Operation Steinbock
Operation Steinbock or Operation Capricorn, sometimes called the Baby Blitz or Little Blitz, was a strategic bombing campaign by the German Air Force during the Second World War. It comprised attacks on southern England and lasted from January to May 1944. Steinbock was the last strategic air offensive by the German bomber arm during the conflict.
In late 1943, the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive was gathering momentum against Germany. The Allied air forces were conducting a strategic bombing campaign day and night against German industrial cities. Adolf Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to prepare a bombing operation against the United Kingdom. The bombing offensive also served as propaganda value for the German public and domestic consumption. The operation ran parallel to the Battle of Berlin conducted by RAF Bomber Command.
The Luftwaffe assembled 474 bomber aircraft for the offensive. The attacks were mainly aimed at and around the Greater London area. In Britain, it was known as the Baby Blitz due to the much smaller scale of operations compared to the Blitz in 1940–1941. The operation began in January and ended in May 1944. It achieved very little, and the German force suffered a loss of some 329 machines during the five months of operations before it was abandoned. Casualties were at 70 per cent for the aircraft committed and were destroyed at an average rate of 77 per month.
The revenge attacks gave way to attempts to disrupt preparations for the impending Allied invasion of France but Steinbock had worn down the offensive power of the Luftwaffe to the extent it could not mount any significant operations when the D-Day invasion began on 6 June 1944. The offensive was the last big bombing campaign against England using conventional aircraft, thenceforth only the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rockets – the pioneering examples of cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles respectively – were used against British cities.
Background
Allied bombing
By the end of 1943 the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive had taken a severe toll on Germany. Under the leadership of Generalleutnant Josef Kammhuber, the Luftwaffe night fighter force expanded against the threat. The introduction of airborne radar in the Luftwaffe enabled the German air defences to inflict many losses on RAF Bomber Command, but they could not prevent widespread destruction of industrial cities. Two years after the first radar-intercepted victory by the Luftwaffe, only 83 per cent of the night fighters were equipped with Lichtenstein radar. Production of sets was well behind and the later SN-2 sets were unusable by late 1943. By the following spring, technical and production improvements made it effective and available in quantity. The 1,000th set was built in May 1944. Only once did the RAF lose as many as 9 per cent of the attacking force over Germany—during an attack on Pilsen, Czechoslovakia on 17 May 1943. This was below the 10 per cent required to force the British to abandon operations, though Bomber Command losses increased to a peak of 7.14 per cent in December 1943. Average Bomber Command losses rose from 3.98 per cent in January to July 1943 to 5.76 per cent August to December and reached 7.14 per cent that month.Genesis of ''Steinbock''
Kammhuber's efforts were damaged by the amateurish leadership style of Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe. Göring's poor understanding of the technicalities of air warfare was mirrored by the Chief of the General Staff, Hans Jeschonnek. Göring had neglected his command since the outbreak of war but sought to meet his responsibilities in 1943 as his prestige with Adolf Hitler waned in the aftermath of Stalingrad on the Eastern Front. Göring's interference in air defence was disastrous. On the night of 22/23 October 1943, he took command of the night fighters. The British Operation Corona helped confuse the defences and Göring's mishandling of the night fighter force allowed Bomber Command to devastate Kassel. Göring deflected the blame for British attacks on his subordinates and his relations with them deteriorated. In August 1943 Jeschonnek killed himself after the Peenemünde Raid. In November 1943 Bomber Command began the Battle of Berlin and Kammhuber was sacked.At the top of the German High Command there was little understanding or appreciation for air defence, even in the aftermath of the bombing of Hamburg which inflicted 76,600 casualties and destroyed large parts of the city and its industry. While Hitler had left the Luftwaffe to Göring earlier in the war, he was now enmeshed in decision-making. Göring was reduced to a conduit through which Hitler's orders were channelled to senior commanders and the failure of the Luftwaffe frequently drew Hitler's ire. At one conference Göring attempted to placate Hitler by suggesting that the destruction of German cities worked in the Nazi favour, as he perceived it created a body of people with nothing to lose and who "will therefore fight on with utter fanaticism".
Göring was reluctant to allocate resources to the defence of Germany for other reasons. He argued that the German people had survived before there were cities and that the Soviet danger was the priority of the Luftwaffe. Even at this stage of the war, in October 1943, Göring exhibited a bias toward bombers rather than fighters. He said, "All they wish to hear when a hospital or a children's home in Germany is destroyed is that we have destroyed the same in England!".
The strategic dilemma facing the Luftwaffe in the winter of 1943–1944 was a serious one. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe sought to change the Luftwaffe procurement priorities to the defensive. Erhard Milch—responsible to the Reichsluftfahrtministerium for production—recommended doubling fighter production to strengthen Germany's defences. The overwhelming consensus at OKL was that German air power should concentrate resources on defensive efforts against the Allied Air Forces. After a meeting with senior Luftwaffe staff officers Adolf Galland—General der Jagdflieger —wrote,
Never before and never again did I witness such determination and agreement among the circle of those responsible for the leadership of the Luftwaffe. It was as though under the impact of the Hamburg catastrophe everyone put aside either personal or departmental ambitions. There was no conflict between the General Staff and the war industry, no rivalry between bombers and fighters; only the common will to do everything in this critical hour for the Defence of the Reich.
Milch proposed to accelerate fighter production to 2,000 per month. The defence of the Reich was to take priority and the Eastern Front air units would have to cope until the threat from Bomber Command, the American Eighth Air Force operating from England and the Fifteenth Air Force in North Africa and Italy, had been mastered. Hitler maintained the Luftwaffe was an offensive weapon. For his part, Göring doubted that the night fighter was worth the expense. Göring complained bitterly to Milch that he was "placing too much emphasis on the Reich's defence and for robbing production from the bomber forces". Milch's proposals were finally agreed to but it was Göring, not the staff officers, that took this proposal to Hitler. After an hour, Göring returned. Dietrich Peltz described the scene,
We were met with a shattering picture. Göring had completely broken down. With his head buried in his arms on the table he moaned some indistinguishable words. We stood there for some time in embarrassment until at last he pulled himself together and said we were witnessing the deepest moments of despair. The Führer had lost faith in him. All the suggestions from which he had expected a radical change in the situation of war in the air had been rejected; the Führer had announced that the Luftwaffe had disappointed him too often, and a change over from the offensive to defensive in the air against England was out of the question.
After a time Göring announced that the only way to stop such destruction was to retaliate against the Allies so that they would not dare risk another raid like Hamburg, without the fear of similar retribution. Göring gave Peltz instructions to assemble a retaliation force.offensive to defensive in the air against England was out of the question. On 28 November 1943, Peltz was summoned to a conference where Göring officially informed him that he was to be placed in command of a new, large bombing operation against Britain and London in particular. As the conference ended, Göring asked Peltz if older types such as the Dornier Do 217 were still adequate for bombing operations. Peltz replied that he would be happy with anything that could carry a bomb. It was hoped that the operation would commence during December and though this proved unrealistic, by the third week of January 1944 a force approaching 600 aircraft had been amassed by stripping five Kampfgruppen from the Italian front and by rebuilding bomber units in the West. On 3 December 1943 Göring issued a directive for Unternehmen Steinbock, with the objective of "avenging terror attacks of the enemy".
German forces
Three years after the Blitz, the Luftwaffe still possessed a mix of first-generation medium bomber designs like the Junkers Ju 88. The Junkers design was upgraded and the Junkers Ju 188 was derived from it and was available in 1943. The other main medium bomber was Dornier Do 217, a larger and upgraded version of the Dornier Do 17 light bomber design. The Heinkel He 177A was the only genuine heavy bomber in the fleet, which had serious powerplant difficulties from its beginnings.The Do 217 and Ju 88A-4 carried the burden of operations. These designs had been in use for operations over Britain from 1941/42 and had been used extensively by Luftflotte 3, based in France and Belgium. The Do 217 could carry a heavier bomb load than its predecessor owing to a deepened fuselage. However, the German practice of using external bomb racks meant nearly 40 per cent of the 4,000 kg load was carried outside the aircraft. The Ju 88 carried nearly two-thirds of its load externally.
The two machines mounted adequate defensive firepower – four to six modern machine guns, heavy machine guns and even 20mm autocannon in the Ju 88 and six to seven in the Do 217 – the confined space and 75-round magazines made it difficult to sustain concentrated fire against night fighters. The close proximity of the crews in the cockpit, a feature of nearly all German bomber designs from the Ju 88A onwards, was also a disadvantage. Should a night fighter land an accurate burst most, if not all of the crew, could be killed or incapacitated. The layout of Allied bombers, like the B-17 Flying Fortress, spread the crew throughout the aircraft and allowed for a greater chance of survival.
The German bombers were afforded some protection in the form of the new, mid-VHF band prefixed Funk-Gerät FuG 216 Neptun radar system, usable both as an airborne intercept system and as a tail-warning radar, which could detect approaching RAF night fighters from the rear. To confuse British radars further various medium bomber types were equipped with Kettenhund radar jammers, specifically carried in the Ju 88, which had some effect in jamming the upper-VHF band, 205 MHz frequency SCR-268 gun laying radar used by anti-aircraft artillery, but was ineffective in countering microwave-frequency radars like the 3 GHz frequency, SCR-584 radar. German bombers also used Düppel techniques to confound British ground radar as they approached the British coast. The tin foil strips swamped the radar screens and masked the true height, direction and speed of approaching bombers.
Apart from the numbers of conventional medium and heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe also employed a number of fast bomber types such as the Ju 88S-1 — a streamlined version of the Ju 88A using unitised BMW 801 radials and omitting the Bola undernose gondola — the DB 603-powered Messerschmitt Me 410 Hornisse Schnellbomber, and a number of single-engine fighter-bombers Messerschmitt Bf 109Gs and longer-ranged Focke-Wulf Fw 190As, known as Jabos in the Luftwaffe. These aircraft were more difficult to intercept due to their great speed, but carried limited payload and with less accuracy compared to the conventional bombers. The Ju 88S-1 was allotted the role of pathfinder, replacing the younger but slower and heavier Do 217.
Luftflotte 3, under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle was to carry out the bulk of the operation. Göring ordered that Luftflotte 2 transfer control of two gruppen of Kampfgeschwader 30, one from Kampfgeschwader 54, and Kampfgeschwader 76 to Luftflotte 3. II./Kampfgeschwader 6, I./Kampfgeschwader 100 and I./Kampfgeschwader 51 were also sequestered for Steinbock.
Göring ordered that operational strength was to be maintained in the event of an Allied landing in France and to maintain pressure on Britain and that bombers were to carry a mixed ordnance load, consisting of 70 per cent incendiaries and 30 per cent high explosive bombs—including large bombs and mines for maximum destruction. German bombers were to be well-dispersed and parked in revetments. Dummy airfields were set up in accordance with Göring's orders. The Reichsmarschall was now fully aware of British night fighter intruder operations and the threat of Allied bombing attacks. From June to December 1943, German bomber losses in 17 major attacks in England amounted to 48 aircraft in 948 sorties, a loss rate of 5.06 per cent. RAF defences were far stronger than in 1941 and German losses would have been higher if operations not been restricted to coastal rather than inland targets.