Joseph Stilwell
Joseph Warren "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell was a United States Army general who served in the China Burma India theater during World War II. Stilwell served as commander of the US forces in the theater, and also as deputy for both Lord Louis Mountbatten, and Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader.
After being defeated by the Japanese in 1942, Stilwell became an early American popular hero of the war for leading a column walking out of Burma on foot. Stilwell's command was marred by disputes with Chiang Kai-shek, Air Force commander Claire Chennault, and British commanders. Stilwell saw Chinese Nationalist forces as corrupt and believed that Chiang was keeping Lend-Lease supplies to fight the Chinese Communist Party, while Chiang regarded Stilwell as reckless, insubordinate, and responsible for heavy Chinese losses under his command. Following the Chinese defeat to a major Japanese offensive in 1944, Stilwell appealed directly to President Roosevelt for support, and delivered to Chiang Roosevelt's message, which threatened that Lend-Lease aid to China would be cut off if Stilwell was not appointed in full command of all Chinese forces. Chiang rejected the ultimatum, seeing it as an affront to China's independence, and with backing of ambassador Patrick J. Hurley demanded Stilwell's replacement, which happened in October 1944.
Stilwell's implacable demands for units debilitated by disease to be sent into heavy combat resulted in Merrill's Marauders, the only American ground unit present in his theater, becoming disenchanted with him. Marauders were disbanded after suffering extremely heavy casualties in Siege of Myitkyina.
Influential voices such as the journalist Brooks Atkinson viewed the Communists as an effective military force and Stilwell as a victim of a corrupt regime. Stilwell's admirers saw him as having been given inadequate resources and incompatible objectives. Critics viewed him as a hard-charging officer whose temperament and conduct towards Chiang contributed to the loss of China.
Early life and education
Stilwell was born on 19 March 1883, in Palatka, Florida. His parents were Doctor Benjamin Stilwell and Mary A. Peene. Stilwell was an eighth-generation descendant of an English colonist who had arrived in America in 1638 and whose descendants remained in New York until the birth of Stilwell's father.Named for a family friend and the doctor who delivered him, Stilwell, known as Warren by his family, grew up in Yonkers, New York, under a strict regimen from his father that included an emphasis on religion. Stilwell later admitted to his daughter that he picked up criminal instincts by "being forced to go to Church and Sunday School, and seeing how little real good religion does anybody, I advise passing them all up and using common sense instead."
Stilwell's rebellious attitude led him to a record of unruly behavior once he reached a postgraduate level at Yonkers High School. Prior to his last year, Stilwell had performed meticulously in his classes and had participated in football and track. Under the discretion of his father, Stilwell was then placed into a postgraduate course and immediately formed a group of friends whose activities ranged from card playing to stealing the desserts from the senior dance in 1900. The last event in which an administrator was punched led to the expulsions and suspensions for Stilwell's friends. Meanwhile, since he had already graduated, Stilwell was once again by his father's guidance sent to attend the US Military Academy at West Point, rather than Yale University, as had been originally planned.
Despite missing the deadline to apply for congressional appointment to the military academy, Stilwell gained entry through the use of family connections, via which US President William McKinley was approached. In his first year, Stilwell underwent hazing as a plebe which he referred to as "hell." At West Point, Stilwell showed an aptitude for languages such as French in which he ranked first in his class during his second year. In sports, Stilwell is credited with introducing basketball to the academy, participating in cross-country running as captain, and playing on the varsity football team. At West Point, he had two demerits for laughing during drill. Ultimately, Stilwell graduated with the class of 1904 and ranked 32nd out 124 cadets.
