2008 attack on the United States embassy in Sanaa
On September 17, 2008, a group of seven heavily armed militants launched a coordinated attack on the United States embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. Dressed in army uniforms, the attackers planned to infiltrate the compound through the main gate in two vehicles before bombing the embassy wall and raiding it. After being denied entrance, the militants opened fire on the guards at the front entrance and launched a suicide car bomb attack on the guard post near the gate. While the militants were engaged with responding Yemeni security forces, a second car driven by a suicide bomber managed to get past the outer security checkpoint and detonated near a civilian entrance to the embassy after hitting an inner ring of concrete blocks. Yemeni forces continued to clash with the militants for 10 to 15 minutes until all of them were killed.
19 people were killed in the attack, including the seven militants who conducted it, six Yemeni security personnel and six civilians. Three Yemeni police officers and 13 civilians were also wounded. No American embassy employees or diplomats were harmed, though a security guard employed by the embassy was killed at the front entrance. The only American citizen killed in the attack was Susan Elbaneh, an 18-year-old Yemeni-American woman who was waiting outside the embassy with her husband.
A previously unknown group called Islamic Jihad in Yemen claimed responsibility for conducting the attack shortly after it. The group claimed it was connected to al-Qaeda and would launch further attacks on foreign embassies in Sanaa if the Yemeni government did not free imprisoned militants. A US Department of State spokesman claimed the attacks bore "all the hallmarks" of al-Qaeda, with analysts suggesting that the group may have had Islamic Jihad claim the attack on its behalf. Al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula, the group's official branch in Yemen, later claimed responsibility for the attack on 14 November and vowed further attacks on Western targets. After the attack, Yemeni investigators apprehended six suspects affiliated with Islamic Jihad, including its purported leader. Three of them were tried for being connected to the Israeli government, one receiving the death penalty while the other two were imprisoned. The attack was condemned by Yemen and the US, along with the United Nations and several other countries.
Background
Al-Qaeda insurgency
The al-Qaeda network of Yemen underwent a significant resurgence since a prison escape in 2006 freed several key militants. This heralded the emergence of a new, more radical generation of jihadists, among them numerous returning insurgents from Iraq. The year of 2008 witnessed an increase in attacks and propaganda releases by militant groups in Yemen affiliated with al-Qaeda. One of these groups was al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula, which announced itself as al-Qaeda's affiliate in the country early in the year, while a splinter group called the Soldiers' Brigade of Yemen also operated concurrently.The Embassy of the United States in Sanaa had long been a target of militant threats and violence, resulting in the diplomatic mission instilling heavy security measures. Since 2003, the embassy had been the target of four attacks, the most recent one occurring on March 16, 2008, when an attempted mortar shelling had struck a nearby female high school, killing a security guard and wounding several students. This was followed by further shelling against an embassy residential compound in Haddah on April 6, resulting in an evacuation order being issued for nonessential embassy personnel and their relatives.
These incidents were attributed to the Soldiers' Brigade of Yemen. After the group conducted a suicide bombing against a local police station in July, Yemeni security forces responded with a raid on the town of Tarim in August which killed five of their members, including group leader Hamza al-Quaiti. The raid effectively dismantled the Soldiers' Brigade of Yemen, a small, highly-localized cell of the larger al-Qaeda presence in the country, but the success was interpreted by some as a total victory against al-Qaeda. The State Department rescinded its April order for nonessential embassy personnel to leave on August 11, citing an improvement regarding security conditions.
