Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism, also spelled as Euroskepticism or EU-scepticism, is a political position involving criticism of the European Union and European integration. It ranges from those who oppose some EU institutions and policies and seek reform, to those who oppose EU membership and see the EU as unreformable. The opposite of Euroscepticism is known as pro-Europeanism.
The main drivers of Euroscepticism have been beliefs that integration undermines national sovereignty and the nation state, that the EU is elitist and lacks democratic legitimacy and transparency, that it is too bureaucratic and wasteful, that it encourages high levels of immigration, or perceptions that it is a neoliberal organisation serving the big business elite at the expense of the working class, that it is responsible for austerity, and drives privatization.
Euroscepticism is found in groups across the political spectrum, both left-wing and right-wing, and is often found in populist parties. Although they criticise the EU for many of the same reasons, Eurosceptic left-wing populists focus more on economic issues, such as the Euro area crisis and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, while Eurosceptic right-wing populists focus more on nationalism and immigration, such as the 2015 European migrant crisis. The rise in radical-right parties since the 2000s is strongly linked to a rise in Euroscepticism.
Eurobarometer surveys of EU citizens show that trust in the EU and its institutions declined strongly from 2007 to 2015. In that period, it was consistently below 50%. A 2009 survey showed that support for EU membership was lowest in the United Kingdom, Latvia, and Hungary. By 2016, the countries viewing the EU most unfavourably were the UK, Greece, France, and Spain. The 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum resulted in a 51.9% vote in favour of leaving the EU, a decision that came into effect on 31 January 2020.
Since 2015, trust in the EU has risen in most EU countries as a result of falling unemployment rates and the end of the migrant crisis. A post-2019 election Eurobarometer survey showed that 68% of citizens support the EU, the highest level since 1983; however, sentiment that things are not going in the right direction in the EU had increased to 50%. Trust in the EU had increased significantly at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with levels varying across member states.
In March 2025, support for the European Union reached an all-time high among citizens of EU members states. A Eurobarometer poll conducted in January and February found that 74% of EU citizens believe their country’s membership in the bloc is beneficial, the highest level recorded since the question was first introduced in 1983. The decline in Euroscepticism has been attributed to growing security concerns amid ongoing geopolitical instability, including the Russo-Ukrainian war and renewed transatlantic tensions under Donald Trump, who has been critical of NATO and the European Union.
Reasoning
The main reasons for Euroscepticism include beliefs that:- integration undermines national sovereignty and the nation state;
- the EU is elitist and lacks democratic legitimacy and transparency;
- the EU is too bureaucratic and wasteful;
- it encourages high levels of immigration;
- it is a neoliberal organisation serving the big business elite at the expense of the working class;
- the EU is responsible for austerity;
- the EU is responsible for driving privatization.
Terminology
Hard Euroscepticism
According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, hard Euroscepticism, or anti-EU-ism, is "a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived". The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group in the European Parliament displayed hard Euroscepticism, but following the 2019 EU elections the group was disbanded due to too few members, as its largest member, the British Brexit Party, withdrew ahead of the United Kingdom's formal exit from the EU.Some hard Eurosceptics regard their position as pragmatic rather than in principle. Additionally, Tony Benn, a left-wing Labour Party MP who fought against European integration in 1975 by opposing membership of the European Communities in that year's referendum on the issue, emphasised his opposition to xenophobia and his support of democracy, saying: "My view about the European Union has always been not that I am hostile to foreigners, but that I am in favour of democracy.... I think they're building an empire there, they want us to be a part of their empire and I don't want that."
The Czech president Václav Klaus rejected the term Euroscepticism for its purported negative undertones, saying at a meeting in April 2012 that the expressions for a Eurosceptic and their opponent should be "a Euro-realist" and someone who is "Euro-naïve", respectively. François Asselineau of the French Popular Republican Union has criticised the use of the term 'sceptic' to describe hard Eurosceptics, and would rather advocate the use of the term "Euro opponent". He believes the use of the term 'sceptic' for soft Eurosceptics to be correct, since other Eurosceptic parties in France are "merely criticising" the EU without taking into account the fact that the Treaty of Rome can be modified only with a unanimous agreement of all the EU member states, something he considers impossible to achieve.
Soft Euroscepticism
Soft Euroscepticism, also known as Eurorealism, reflects a support for the existence of, and membership of, a form of EU but with opposition to specific EU policies, or in Taggart's and Szczerbiak's words, "where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory."Both the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, dominated by the right-wing Polish party Law and Justice as well as the Italian Brothers of Italy party, and The Left Group, which is an alliance of the left-wing parties in the European Parliament, display soft Euroscepticism. The European Conservatives and Reformist Group does not itself use the descriptions Euroscepticism or soft Euroscepticism and instead describes its position as one of Eurorealism, a distinction described by Leruth as being one that is "quite subtle but should not be ignored" given the association of the term Euroscepticism with "European disintegration". Leruth describes Eurorealism as "a pragmatic, anti-federalist, and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails, aiming to reform the current institutional framework to extend the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process." Steven states that "Eurorealism is a form of conservativism, first and foremost, rather than a form or Euroscepticism, even if it obviously very much also has the 'soft' Eurosceptic tendencies which are present in a number of ECR member parties."
Anti-Europeanism
While having some overlaps, Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism are different. Euroscepticism is criticism of the European Union and European integration. Anti-Europeanism is sentiment or policies in opposition to Europe. For example, American exceptionalism in the United States has long led to criticism of European domestic policy, such as the size of the welfare state in European countries, and foreign policy, such as European countries that did not support the US-led 2003 invasion of Iraq.Other terms
Some scholars consider the gradual difference in terminology between hard and soft Euroscepticism inadequate to accommodate the large differences in terms of political agenda; hard Euroscepticism has also been referred to as Europhobia as opposed to mere Euroscepticism. Other alternative names for hard and soft Euroscepticism include withdrawalist and reformist, respectively.Eurobarometer surveys
A survey in, conducted by TNS Opinion and Social on behalf of the European Commission, showed that, across the EU as a whole, those with a positive image of the EU were down from a high of 52% in 2007 to 37% in autumn 2015; this compares with 23% with a negative image of the EU, and 38% with a neutral image. About 43% of Europeans thought things were "going in the wrong direction" in the EU, compared with 23% who thought things were going "in the right direction". About 32% of EU citizens tend to trust the EU as an institution, and about 55% do not tend to trust it. Distrust of the EU was highest in Greece, Cyprus, Austria, France, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. Overall, more respondents distrusted their own government than they distrusted the EU. Distrust of national government was highest in Greece, Slovenia, Portugal, Cyprus, and France.A Eurobarometer survey carried out four days prior to and six days after the 2016 United States presidential election revealed that the surprise victory of Donald Trump caused an increase in the popularity of the EU in Europe. The increase was strongest among the political right and among respondents who perceived their country as economically struggling.
A survey carried out in April 2018 for the European Parliament by Kantar Public consulting found that support for the EU was "the highest score ever measured since 1983". Support for the EU was up in 26 out of 28 EU countries, the exceptions being Germany and the UK, where support had dropped by about 2% since the previous survey. Almost half of the 27,601 EU citizens surveyed agreed that their voice counted in the EU, up from 37% in 2016, whereas 46% disagreed with this statement. Two-thirds of respondents felt that their country had benefited from EU membership and 60% said that being part of the bloc was a good thing, as opposed to 12% who felt the opposite. At the height of the EU's financial and economic crises in 2011, just 47% had been of the view that EU membership was a good thing. Support for EU membership was greatest in Malta, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Luxembourg, Estonia, and Denmark, and lowest in Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
When asked which issues should be a priority for the European Parliament, survey respondents picked terrorism as the most pressing topic of discussion, ahead of youth unemployment and immigration. Not all countries shared the same priorities. Immigration topped the list in Italy, Malta, and Hungary but fighting youth unemployment and support for economic growth were top concerns in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and Croatia. Social protection of citizens was the top concern for Dutch, Swedish, and Danish respondents.
The April 2019 Eurobarometer showed that despite the challenges of the past years, and in cases such as the ongoing debate surrounding Brexit, possibly even because of it, the European sense of togetherness had not weakened, with 68% of respondents across the EU27 believing that their countries have benefited from being part of the EU, a historically high level since 1983. On the other hand, more Europeans were uncertain and saw the EU as "neither a good thing nor a bad thing", an increase in 19 countries. Despite the overall positive attitude towards the EU but in line with the uncertainty expressed by a growing number of Europeans, the feeling that things were not going in the right direction in both the EU and in their own countries had increased to 50% on EU average since September 2018.
The Eurobarometer 93.1 survey was in the field across Europe when the European Council summit reached political agreement on a pandemic economic recovery fund on 21 July 2020. A comparison of Eurobarometer responses gathered before this seminal decision and interviews conducted shortly thereafter indicates that the European Council's endorsement of pandemic economic relief increased popular support of COVID-19 economic recovery aid - but only among Europeans who view EU decisionmakers as trustworthy.