Operation Torch
Operation Torch was an Allied invasion of French North Africa during World War II. Torch was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces the opportunity to begin their fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on a limited scale.
The French colonies were aligned with Germany via Vichy France but the loyalties of the population were mixed. Reports indicated that they might support the Allies. The American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in Mediterranean theater of the war, approved plans for a three-pronged attack on Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, then a rapid move on Tunis to catch Axis forces in North Africa from the west in conjunction with the British advance from Egypt.
The Western Task Force encountered unexpected resistance and bad weather but Casablanca, the principal French Atlantic naval base, was captured after a short siege. The Centre Task Force suffered some damage to its ships when trying to land in shallow water; Oran surrendered after bombardment by British battleships. The Eastern Task Force met less opposition and were able to push inland and compel surrender on the first day.
The success of Torch caused Admiral François Darlan, commander of the Vichy French forces, who was in Algiers, to order co-operation with the Allies, in return for being installed as High Commissioner, with many other Vichy officials keeping their jobs. Darlan was assassinated by a monarchist six weeks later and the Free French gradually came to dominate the government.
Background
Allied strategy
When the United States entered the Second World War in December 7 1941, British and Americans met at the Arcadia Conference in Washington D.C. to discuss future strategy. The principle of Europe first was agreed upon, but British and Americans had different views on how to implement it. Americans favoured a direct approach with first a limited landing in Europe in 1942, and then a follow-up main thrust in 1943. The British pressed for a less ambitious plan. They realized the build-up of American forces would take time, and there was not enough shipping available for large operations. Winston Churchill proposed to invade North Africa. The head of the United States Army, General George Marshall and the head of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King strongly opposed that plan, and were inclined to abandon the Germany first strategy if Churchill persisted. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to support the Russians and as any Pacific operation would be of no help to them, he agreed to the North-African operation. On 14 August 1942 Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as Commander in Chief Allied expeditionary Force, and he set up his headquarters in London.Planners identified Oran, Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there would also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps forces in Italian Libya. A compromise would be to land at Bône in eastern Algeria, some closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower, who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers, had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate Spain to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca in the event of closure of the straits.
The Morocco landings ruled out the early occupation of Tunisia. But with British forces advancing from Egypt, this would allow the Allies to carry out a pincer operation against Axis forces in North Africa by mid-January 1943.
Intrigues with Vichy commanders
The Allies believed that the Vichy French Armistice Army would not fight, partly because of information supplied by the American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. The French were former members of the Allies, and US troops were instructed not to fire unless they were fired upon. The Vichy French Navy were expected to be very hostile after the British Attack on Mers-el-Kébir in June 1940, and the Syria–Lebanon campaign in 1941.Allied military strategists needed to consider the political situation in North Africa. The Americans had recognised Pétain and the Vichy government in 1940, whereas the British did not and had recognised General Charles de Gaulle's French National Committee as a government-in-exile instead. After his backing of British operations against the Vichy French in Dakar and Syria, de Gaulle did not have many supporters in North Africa. Hence the Allies decided to keep de Gaulle and his Free French Forces entirely out of the operation.
To gauge the feeling of the Vichy French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might support an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting several French officers, including General Charles Mast, the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied general in Algeria. Major General Mark W. Clark, one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was secretly dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria aboard the British submarine and met with these Vichy French officers on 21 October 1942. Due to the need to maintain secrecy, the French officers were left in the dark about concrete plans, but they gave Clark detailed information about the military situation in Algiers. These officers also asked French General Henri Giraud be moved out of Vichy France to take the lead of the operation.
Eventually the Allies succeeded in slipping Giraud out of Vichy France on HMS Seraph to Gibraltar, where Eisenhower had his headquarters, intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud would take no position lower than commander in chief of all the invading forces. When he was refused, he decided to remain "a spectator in this affair".
Forces
Allied forces
The Allies organised three amphibious task forces to simultaneously seize the key ports and airports in Morocco and Algeria, targeting Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.A Western Task Force was composed of American units, with Major General George S. Patton in command and Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt heading the naval operations. This Western Task Force consisted of the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, and two battalions from the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, 35,000 troops in a convoy of over 100 ships. They were transported directly from the United States in the first of a new series of UG convoys providing logistic support for the North African campaign.
The Centre Task Force, aimed at Oran, included the U.S. 2nd Battalion 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and the U.S. 1st Armored Division, a total of 18,500 troops. They sailed from the United Kingdom and were commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the naval forces being commanded by Commodore Thomas Troubridge.The central task force also included air power from USS Ranger, the only true aircraft carrier involved, and USS Swanee, an escort carrier. This included Grumman Wildcat, a navy standard aircraft fighter of the time.
Torch was, for propaganda purposes, a landing by U.S. forces, supported by British warships and aircraft, under the belief that this would be more palatable to French public opinion, than an Anglo-American invasion. For the same reason, Churchill suggested that British soldiers might wear U.S. Army uniforms, and No. 6 Commando did so. In reality, the Eastern Task Force, aimed at Algiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of a brigade from the British 78th and the U.S. 34th Infantry Divisions, along with two British commando units, together with the RAF Regiment providing 5 squadrons of infantry and 5 Light anti-aircraft flights, totalling 20,000 troops. During the landing phase, ground forces were to be commanded by U.S. Major General Charles W. Ryder, Commanding General of the 34th Division and naval forces were commanded by Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough.
Aerial operations were split into two commands, with Royal Air Force aircraft under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh operating east of Cape Tenez in Algeria, and all United States Army Air Forces aircraft under Major General Jimmy Doolittle, who was under the direct command of Major General Patton, operating west of Cape Tenez.