Prelude
The attack was led by scholar Lutf Muhammad Bahr Abu Abdul-Rahman, involving both himself and six students he recruited from a mosque he taught at in al-Hudaydah. Most of the militants involved had previously intended to fight in the Iraqi insurgency, but decided to conduct an attack in Yemen due to increased travel restrictions. One of them, former prisoner Mahmud Sa'ad, was responsible for heavily modifying the vehicles used in the attack. The militants decided upon conducting the attack on September 17, 2008, to coincide, Islamic calendar-wise, with the anniversary of the Battle of Badr, when Islamic prophet Muhammad led a small band of Muslims who defeated a powerful army of pagans.The Soldiers' Brigade of Yemen issued a statement through the jihadist internet forum al-Ikhlas in response to the Tarim raid on August 19, threatening revenge for the killing of Quaiti. This was followed by al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula posting a teaser to the site on September 9 for an upcoming issue of their magazine Sada al-Malahem, a common indicator of an attack being imminent. On top of this, al-Ikhlas began advertising a "special message" from Osama bin Laden set to commemorate the September 11 attacks. Embassy officials feared Bin Laden could use the message to direct an attack in Yemen. However, al-Ikhlas was shut down, possibly by the National Security Agency, on the evening of September 10, preventing the release of new jihadist material and relieving US personnel in Sanaa.
Attack
The attack utilized two explosive-laden Suzuki jeeps, heavily modified with tinted windows and cutouts in the roofs for gunmen. Their plan was to have the first vehicle, driven by two suicide bombers, breach the main gate of the embassy compound, allowing the second vehicle to enter and insert the other militants, each armed with automatic rifles and suicide vests, into the embassy's chancery building. To reach the gate, the militants attempted to impersonate a delegation of the Yemeni Armed Forces, fitting their vehicles with paint jobs and license plates consistent with those used by the military while wearing army fatigues. The militants were likely attempting to capitalize off an early morning attack during Ramadan, as security would potentially be less attentive and most nearby businesses were closed.Upon arriving, the convoy successfully passed by a cordon on the road ran by the Central Security Forces at 9:10 a.m. local time before reaching another outer checkpoint at the embassy's parking lot, which guarded access to the gate about 200 yards further away. One militant claimed to the two guards manning the station that they were transporting a military general for a meeting with US ambassador Stephen Seche. Already suspicious due to the rarity of Seche conducting meetings at the embassy itself, one of the guards began to approach the first vehicle before he stopped to note its tinted windows, whereupon a gunman appeared from the roof hole and opened fire. The guard ran to cover, but the other one who was manning the rope to the gate's drop bar, Mukhtar al-Faqih, waited a few more seconds until it was completely closed before sounding the embassy's alarm system. Faqih then attempted to escape towards cover before he was gunned down.
One of the militants managed to lift the drop bar at the checkpoint and allowed for the convoy to enter the parking lot, but the element of surprise was gone. Instead of targeting the main gate, the first vehicle sped down the road and exploded into a Yemeni military technical parked adjacent to the gate at approximately 9:13 a.m. as gunmen traded fire with the guards. Numerous civilians waiting in line by the gate were killed by the blast and the shooting.
The first car bomb failed to blow open the gate as planned, forcing rest of the group to search for weak points from which they could breach the embassy. From 9:15 a.m. onwards, security footage exhibited several militants probing the front of the embassy on foot while firing through openings in the structure and across the road. The drivers of the second vehicle spent several minutes looking for a point to attack before deciding on the pedestrian entrance in the parking lot. At at 9:22 a.m., once the three gunmen on the ground took cover, the two occupants drove into the entrance and detonated their vehicle.
The second bomb failed to breach the wall of the embassy. The propane tanks fitted in the vehicle to amplify the explosion were sent instead flying across the area. The remaining three militants continued to maintain control of the entrance, but they did not have a way to enter the embassy. At around 9:33 a.m., they opened at a fire truck arriving at the scene, forcing it to retreat. Shortly afterwards, one of the gunmen set off their suicide vest next to a wall near the gate in an attempt to create an opening, but was unsuccessful. Another militant later attempted the same and failed, leaving only one of the seven militants alive. By 9:53 a.m., while possibly wounded, the sole attacker attempted to surrender to a police officer while cooking a grenade, though the officer managed to retreat before the militant blew himself up.
