October 7 attacks
The October 7 attacks were a series of coordinated armed incursions from the Gaza Strip into the Gaza envelope of southern Israel, carried out by Hamas and several other Palestinian militant groups in 2023, during the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah. The attacks, which began the ongoing Gaza war, were the first large-scale invasion of Israeli territory since the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. In response, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in Gaza.
The attacks began with a barrage of at least 4,300 rockets launched into Israel and vehicle-transported and powered paraglider incursions into Israel. Hamas militants breached the Gaza–Israel barrier, attacking military bases and massacring civilians in 21 communities, including Be'eri, Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, Netiv Haasara, and Alumim. According to an Israel Defense Forces report that revised the estimate on the number of attackers, 6,000 Gazans breached the border in 119 locations into Israel, including 3,800 from the elite Nukhba forces and 2,200 civilians and other militants. Additionally, the IDF report estimated 1,000 Gazans fired rockets from the Gaza Strip, bringing the total number of participants on Hamas's side to 7,000.
In total, 1,219 people were killed by the attacks: at least 810 civilians and at least 379 members of the security forces. 364 civilians were killed while they were attending the Nova music festival and many more wounded. At least 14 Israeli civilians were killed by the IDF's use of the Hannibal Directive. About 250 Israeli and non-Israeli civilians and soldiers were taken as hostages to the Gaza Strip. Dozens of cases of rape and sexual assault reportedly occurred, but Hamas officials denied the involvement of their fighters.
Hamas said its attack was in response to the continued Israeli occupation, the blockade of the Gaza Strip, the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements, rising Israeli settler violence, and recent escalations. The day was labelled the bloodiest in Israel's history and "the deadliest for Jews since the Holocaust" by many figures and media outlets in the West, including then-US president Joe Biden. Some have made allegations that the attack was an act of genocide or a genocidal massacre against Israelis. The governments of 44 countries denounced the attack and described it as terrorism, while some Arab and Muslim-majority countries blamed Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories as the root cause of the attack.
Name
Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups codenamed the attacks Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, while in Israel they are referred to as Black Saturday or the Simchat Torah Massacre. Internationally and commonly in Israel, the attacks are called the October 7 attacks.Background
Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories, including the Gaza Strip, since the Six-Day War in 1967. In 2005, Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip by dismantling all 21 Israeli settlements there. Nonetheless, the Gaza Strip has continued to be regarded by the United Nations, many other international humanitarian and legal organizations, and most academic commentators as being under Israeli occupation due to Israel's active control over the territory's external affairs, as affirmed by the 2024 International Court of Justice advisory opinion.The Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian nationalist Islamist movement. They formed in 1987, and are the largest Islamist movement in the Palestinian territories. They maintain an uncompromising stance on the "complete liberation of Palestine", often using political violence to achieve their goals. Recent statements suggest a shift in focus toward ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and establishing a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Hamas has been responsible for numerous suicide bombings and rocket attacks targeting Israeli civilians. Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, and the UK have designated Hamas a "terrorist organisation". In 2010 it attempted to derail the peace talks between Israel and the PA. In 2017, it adopted a new charter, removing antisemitic language and shifting focus from Jews to Zionists. Scholars differ on Hamas's objectives, with some saying it sought a Palestinian state within 1967 borders while others believe Hamas still sought the destruction of Israel.
Warnings
Before the attack, Saudi Arabia warned Israel of an "explosion" as a result of the continued occupation, and Egypt had warned of a catastrophe.Events leading to the attack
Throughout 2023, increased settler attacks displaced hundreds of Palestinians. In April, clashes occurred around the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a contested holy site in Jerusalem. In May, clashes occurred between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group.Tensions between Israel and Hamas rose in September 2023, and The Washington Post wrote that the two were "on the brink of war". On September 13, five Palestinians were killed at the border. Israel said it found explosives hidden in a shipment and halted all exports from Gaza; Hamas denied Israel's claims. Reuters quoted Palestinians who said that the several-day ban affected thousands of families. In response to the ban, Hamas put its forces on high alert and conducted military exercises with other groups, including openly practicing storming Israeli settlements. Hamas also allowed Palestinians to resume protests at the Gaza–Israel barrier. On September 29, Qatar, the UN, and Egypt mediated an agreement between Israeli and Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip to reopen closed crossing points and deescalate tensions; the total number of Gazans with work permits in Israel stood at 17,000.
Egypt said it warned Israel days before the attack that "an explosion of the situation coming, and very soon, and it would be big." Israel denied receiving such a warning, although Michael McCaul, Chairman of the US House Foreign Relations Committee, said that warnings were given three days before the attack.
