Popular Mobilization Forces


The Popular Mobilization Forces, also known as the Popular Mobilization Units, is an Iranian-backed paramilitary umbrella group that operates within Iraq. Although formally and legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and reporting directly to the prime minister, PMF leaders act independently from state control and, in reality, answer to the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.
The PMF is composed of about 67 primarily Shia armed factions, almost all of which are Iranian-backed and openly pledge allegiance to Khamenei. Chief of Staff of the PMF, Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi, openly declared that the PMF takes orders from Khamenei. PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh cooperates with the Iranian IRGC to implement Iranian instructions in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias. The PMF were formed in 2014 and fought in nearly every major battle during the War in Iraq against the Islamic State. In December 2016, the Iraqi Council of Representatives passed a law that defined the PMF’s legal status and created the Popular Mobilization Commission, which is a formal governmental agency that includes all PMF groups.
Many of its main factions that belong to the Shia faction trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shia groups that previously fought in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents. Pro-Iran organizations in the PMF include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Khorasani, etc. Several militant groups received training and strategic aid from Hezbollah's Unit 3800. It has been labeled the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then commander-in-chief Haider al-Abadi, previous prime minister of Iraq, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".
Factions within the PMF are designated as terrorist groups by some states, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan, and have been widely accused of promoting sectarian violence, perpetrating ethnic cleansing and displacement of Iraqi Sunnis, and carrying out war crimes, including abductions, forced disappearances, massacres, extrajudicial killings, and the destructions of villages in Anbar, Saladin, and Diyala, as well as conducting anti-Sunni campaigns described as inherently genocidal. During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the pro-Iran groups were accused of being responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists. Pro-Iran PMF groups have also fought against pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF groups, and their increasing rivalry erupted into violent clashes in 2022. Since 2020, Iranian-backed PMF groups have launched attacks against American forces and its allies in the region, claiming them under the name of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Logos and flags

While the factions have their own flags, a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF along with the Iraqi flag. PMF factions frequently hold up Iranian flags and posters of Iranian religious figures such as Ruhollah Khomeini.

Name

With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word الشعبي translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word الحشد translates as "mobilization" or "Mass", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", or "gathering".

Background and formation

The PMF trace their origins to the so-called Special Groups, a US term to designate groups of the Iraqi insurgency which were Shiite, supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force, as opposed to Ba'athist loyalist or radical Sunni Salafi jihadist insurgents. The Special Groups fought both the US-led Coalition forces, but also the afforementioned Ba'ath and sunni insurgent in a sectarian conflict. Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014.
Original seven groups:
Additional groups:
According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.
The People's Mobilization Forces were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June. The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014. The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014. The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Masdar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group. However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.
On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate. However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.
According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.

Structure

In 2025, the Popular Mobilization Forces are led by a Chairman appointed by the Prime Minister, and a Chief of Staff, who plays a crucial role in shaping the organization's strategy and direction. The PMF operate in a decentralized manner.
The Tribal Mobilization forces are also a part of PMF.

Chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Forces

The Chairman of the PMF is assisted by a dedicated Office. There are also nine central Directorates directly subordinated to the Chairman:
  • Administrative Affairs;
  • Doctrinal Guidance;
  • Financial Affairs;
  • Legal Affairs;
  • Media;
  • Planning;
  • Public Relations;
  • Security;
  • Inspector-General of the Popular Mobilisation Forces.

    Chief of Staff of the Popular Mobilisation Forces

The Chief of Staff of the Popular Mobilisation Forces exercises command over five Deputy Chiefs of Staff:
  • Deputy Chief of Staff for Medical Affairs, Combatants, and Sacrifices;
  • Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics Support;
  • Deputy Chief of Staff for Administrative and Personnel Affairs;
  • Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Information Affairs;
  • Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Affairs.

    Operations commands

The Popular Mobilization Forces are subdivided into eleven regionally-based Operations Commands:
  • Anbar Operations Command
  • Baghdad Operations Command
  • Basra Operations Command
  • Diyala Operations Command
  • Kirkuk and East Tigris Operations Command
  • Jazeera and Badia Operations Command
  • Middle Euphrates Operations Command
  • Ninewa Operations Command
  • Rafidain Operations Command
  • Salah ad Din Operations Command
  • Samarra Operations Command

    Active units

In February 2019, raided a base belonging to Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, during the raid the group's leader Aws al-Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes. The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government.
In 2020, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Composition and organization

While there are no official data about the strength of the Popular Mobilization Forces, there are some estimates, differing significantly. Around Tikrit reports in 2015 suggested there were about 20,000 engaged militiamen, while the grand total ranges are from 2–5 million to 300,000–450,000 Iraqi armed forces. Higher estimates have included about 40,000 Sunni fighters in 2016, a figure evolving from reports in early 2015, which counted 1,000 to 3,000 Sunni fighters. By early March 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces appeared to be strengthening its foothold in the Yazidis town of Shingal by recruiting and paying local people.
The Popular Mobilization Forces consist of both new volunteers and pre-existing militias, which have been grouped within the umbrella organization formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Units directorate. Among these militias there are the Peace Companies, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization.
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered on April 7, 2015, that the Popular Mobilization Forces be placed under the direct command of the prime minister's office, thus giving a further official status to the militia.
In 2015, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee in the Iraqi government was Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also the National Security Adviser. The Popular Mobilization Committee is under the Office of Prime Minister. The PMF are said to have been led on the battlefields by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, also known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah, but the chain of command runs through pre-existing leaders. According to Iraqi sources, as well as to the London-based pro-Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat, the different militias rely on their own chain of command, and rarely work together or follow regular Iraqi Army's orders.
The Laws and conduct by which the PMF should abide are those of the Iraqi Government since the Iraqi Prime Minister has the final control over the PMF. Nonetheless, Marja' Ali al-Sistani issued an "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields" which included a 20 points form of how the PMF should conduct themselves. The main points were that the PMF should treat the liberated areas locals with the Islamic Law which is as quoted from the second point which is a Hadith of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed; "Do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill an elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do no not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise". Other points included the same aforementioned guidance when treating non-Muslims and also not to steal or disrespect people even if they are the families of the ISIS fighters.
Alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, other people in charge of the PMF include Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hadi Al-Amiri, the chief of the Badr Organization. According to The New York Times, such organizational autonomy may present a challenge to the consolidation of Haider al-Abadi's authority. Volunteers include Shia Arabs, and smaller numbers of Iraqi Christians, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Turkmen.
The militias are trained and supported by military advisers from Turkey, Iran, and Hezbollah, including prominent Quds Force figures, such as Qasem Soleimani. The PMF also appeared to have deployed at least a regiment under the command of Colonel Jumaa al-Jumaily in Al Anbar Governorate. They are also said to have their own military intelligence, administrative systems, a sort of "media war team" that provides morale boosting, battlefield updates and propaganda videos, and a court of law.