Embassy personnel response
Ambassador Seche was in his office on the third floor of the chancery building when the first explosion occurred. Shortly after, he ran down the hallway to the office of the Regional Security Officer, Nicholas Collura, intending to coordinate with him. Upon realizing that he was not present, Seche ran to Post 1, the "command-and-control center" of the embassy, where he was let in by a Marine Security Guard. Viewing the remaining security cameras active at the blast site, Seche noted that "the men on the black-and-white CCTV monitors didn’t look like they were in a hurry... these men had just killed a lot of people, executing some of them, but on the screen they looked too casual to be murderers." He grew increasingly frustrated as Yemeni security forces failed to neutralize the attackers.Upon the first explosion, embassy staff and visitors were ordered to enter a duck and cover position for the rest of the attack. Diplomatic personnel were transferred to a safe room in the basement of the embassy building. At his office on the first floor of the chancery, Federal Bureau of Investigation legal attaché Richard Schwein guided two female colleagues into a safe room immediately after the explosion before calling the FBI headquarters in the US and his assistant Susan Ostrobinski, who was in Ethiopia at the time.
Collura was at the British embassy in Sanaa when he received a call at 9:15 a.m. informing him of an attack. He then drove to the front of the embassy, where he found Yemeni security personnel pinned down by gunfire. Fearing the embassy had been breached, he ran to a back door of the compound, which was locked, before going to a CSF base adjacent to the northwest corner of the compound. He attempted to convince some 40 CSF soldiers to mobilize against the militants, even after having an embassy surveillance detection officer translate his orders.
Collura and the officer then went by themselves to the northeastern corner of the compound wall, near where the attackers were present. An auxiliary gate controlled by Post 1 was a turn away from the corner. Collura phoned Post 1 and coordinated to quickly open the gate to allow them to enter before shutting it. As the two were making their first attempt, the second car bomb detonated nearby, knocking them to the ground and forcing them to retreat to cover unnoticed. The second attempt, which took place just after the final militant had died, was successful.
Once inside, Collura went to Post 1 to establish contact with Seche, while alert for any remaining militants possibly inside the compound. He then met with Schwein and formulated a team to secure the rest of the compound. After arming themselves, they set out to retrieve stranded civilians before searching every building in the compound. At 9:58 a.m., Collura declared to embassy staff that the threat was neutralized.
Casualties
Nineteen people in total were killed in the attack. The toll consisted of seven attackers, six Yemeni soldiers guarding the embassy, and six civilians, two of whom died in a hospital by September 22. No American diplomats or embassy personnel were harmed. This does not include Yemeni guard Mukhtar al-Faqih, classified by the State Department as a Foreign Service National.Among those listed as civilian casualties included 26-year-old Indian nurse Rani Krishnan, who was commuting to her job at a hospital when she was killed by a car bomb explosion, and Susan Elbaneh, an 18-year-old Yemeni American high school senior and native of Lackawanna, New York. Elbaneh travelled to Yemen to wed her husband in an arranged marriage, which took place on August 25. The two were waiting in line outside the embassy to file paperwork for their return to the US when they were both killed. She was the only American who died in the attack.
Susan was a distant cousin of fellow Yemeni American and Lackawanna native Jaber Elbaneh, wanted by the FBI for allegedly providing material support to al-Qaeda. Susan's family denied any between them and Jaber, and claimed that she was a victim of terrorism.
Responsibility
A little-known group called Islamic Jihad in Yemen claimed responsibility for the attack hours after it took place in a statement attributed to one Abu Ghayth al-Yamani. The statement demanded the release of militants incarcerated by the Yemeni government. This claim of responsibility was disputed by Yemeni officials, who instead levied blame on the local al-Qaeda affiliate. A preliminary Yemeni intelligence report determined the attack was perpetrated by individuals linked to al-Qaeda, and had involved "substantial weaponry, ample funding and elaborate planning." US State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack said the attack carried "all the hallmarks" of al-Qaeda.Yemeni and American analysts alike mentioned that it was not unprecedented for al-Qaeda in Yemen to claim an attack under several different names in order to amplify the perceived jihadist threat. Writing for Jihadica, Gregory D. Johnsen expressed doubt of any true linkage between Islamic Jihad in Yemen and the attack, claiming "some individual such as Abu Ghayth al-Yamani hears the news and dashes off a fax, and then a day or two later the group responsible posts an official statement claiming responsibility." CBS News noted at least once prior instance in which Islamic Jihad in Yemen claimed responsibility for an attack in the country, only for it to be debunked and confirmed as an al-Qaeda attack.