Operational planning
For two years, Hamas used hardwired phone lines within Gaza's tunnel network, nicknamed the "Gaza metro", to covertly communicate, evade Israeli intelligence, and plan Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.In the months preceding the attack, Hamas publicly released videos of its militants preparing to attack Israel. A video released in December 2022 showed Hamas training to take hostages, while another video showed Hamas practicing paragliding. On September 12, Hamas posted a video of its fighters training to blast through the border. After the attack, the IDF said that Hamas had extensively studied the military bases and communities near the border.
The Wall Street Journal has accused Iran of being behind the attack. U.S. officials and Iran have denied this.
According to a New York Times investigation, a memo dated August 24, 2022, and apparently written by Yahya Sinwar described a Hamas attack on Israel similar to October 7 attacks. It called for bulldozers to breach the Gaza-Israel fence and for multiple assault waves. It urged "Stomp on the heads of soldiers" and listed "opening fire on soldiers at point-blank range, slaughtering some of them with knives, blowing up tanks". It ordered entry into residential areas to set them on fire "with gasoline or diesel from a tanker", preparing "two or three operations" in which "an entire neighborhood, kibbutz, or something similar will be burned". It directed unit commanders to film and broadcast the acts to mobilize Palestinians in the West Bank, Arabs in Israel, and "our nation" to "join the revolution".
The IDF reportedly seized over 10,000 weapons following the attack. The arsenal included RPGs, mines, sniper rifles, drones, thermobaric rockets, and other advanced weapons. According to Israeli sources, documents and maps seized from Hamas militants indicated that Hamas intended a coordinated, month-long operation to invade and occupy Israeli towns, cities, and kibbutzim, including attacking Ashkelon by sea and reaching Kiryat Gat, 20 miles into Israel. The scale of weapons, supplies, and plans indicated, according to Israel, that Hamas intended to inflict mass casualties on Israeli civilians and military forces over an extended period. Western and Middle Eastern security officials gathered evidence suggesting that Hamas intended to invade as far as the West Bank, had the initial attack been more successful.
Israeli intelligence failure
According to The New York Times, Israeli officials had obtained detailed attack plans more than a year before the attack. The document described operational plans and targets, including the size and location of Israeli forces, and raised questions in Israel about how Hamas learned these details. The document provided a plan that included a large-scale rocket assault before an invasion, drones to knock out the surveillance cameras and automated guns that Israel has stationed along the border, and gunmen invading Israel, including with paragliders. The Times reported, "Hamas followed the blueprint with shocking precision." According to The Times, the document was widely circulated among Israeli military and intelligence leadership, who largely dismissed the plan as beyond Hamas's capabilities, though it was unclear whether the political leadership was informed. In July 2023, a member of the Israeli signals intelligence unit alerted her superiors that Hamas was conducting preparations for the assault, saying, "I utterly refute that the scenario is imaginary". An Israeli colonel ignored her concerns.The official investigation by Israel's domestic intelligence agency, Shin Bet, found that the agency failed to provide the warning that could have prevented the massacre. The head of Shin Bet convened a situation assessment in the early hours of October 7 to discuss the intelligence received from Gaza; in the end, only a low-level warning was issued, and a small team specialising in thwarting limited attacks was sent to the south. According to the report the counterintelligence service of Hamas had been highly effective in preventing the gathering of intelligence in Gaza.
According to the findings of the investigation, Shin Bet warned the Prime Minister that Hamas was not deterred and objected to the prevailing divide-and-rule policy of the Israeli government.
According to Haaretz, Shin Bet and IDF military commanders discussed a possible threat to the Nova music festival near kibbutz Re'im just hours before the attack, but the festival's organizers were not warned.
As revealed by a BBC investigation, surveillance reports suggested that Hamas was planning a significant operation against Israel, but senior IDF officers repeatedly ignored the warnings.
A Haaretz investigation found that incompetence in the IDF's higher ranks, including refusal to acknowledge Hamas's preparations for the attacks, was a major contributor to the severity of the October attacks. The IDF had reduced funding and manpower dedicated to observing Hamas, focusing primarily on rocket sites and ignoring Hamas training and troop movements, and the activities of the Hamas military leadership. Exercises in which Hamas attacks were simulated found the Gaza division's response lacking. Cultural conformity was fostered among officers and dissent discouraged. Senior officers often silenced subordinates to maintain their positions, contributing to a toxic atmosphere in which lower-ranking officers were apprehensive about questioning the decisions of their superiors - and tended to refrain from doing so.