
In 1940, after France fell to the Germans, the Marine Nationale in the Mediterranean became the navy of the Vichy French government. As the Vichy French Navy, this force was considered a potentially grave threat to the Royal Navy. As such, it was imperative to the British that this threat be neutralised.As the opening phase of Operation Catapult, the French squadron at Alexandria in Egypt was dealt with via negotiations. This proved possible primarily because the two commanders—Admirals René-Emile Godfroy and Andrew Cunningham—were on good personal terms. In contrast, a British ultimatum to place the bulk of the remainder of the French fleet out of German reach was refused. The fleet was located at Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria, so on 3 July 1940 it was largely destroyed by bombardment by the British "Force H" from Gibraltar. The Vichy French government broke off all ties with the British as a result of this attack and the Vichy French Air Force even raided British installations at Gibraltar.
At least two Allied freighters were captured by French forces in Tunisia and later handed over to the Italian navy.
In June and July 1941, a small Vichy French naval force was involved during Operation Exporter. This was an Allied action launched against Vichy French forces based in Lebanon and Syria. French naval vessels had to be driven off before the Litani River could be crossed.
In 1942, as part of the occupation of Vichy France during "Case Anton", the Germans intended to capture the French fleet at Toulon. This was thwarted by determined action by French commanders; the bulk of the fleet was scuttled at anchor.
German Navy
The Mediterranean U-boat Campaign lasted approximately from 21 September 1941 to May 1944. Germany's Kriegsmarine aimed at isolating Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal so as to break Britain's trade route to the far east. More than 60 U-boats were sent to disrupt shipping in the sea, although many were attacked in the Strait of Gibraltar, which was controlled by Britain. The Luftwaffe also played a key part in the Battle of the Mediterranean, especially during the summer of 1941. German war strategy, however, viewed the Mediterranean as a secondary theatre of operations.History
First actions
On 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on Britain and France. The following day, Italian bombers attacked Malta on what was to be the first of many raids. France's Marine Nationale shelled a number of targets on the northwestern coast of Italy, in particular the port of Genoa. When France surrendered on 24 June, the Axis leaders allowed the new Vichy French government to retain its navy.The first clash between the rival fleets in the Battle of Calabria, took place on 9 July, four weeks after the start of hostilities. This was inconclusive, and concurrent with a series of small surface actions during the summer, among them being the Battle of the Espero convoy and the Battle of Cape Spada.
Battle of Taranto
To reduce the threat posed by the Italian fleet, which was based in the port of Taranto, to convoys sailing to Malta, Admiral Cunningham organised an attack code-named Operation Judgement. Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers from attacked the Italian fleet on 11 November 1940 while it was still at anchor. This was the first time that an attack such as this had been attempted and it was studied by Japanese naval officers in preparation for the later attack on Pearl Harbor. British Fleet Air Arm aircraft badly damaged two Italian battleships and a third was forced to run aground to prevent her sinking, putting half of the Regia Marinas major ships out of action for several months. This attack also forced the Italian fleet to move to Italian ports further north so as to be out of range of carrier-based aircraft. This reduced the threat of Italian sallies attacking Malta-bound convoys.Cunningham's estimate that Italians would be unwilling to risk their remaining heavy units was quickly proven wrong. Only five days after Taranto, Inigo Campioni sortied with two battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers to disrupt a British aircraft delivery operation to Malta.
Furthermore, as early as 27 November, the Italian fleet was able to confront the Mediterranean fleet again in the indecisive Battle of Cape Spartivento. Two of the three damaged battleships were repaired by mid-1941 and control of the Mediterranean continued to swing back and forth until the Italian armistice in 1943. Measured against its primary task of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the Taranto attack had little effect. In fact, Italian shipping to Libya increased between the months of October 1940 – January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month, up from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months. Moreover, rather than change the balance of power in the central Mediterranean, British naval authorities had "failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed the context within which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought."