Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka refers to a tradition of Buddhist philosophy and practice founded by the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher Nāgārjuna. The foundational text of the Mādhyamaka tradition is Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. More broadly, Madhyamaka also refers to the ultimate nature of phenomena as well as the non-conceptual realization of ultimate reality that is experienced in meditation.
Since the 4th century CE onwards, Madhyamaka philosophy had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, especially following the spread of Buddhism throughout Asia. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan Buddhism and has also been influential in East Asian Buddhist thought.
According to the classical Indian Madhyamika thinkers, all phenomena are empty of "nature", of any "substance" or "essence" which could give them "solid and independent existence", because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
Etymology
Madhya is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". The -ma suffix is a superlative, giving madhyama the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The -ka suffix is used to form adjectives, thus madhyamaka means "middling". The -ika suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus mādhyamika mean "belonging to the mid-most".In a Buddhist context, these terms refer to the "middle path", which refers to right view which steers clear of the metaphysical extremes of annihilationism and eternalism. For example, the Sanskrit Kātyāyanaḥsūtra states that though the world "relies on a duality of existence and non-existence", the Buddha teaches a correct view which understands that:
Arising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world. Thus avoiding both extremes the Tathāgata teaches a dharma by the middle path . That is: this being, that becomes; with the arising of this, that arises. With ignorance as condition there is volition...Though all Buddhist schools saw themselves as defending a middle path in accord with the Buddhist teachings, the name Madhyamaka refers to a school of Mahayana philosophy associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators. The term Mādhyamika refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school. Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.
Philosophical overview
Svabhāva, what Madhyamaka denies
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is śūnyatā, "emptiness", and this refers to the central idea that dharmas are empty of svabhāva. This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being and substance. Furthermore, according to Richard P. Hayes, svabhāva can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence". Likewise, Westerhoff notes that svabhāva is a complex concept that has ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include svabhāva as essence, as a property which makes an object what it is, as well as svabhāva as substance, meaning, as the Madhyamaka thinker Candrakīrti defines it, something that does "not depend on anything else".It is substance-svabhāva, the objective and independent existence of any object or concept, which Madhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting. A common structure which Madhyamaka uses to negate svabhāva is the catuṣkoṭi, which roughly consists of four alternatives: a proposition is true; a proposition is false; a proposition is both true and false; a proposition is neither true nor false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical Madhyamaka include causality, change, and personal identity.
Madhyamaka's denial of svabhāva does not mean a nihilistic denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, Madhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ultimately these things are empty of inherent existence. Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
Svabhāva's cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist. This idea of svabhāva that Madhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a cognitive distortion that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the five aggregates as constituting a single self. Candrakirti compares it to someone who suffers from vitreous floaters that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field. This cognitive dimension of svabhāva means that just understanding and assenting to Madhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our reification of the world, just like understanding how an optical illusion works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of cognitive shift in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift. As Candrakirti says:
For one on the road of cyclic existence who pursues an inverted view due to ignorance, a mistaken object such as the superimposition on the aggregates appears as real, but it does not appear to one who is close to the view of the real nature of things.
Much of Madhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various essentialist ideas have absurd conclusions through reductio ad absurdum arguments. Chapter 15 of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā centers on the words svabhava, parabhava, bhava and abhava. According to Peter Harvey:
An important element of Madhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of causality and change. Any enduring essential nature would prevent any causal interaction, or any kind of origination. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change. As Nāgārjuna writes in the MMK:
We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path.
Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty.
The two truths
Beginning with Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth and ultimate truth. Ultimately, Madhyamaka argues that all phenomena are empty of svabhava and only exist in dependence on other causes, conditions and concepts. Conventionally, Madhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically. In Madhyamaka this phenomenal world is the limited truth – saṃvṛti satya, which means "to cover", "to conceal", or "obscure". Saṃvṛti is also said to mean "conventional", as in a customary, norm based, agreed upon truth and it is also glossed as vyavahāra-satya. Finally, Chandrakirti also has a third explanation of saṃvṛti, which is "mutual dependence".This seeming reality does not really exist as the highest truth realized by wisdom which is paramartha satya, and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation. This limited truth includes everything, including the Buddha himself, the teachings, liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments. This two truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of nihilism; understanding both correctly meant seeing the middle way:
"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained."
The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a nominal reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality. It is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence. Hence, the two truths are not two metaphysical realities; instead, according to Karl Brunnhölzl, "the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception". As Candrakirti says:
It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities
That the entities that are thus found bear two natures.
The object of perfect seeing is true reality,
And false seeing is seeming reality.
This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily epistemological and dependent on the cognition of the observer, not ontological. As Shantideva writes, there are "two kinds of world", "the one of yogins and the one of common people". The seeming reality is the world of samsara because conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. As Buddhapalita states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them".
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material and intellectual.