The official al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the South of the Arabian Peninsula, took responsibility for the attack in a statement posted on the internet months later, SITE Intelligence Group reported on November 14. The statement provided a detailed description of the assault and the militants who took part in it, led by scholar and fighter Lutf Muhammad Abu Abdul-Rahman, and vowed more attacks against diplomatic facilities in Yemen. It additionally claimed that administrative officer Jeffrey Patneau was killed in the attack, although the US embassy issued a statement clarifying that he died in an unrelated traffic collision later in September and denied reports on the contrary.
Investigation
The embassy announced that the US would collaborate with Yemeni authorities to investigate the attack, and would temporarily close so that employees could accommodate the authorities. A source in the Yemeni government said that US officials, possibly from the FBI, would be sent to lead the initiative. Embassy spokesperson Ryan Gliha noted that FBI deployments were common after attacks against American foreign interests. The next day, the embassy area was cordoned off from traffic by Yemeni security forces as non-Yemeni investigators were seen examining it's exterior, where the assault took place. CNN correspondent Ben Wedeman was permitted to set foot in the entrance area by "Yemeni security officials who didn’t coordinate with the Americans", but was ushered off after US personnel had noticed him. He was forced to reposition behind a barrier due to potential evidence tampering, but noted Yemeni soldiers were still in the area regardless.In the 24 hours after the attack, Yemeni authorities arrested 25 suspected militants from across the country in connection to it, who were interrogated by both Yemeni and American investigators. The Associated Press noted that many individuals are usually detained after a major terrorist attack in Yemen; diplomatic commentators speaking to CNN believed that local authorities routinely detain "the usual suspects, and then nothing comes out of it." By September 22, authorities had arrested a total of 50 people in connection to the attack. Among those arrested included Adnan al-Qadhi, a military officer believed to have supplied the military license plates used on the vehicles during the attack. He was kept in prison for multiple months, but due to his membership in the powerful Sanhan tribe, he was eventually released without charge by early 2009.
In October 2008, the Yemen Times reported alleged preliminary results from the investigation determining that two al-Qaeda members were among the militants who died in the attack, including high-ranking member Qasim al-Raymi. The newspaper noted the report could not be confirmed by an official source. Abdulelah Haider Shaye, an expert on terrorism in Yemen, believed the reports were false as the perpetrators were "new personalities who the FBI was not able to identify" and that "If there had been any al-Qaeda leaders among the attackers, it would have been announced earlier." A Yemeni security official publicly confirmed al-Qaeda's connection to the attack on November 1, stating that the perpetrators had been trained at al-Qaeda camps in Hadhramaut and Marib governorates, and that three of them had recently returned from fighting in the Iraqi insurgency. By the time that Saudi national Said Ali al-Shihri had reemerged in early 2009 as an al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, American officials were of the belief that he may have been involved in the attack.
Although personnel from the FBI collaborated with Yemeni authorities and provided them forensic evidence, the investigation into the attack had eventually stalled.