In 1910, he married Winifred Alison Smith. They were the parents of five children, including Brigadier General Joseph Stilwell Jr., who served in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
Early military career
Stilwell later taught at West Point and attended the Infantry Advanced Course and the Command and General Staff College. During World War I, he was the Fourth Corps intelligence officer and helped plan the St. Mihiel Offensive. He was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal for his service in France, the medal's citation reading as follows:Stilwell is often remembered by his sobriquet, "Vinegar Joe," which he acquired as a commander at Fort Benning, Georgia. Stilwell often gave harsh critiques of performance in field exercises, and a subordinate, stung by the caustic remarks, drew a caricature of Stilwell rising out of a vinegar bottle. After discovering the caricature, Stilwell pinned it to a board and had the drawing photographed and distributed to friends. Yet another indication of his view of life was the motto he kept on his desk: Illegitimi non carborundum, a form of fractured Latin that translates as "Don't let the bastards grind you down."
World War II
Between the wars, Stilwell served three tours in China, where he mastered spoken and written Chinese and was the military attaché at the US legation in Beijing from 1935 to 1939. In 1939 and 1940 he was assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Division and from 1940 to 1941 organized and trained the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California. It was there that his leadership style which emphasized concern for the average soldier and minimized ceremonies and officious discipline, earned him the nickname of "Uncle Joe."Just prior to the United States entering World War II, following the Imperial Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stilwell had been recognized as the Army's top corps commander, and he was initially selected to plan and command the Allied invasion of North Africa. However, he and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were skeptical about the operation and believed military planners underestimated the risk of submarine attacks interfering with the amphibious landings. He also believed that Allied military planners were too lenient towards Francoist Spain and underestimated the risk of it joining the Axis powers, writing "The Boches own the country. Franco must pay the bill for his war." After Stilwell prepared a scathingly anti-British final report on the Arcadia Conference, his superiors decided to reassign him. When it became necessary to send a senior officer to China to keep it in the war, Stilwell was selected, over his own personal objections, by US President Franklin Roosevelt and his old friend, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall.
Stilwell became the chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, served as US commander in the China Burma India Theater, was responsible for all Lend-Lease supplies going to China, and later became deputy commander of South East Asia Command. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers over the distribution of lend-lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and US forces in the 11th Army Group under British command.
Burma retreat and offensive
In February 1942 Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general and was assigned to the China-Burma-India Theater, where Stilwell had three major roles: commander of all US forces in China, Burma, and India; deputy commander of the Burma-India Theater under Admiral Louis Mountbatten; and military advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the commander of all Nationalist Chinese forces as well as commander of the Chinese Theater.The CBI was a geographical administrative command on the same level as the commands of Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur, but unlike other combat theaters like the European Theater of Operations, the CBI was never formally designated a "theater of operations" and did not report to an overall American commander. The China Theater came under the operational command of Chiang, the commander of the National Revolutionary Army, and the Burma India Theater came under the operational command of the British. During his tenure, there were hardly any American combat forces in the theater, and Stilwell commanded Chinese troops almost exclusively.
The British and the Chinese were ill-equipped and the targets of Japanese offensives. Chiang was interested in conserving his troops and Allied lend-lease supplies to be used against any sudden Japanese offensive and against Communist forces in a later civil war. His wariness increased after he had observed the disastrous Allied performance during the Japanese invasion of Burma. After fighting and resisting the Japanese for five years, many in the Nationalist government felt that it was time for the Allies to assume a greater burden in fighting the war.
The Chinese and American commands were beset by a difference in strategies. Chiang, having fought against Japan since 1937, favored "defense in depth", an approach partially adopted by the British later in 1944. During the early stages of the conflict both the British and the Americans underestimated the Japanese. Captain Evans Carlson, after observing the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, called the Imperial Japanese Army "third rate", while Stilwell wanted to go on the offensive to save Burma. The Japanese divisions there were proficient in both jungle and offroad warfare. They successfully outmaneuvred the road-bound British, coordinated with air support, and exploited local anticolonial sentiments.
The situation was not helped by miscommunication and insubordination. In February 1942, while retreating across the Sittaung River, the main British force left two brigades on the wrong side after prematurely blowing up the bridge. During an ambush against incoming Japanese at Pyinmana, only the Chinese 5th Army stayed in position. The British pulled back, fearing encirclement, while the Chinese 200th Division refused to rush in.
The first step for Stilwell was the reformation of the Chinese Army. The reforms clashed with the delicate balance of political and military alliances in China, which kept Chiang in power. Reforming the army meant removing men who maintained Chiang's position as commander-in-chief. Chiang gave Stilwell technical overall command of some Chinese troops but worried that the new US-led forces would become yet another independent force outside of his control. Since 1942, members of his staff had continually objected to Chinese troops being used in Burma for what they viewed as returning the country to British colonial control.
Chiang therefore sided with Major General Claire Lee Chennault's proposals for the war against the Japanese to be continued largely using existing Chinese forces supported by air forces, which Chennault assured Chiang to be feasible. The dilemma forced Chennault and Stilwell into competition for the valuable lend-lease supplies arriving over the Himalayas from British-controlled India, an obstacle referred to as "The Hump."
George Marshall's biennial report covering 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945, acknowledged that he had given Stilwell "one of the most difficult" assignments of any theater commander.
After the collapse of the Allied defenses in Burma cut China off from the remaining supply route, Stilwell declined an airlift offer from General Chennault and led his staff of 117 out of Burma into Assam, India, on foot. They marched at what his men called the "Stilwell stride" of 105 paces per minute. Two of the men accompanying him, his aide Frank Dorn and the war correspondent Jack Belden, wrote about their experiences in Walkout with Stilwell in Burma and Retreat with Stilwell respectively. The Assam route was used by other retreating Allied and Chinese forces.
Stilwell's walkout separated him from the approximately 100,000 Chinese troops still there. 25 thousand of them would later perish during their retreat due to the harsh jungle conditions, poor logistics, and Japanese military operations.
In India, Stilwell soon became well known for his no-nonsense demeanor and his disregard for military pomp and ceremony. His trademarks were a battered Army campaign hat, GI shoes, and a plain service uniform with no insignia of rank. He frequently carried a Model 1903,.30–06 Caliber, Springfield rifle in preference to a sidearm. His hazardous march out of Burma and his bluntly honest assessment of the disaster captured the imagination of the American public: "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it." Stilwell's derogatory remarks on Limey forces, however, did not sit well with British and Commonwealth commanders.
After the Japanese occupied Burma, China was almost completely cut off from Allied aid and materiel except through the hazardous air route over the Hump. Early on, Roosevelt and the US War Department had given priority to other theaters for US combat forces, equipment, and logistical support. The closure of the Burma Road and the fall of Burma made it extremely difficult to replace Chinese war losses. This jeopardized the Allies' initial strategy, which was to maintain the Chinese resistance to the Japanese by providing logistical and air support.
In August 1942, Stilwell opened a training center in Ramgarh, India, west of Calcutta, to train Chinese troops which had retreated to Assam from Burma. Stilwell's decision to establish the center at Ramgarh met with opposition from several senior British commanders, including Wavell, primarily due to logistical reasons. Chinese soldiers at the center received medical care along with new weapons and uniforms and were trained how to operate artillery, Universal Carriers, and M3 Stuart tanks. By the end of December 1942, 32,000 Chinese troops were being trained at the center to create the 22nd and 38th Divisions along with three artillery regiments and a tank battalion. From the outset, Stilwell's primary goals were the opening of a land route to China from northern Burma and India by means of a ground offensive in northern Burma to allow more supplies to be transported to China and to organize, equip, and train a reorganized and competent Chinese army that would fight the Japanese in the China-Burma-India theater. Stilwell argued that the CBI was the only area with the possibility for the Allies to engage large numbers of troops against their common enemy, Japan. Unfortunately, the huge airborne logistical train of support from the US to British India was still being organized, and supplies being flown over the Hump were barely sufficient to maintain Chennault's air operations and replace some of the Chinese war losses, let alone equip and supply an entire army.
Additionally, critical supplies intended for the CBI were being diverted to other combat theaters. Some Chinese and American soldiers diverted the supplies that made it over the Hump to the black market for their personal enrichment. As a result, most Allied commanders in India, with the exception of General Orde Wingate and his Chindit operations, focused on defensive measures.