United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967, in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. It was adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The resolution was sponsored by British ambassador Lord Caradon and was one of five drafts under consideration.
The preamble refers to the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security".
Operative Paragraph One "Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."
Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon entered into consultations with the UN Special representative over the implementation of 242. After denouncing it in 1967, Syria "conditionally" accepted the resolution in March 1972. Syria formally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 338, the cease-fire at the end of the Yom Kippur War, which embraced Resolution 242.
On 1 May 1968, the Israeli ambassador to the UN expressed Israel's position to the Security Council: "My government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution."
Resolution 242 is one of the most widely affirmed resolutions on the Arab–Israeli conflict and formed the basis for later negotiations between the parties. These led to peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan, as well as the 1993 and 1995 agreements with the Palestinians.
Context
The resolution is the formula proposed by the Security Council for the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, in particular, ending the state of belligerency then existing between the 'States concerned', Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The resolution deals with five principles; withdrawal of Israeli forces, 'peace within secure and recognized boundaries', freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem and security measures including demilitarized zones. It also provided for the appointment of a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East in order to promote agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the principles outlined in the resolution.Upon presenting the draft resolution to the Security Council, the U.K. representative Lord Caradon said:
United States secretary of state Dean Rusk commented on the most significant area of disagreement regarding the resolution:
There was much bickering over whether that resolution should say from "the" territories or from "all" territories. In the French version, which is equally authentic, it says withdrawal de territory, with de meaning "the." We wanted that to be left a little vague and subject to future negotiation because we thought the Israeli border along the West Bank could be "rationalized"; certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all parties. We also wanted to leave open demilitarization measures in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and take a fresh look at the old city of Jerusalem. But we never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war. On that point we and the Israelis to this day remain sharply divided. This situation could lead to real trouble in the future. Although every President since Harry Truman has committed the United States to the security and independence of Israel, I'm not aware of any commitment the United States has made to assist Israel in retaining territories seized in the Six-Day War.
A memorandum from the President's Special Assistant, Walt Rostow, to President Johnson said: "What's on the Arab Ambassadors' minds boils down to one big question: Will we make good on our pledge to support the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East? Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace. The tough question is whether we'd force Israel back to 4 June borders if the Arabs accepted terms that amounted to an honest peace settlement. Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: 'The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities. If we are talking about national frontiers—in a state of peace—then we will work toward restoring them.' But we all know that could lead to a tangle with the Israelis."
Rusk met with Foreign Minister Nikezic on August 30, 1967. However, according to telegram 30825 to Belgrade, September 1, which summarizes the conversation, Rusk said the key to a settlement was to end the state of war and belligerence and that if a way could be found to deal with this, other things would fall into place; the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference.
President Johnson responded to a complaint from President Tito that Israel could change the frontiers without Arab consent: "You note that the Arabs feel the US interprets the draft resolution to imply a change of frontiers to their detriment. We have no preconceptions on frontiers as such. What we believe to be important is that the frontiers be secure. For this the single most vital condition is that they be acceptable to both sides. It is a source of regret to us that the Arabs appear to misunderstand our proposal and misread our motives."
Furthermore, Secretary Rusk's Telegram dated March 2, 1968, to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in Cairo summarizing Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin states:
In an address delivered on September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan said:
According to Michael Lynk, there are three schools of thought concerning the proper legal interpretation of the withdrawal phrase. Some of the parties involved have suggested that the indefinite language is a “perceptible loophole”, that authorizes “territorial revision” for Israel's benefit. Some have stated that the indefinite language was used to permit insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations to the 1949 armistices lines, but that unilateral annexation of the captured territory was never authorized. Other parties have said that no final settlement obtained through force or the threat of force could be considered valid. They insist that the Security Council cannot create loopholes in peremptory norms of international law or the UN Charter, and that any use of indefinite language has to be interpreted in line with the overriding legal principles regarding the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and the prohibitions on mass deportations or displacement in connection with the settlement of the refugee problem.
Alexander Orakhelashvili says that the Security Council manifestly lacks the competence to validate agreements imposed through coercion, not least because the peremptory prohibition of the use of force is a limitation on the Council's powers and the voidness of coercively imposed treaties is the clear consequence of jus cogens and the conventional law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A recent South African study concluded that the ultimate status and boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The same study also found that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which govern ‘special agreements’ that can adversely affect the rights of protected persons precludes any change in status of the territory obtained through an agreement concluded during a state of belligerent occupation.
Content
Preamble
The second preambular reference states:Srijita Jha and Akshadha Mishra said that "until 1945, annexation by conquest was a valid mode of acquisition of territory." Following World War I, Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations limited the concept of the right of conquest, that is, members of the League of Nations were not required to preserve "the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of a state engaging in a war of aggression. Since World War II, Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations requires all members to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
Michael Lynk says that article 2 of the Charter embodied a prevailing legal principle that there could be "no title by conquest". He says that principle had been expressed through numerous international conferences, doctrines, and treaties since the late 19th Century. Lynk cites the examples of the First International Conference of American States in 1890; the United States Stimson Doctrine of 1932; the 1932 League of Nations resolution on Japanese aggression in China; the Buenos Aires Declaration of 1936; and the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Surya Sharma says that under the UN Charter, a war in self-defense cannot result in the acquisition of title by conquest. He says that even if a war is lawful in origin it cannot exceed the limits of legitimate self-defense.