Islamic Jihad in Yemen trial
Yemeni authorities arrested six individuals on September 21 in relation to the embassy attack. The Ministry of Interior issued a statement the next day identifying the men as members of Islamic Jihad in Yemen. They were charged with forming a cell responsible for issuing statements on the internet threatening terrorist attacks against numerous public figures, foreign embassies, and non-governmental organisations. Among those arrested included Abu Ghayth al-Yamani. Shaye viewed the arrests as part of the government's information war with jihadists, and discredited the notion that Islamic Jihad in Yemen had perpetrated the embassy attack, citing the ease at which security forces managed to capture the cell in contrast to the complexity and expertise needed to plan such an attack in the first place. In October, Yemen's president referenced the captured cell in a speech, and claimed they were linked to the intelligence services of Israel.The trial for the cell began on January 10, 2009, with the Yemeni government accusing three of the six men of issuing false claims for attacks as Islamic Jihad in Yemen from May 2008 up until their arrest while coordinating with Mossad and Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert. The main defendant, Abu Ghayth al-Yamani, identified as 26-year-old Bassam al-Haidari, was accused of directly communicating with Olmert through emails, including one which said "We are the Organisation of Islamic Jihad and you are Jews, but you are honest, and we are ready to do anything". The court found the three guilty on March 23, sentencing Haidari to death and other two defendants, Ali al-Mahfal and Ammar al-Raimi, to five-year and three-year prison sentences respectively. Haidari's death sentence was upheld by a court decision on April 2, 2010. Lawyer and human rights activist Abdul-Rahman Ali Barman rejected Haidiri's case as politically motivated due to his opposition to the government, and said he was preparing to bring it to the Supreme Court.
Independent investigations
In December 2008, local newspaper Mareb Press published an interview with Soldiers' Brigade of Yemen leader Hamza Ali Saleh al-Dhayani, who local authorities listed as a suspect in the embassy attack. Dhayani said the Yemeni government was coordinating some attacks with al-Qaeda through intelligence agents from the Political Security Organization, and that the embassy attack resulted in positive effects for the government by "reviving its role in fighting terror and its claim to be on the front line", thus boosting its international standings and support. He profiled the perpetrators as would-be Iraqi foreign fighters, and claimed they were motivated by torture suffered in Yemeni prisons.An investigative documentary produced by Al Jazeera and released on June 4, 2015, provided an account of the attack from the perspective of Hani Muhammad Mujahid, an al-Qaeda member working as an informant for the Yemeni government at the time. Mujahid said he had notified his intelligence handlers of the attack on three different occasions before it took place; three months, one week and three days prior. He also provided them with details regarding the attack itself and where it was being prepared. According to Mujahid's testimony, Ammar Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, son of the President and then-deputy of the National Security Bureau, used him as a courier to help funnel explosives and weapons to Raymi which were utilized in the attack.
Terrorism expert and former British intelligence officer Richard Barrett believed Mujahid's claims to an extent, but expressed skepticism regarding Saleh's knowledge of the attack and Raymi's collusion with the government. Schwein, who took part in the FBI investigation, said "Complicity on the part of one or more members of the Yemeni government would be very disappointing, but it wouldn’t necessarily be surprising."
Aftermath
Soon after the attack, the State Department issued a notice recommending all non-emergency staff at the embassy and their families leave Yemen, along with another notice warning US citizens of travelling to Yemen outside of the capital. By the next morning, work had begun to repair the damaged exterior of the embassy compound, including the main gate. The embassy resumed standard operations on September 20. Of the personnel who responded to the attack, the State Department posthumously awarded Faqih with the Thomas Jefferson Star for Foreign Service and Collura with their Award for Valor, while Schwein received a Medal of Valor from the FBI. By 2014, the embassy had hired Muhammad al-Faqih, a younger brother of Mukhtar, to work as a security guard.Reactions
US President George W. Bush was briefed on the attack the day it took place, and said the US would bolster counterterrorism cooperation with the Yemeni government. Speaking at the White House during a meeting with General David Petraeus, Bush called the attack "a reminder that we are at war with extremists who will murder innocent people to achieve their ideological objectives", and said the perpetrators were attempting to "try to cause the United States to lose our nerve and to withdraw from regions of the world."Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh spoke of the attack during a speech in al-Hudaydah on September 19, condemning it and pledging to apprehend the perpetrators. He said that "Security forces cannot prevent a terrorist from dying because he has decided to die, and this is a result of an ignorant and backward mindset." Yemeni foreign minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi called the an act of desperation by al-Qaeda after having suffered significant losses. He told NPR that the Yemeni government required further support from the US to combat al-Qaeda, but suggested a strategy of aiding economic development and education to address the issue. He later told a pro-government newspaper that relations with the US were not negatively impacted by the attack.
Statements of condemnation were issued by the United Nations and the European Union, as well as Japan and Canada among other countries.