Pramana
Pramana literally means "proof" and "means of knowledge". One of the core concepts in Indian epistemology, pramanas are one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge. The focus of pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one does not know, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.
While the number of pramanas varies widely from system to system, many ancient and medieval Indian texts identify six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and attaining to the truth. Three of these are almost universally accepted: perception, inference, and "word", meaning the testimony of past or present reliable experts. The other three pramanas are more contentious: comparison and analogy ; postulation or derivation from circumstances ; and non-perception, or proof from absence. Each of these are further categorized in terms of conditionality, completeness, confidence, and possibility of error.
The various schools of Indian philosophies vary on how many of these six pramanas are epistemically reliable and valid means to knowledge. For example, the Carvaka school of the Śramaṇa tradition holds that only one is a reliable source of knowledge, Buddhism holds that two are valid means, Jainism holds three as valid, and the Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism hold that all six pramanas are useful and can be reliable means to knowledge. The various schools of Indian philosophy have debated whether one of the six forms of pramana can be derived from another and the relative uniqueness of each. For example, Buddhism considers Buddha and other "valid persons", "valid scriptures" and "valid minds" as indisputable, but that such testimony is a form of perception and inference pramanas.
Etymology
literally means "proof," based on the word pramā. The Sanskrit root , is a preposition meaning "outward" or "forth", and means "measurement." means "correct notion, true knowledge, basis, foundation, understand." being a nominalization of the word, means that which is a "means of acquiring or certain, correct, true knowledge".forms one part of a trio of concepts, which describe the ancient Indian view on how knowledge is gained. The other two concepts are, and . They each influence the knowledge, by their own characteristic and the process of knowing.
In Buddhist literature, is referred to as. is also related to the Indian concept of yukti which means active application of epistemology or what one already knows, innovation, clever expedients or connections, methodological or reasoning trick, joining together, application of contrivance, means, method, novelty or device to more efficiently achieve a purpose. yukti and are discussed together in some Indian texts, with yukti described as active process of gaining knowledge in contrast to passive process of gaining knowledge through observation/perception. The texts on pramana, particularly by Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Advaita Vedanta schools of Hinduism, often include in their scope what might be termed "theories of errors"; that is, philosophies regarding the reason for human error, how one may know if one is wrong, and—if so—how one can discover whether one's epistemic method or conclusion was flawed, as well what one ought then do in order to correct it.
Hinduism
Six ''pramanas''
Hinduism identifies six pramanas as correct means of accurate knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi and Śabda.In verse 1.2.1 of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, "four means of attaining correct knowledge" are listed: smṛti, pratyakṣa, aitihya, and anumāna.
In some texts such as by Vedvyasa, ten pramanas are discussed, Krtakoti discusses eight epistemically reliable means to correct knowledge. Six most widely recognized pramanas are:
''Pratyakṣa''
Pratyakṣa means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is arises from the interaction between the five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception refers to the awareness arising from the inner sense, the mind. According to Matt Stefan, the distinction is between direct perception and remembered perception.The ancient and medieval Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:
- Indriyārthasannikarṣa/Indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ: direct experience by one's sensory organ with object being studied.
- Avyapadeśya: non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception, with no intermediate agency involved.
- Avyabhicāra: consistency; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, or suspect.
- Vyavasāyātmika: definite; lacks bias, and inferential judgment; correct perception excludes doubt, either from failure to observe all the details, or from mixing inference with observation.
''Anumāna''
Anumāna means ‘inference’ in Sanskrit, though it often is used to mean ‘guess’ in modern Indian languages. In the context of classical philosophy, it is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana. In all except one Hindu philosophies, this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna, hetu, and drshtanta. The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya and paksha. The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha are present, and if vipaksha are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti—the requirement that the hetu must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana.''Upamāna''
Upamāna means comparison and analogy. Some Hindu schools consider it as a proper means of knowledge. Upamana, states Lochtefeld, may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. He or she is told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like a cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later. The subject of comparison is formally called upameyam, the object of comparison is called upamanam, while the attribute are identified as samanya. Thus, explains Monier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" is upameyam, the moon is upamanam, and charmingness is samanya. The 7th-century text Bhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not. In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types of Upamāna and their value in epistemology are debated.''Arthāpatti''
Arthāpatti means postulation, derivation from circumstances. In contemporary logic, this pramana is similar to circumstantial implication. As an example, if a person was left in a boat on a river earlier, and the time is now past the expected time of arrival, then the circumstances support the truth postulate that the person has arrived. Many Indian scholars considered this pramana as invalid or at best weak, because the boat may have gotten delayed or diverted. However, in cases such as deriving the time of a future sunrise or sunset, this method was asserted by the proponents to be reliable. Another common example for arthapatti in ancient Hindu texts is, that if "Devadatta is fat" and "Devadatta does not eat during the day", then the following must be true: "Devadatta eats in the night". This form of postulation and deriving from circumstances is, claim the Indian scholars, a means to discovery, proper insight and knowledge. The Hindu schools that accept this means of knowledge state that this method is a valid means to conditional knowledge and truths about a subject and object in original premises or different premises. The schools that do not accept this method, state that postulation, extrapolation and circumstantial implication is either derivable from other pramanas or flawed means to correct knowledge, instead one must rely on direct perception or proper inference.''Anupalabdhi''
Anupalabdhi means non-perception, negative/cognitive proof. Anupalabdhi pramana suggests that knowing a negative, such as "there is no jug in this room" is a form of valid knowledge. If something can be observed or inferred or proven as non-existent or impossible, then one knows more than what one did without such means. In the two schools of Hinduism that consider Anupalabdhi as epistemically valuable, a valid conclusion is either sadrupa or asadrupa relation—both correct and valuable. Like other pramana, Indian scholars refined Anupalabdi to four types: non-perception of the cause, non-perception of the effect, non-perception of object, and non-perception of contradiction. Only two schools of Hinduism accepted and developed the concept "non-perception" as a pramana. The schools that endorsed Anupalabdi affirmed that it is valid and useful when the other five pramanas fail in one's pursuit of knowledge and truth.Abhava means non-existence. Some scholars consider Anupalabdi to be the same as Abhava, while others consider Anupalabdi and Abhava as different. Abhava-pramana has been discussed in ancient Hindu texts in the context of Padārtha. A Padartha is defined as that which is simultaneously Astitva, Jneyatva and Abhidheyatva. Specific examples of padartha, states Bartley, include dravya, guna, karma, samanya/jati, samavaya and vishesha. Abhava is then explained as "referents of negative expression" in contrast to "referents of positive expression" in Padartha. An absence, state the ancient scholars, is also "existent, knowable and nameable", giving the example of negative numbers, silence as a form of testimony, asatkaryavada theory of causation, and analysis of deficit as real and valuable. Abhava was further refined in four types, by the schools of Hinduism that accepted it as a useful method of epistemology: dhvamsa, atyanta-abhava, anyonya-abhava and pragavasa.