Corfu incident


The Corfu incident was a 1923 diplomatic and military crisis between Greece and Italy. It was triggered when Enrico Tellini, an Italian general heading a commission to resolve a border dispute between Albania and Greece, was murdered in Greek territory along with two other officers of his staff. In response, Benito Mussolini issued an ultimatum to Greece and, when it was not accepted in whole, dispatched forces to bombard and occupy Corfu. Mussolini defied the League of Nations and stated Italy would leave if it arbitrated in the crisis, and the Conference of Ambassadors instead eventually tendered an agreement favouring Italy. This was an early demonstration of the League's weakness when dealing with larger powers.

Background

During the Italo-Ottoman war of 1911–12, Italy had occupied the Dodecanese islands whose population was largely Greek. Under the Venizelos–Tittoni agreement of 1919, Italy promised to cede the Dodecanese islands except for Rhodes to Greece in exchange for Greek recognition of the Italian claims to part of Anatolia. However, the Turkish National Movement's victory in the Turkish War of Independence had put an end to all plans for partitioning Asia Minor by 1922, and Mussolini took the view that since the Italians had been forced out of Turkey that cancelled out the obligation to cede the Dodecanese islands to Greece. The Greeks continued to press Mussolini on the Dodecanese issue, and in the summer of 1923, he ordered the Italian garrison in the Dodecanese reinforced as part of his plans to formally annex the islands to Italy, which caused Greece to issue notes of protest.
In May 1923, during a visit to Rome, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, told Mussolini that Britain would cede Jubaland and Jarabub to Italy as part of a general settlement of all of Italy's claims, saying that Italians had to settle their disputes with both Yugoslavia and Greece as part of the price of Jubaland and Jarabub. Under the terms of the Treaty of London of 1915, under which Italy entered World War I, Britain had promised to cede Jubaland and Jarabub to Italy, and as Mussolini had founded the Fascist Party in 1919 in part to protest the "mutilated victory" of 1918 as Italy did not obtain all of the territory promised by the Treaty of London, Jubaland and Jarabub had over-sized symbolic importance in Italy far out of proportion to the actual value of these territories. To obtain Jubaland and Jarabub would mean that Italy would have to settle the Fiume dispute with Yugoslavia and the Dodecanese islands dispute with Greece, neither of which Mussolini wanted to compromise on. Though the Milner-Scialoja agreement of 1920 had committed Britain to cede Jubaland and Jarabub to Italy, the British had subsequently tied that to the Italians settling the Dodecanese islands dispute first. Under the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, all of the Allied powers abandoned their claims to Turkey, which badly damaged Mussolini's prestige as he promised as an opposition leader to obtain all of the territories the Italians had fought for in World War I including a large chunk of Anatolia. Having denounced his predecessors as weak leaders who had brought about the "mutilated victory" of 1918 and promised that he was a "strong leader" who would undo the "mutilated victory", Mussolini by the summer of 1923 was to face the reality that Italy was simply too weak to achieve all of his promises.
There was a boundary dispute between Greece and Albania. The two nations took their dispute to the Conference of Ambassadors, which created a commission of British, French, and Italian officials to determine the boundary, which was authorized by the League of Nations to settle the dispute. The Italian General Enrico Tellini became the chairman of the commission. From the outset of the negotiations, the relations between Greece and the commission were bad. Eventually the Greek delegate openly accused Tellini of working in favour of Albania's claims.
In July 1923, Mussolini ordered the Regia Marina's admirals to start preparing for Corfu's occupation, which he predicated would happen that summer in response to the "expected provocative acts" by Greece. The Italian Navy minister, Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel, welcomed the plan to seize Corfu for budgetary reasons, believing a triumph by the Regia Marina would show the Italian people the navy's importance and thus lead to a bigger naval budget. At the same time, Mussolini did not inform the professional diplomats of the Palazzo Chigi about his plans to seize Corfu, expecting them to object, an expectation that was confirmed when Corfu was indeed bombarded.

Tellini's murder

On 27 August 1923, Tellini and two aides, plus an interpreter and a chauffeur, were ambushed and assassinated by unknown assailants at Kakavia's border crossing, near the town of Ioannina in Greek territory. The five victims were Tellini, Major Luigi Corti, Lieutenant Mario Bonacini, Albanian interpreter Thanas Gheziri and the chauffeur Remigio Farnetti. None of the victims were robbed. The incident occurred close to the disputed border and therefore could have been carried out by either side.
According to Italian newspapers and the official statement of the Albanian government, the attack was carried out by Greeks, while other sources, including the Greek government and its officials and the Romanian consul in Ioannina, attributed the murder to Albanian bandits. In April 1945, the British Ambassador to Greece, Reginald Leeper, sent a letter to British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden that expressed the viewpoint that it was the Cham Albanians who were responsible for General Tellini's murder. The letter stated that Daout Hodja, a Cham Albanian bandit, killed General Tellini and the other officers. Summarising the most recent evidence, the Greek historian Aristotle Kallis wrote:
Much about the incident which resulted in Tellini's assassination remains unclear. There is sufficient evidence to lend credence to the Greek government's argument that the perpetrators had in fact originated from Albania and had crossed the border illegally to ambush the car inside Greece and thus inculpate the Greek side.

Italian and Greek reactions

Upon news of the murder, anti-Greek demonstrations broke out in Italy. The Greek newspapers were reported by Australian newspapers to
condemn unanimously the Tellini crime, and express friendly sentiments towards Italy. They hope that the Cabinet will give legitimate satisfaction to Italy without going beyond the limits of national dignity.

On August 28, 1923, Prime Minister Benito Mussolini sent a cable to the Prefects of Lecce and Bari "to make the necessary preparations to stop all cable-telegraphic communications directed to Greece, unless instructed otherwise.” Thereafter, Italy sent an ultimatum to Greece on August 29, 1923, demanding:
  1. a complete official apology at the Italian legation in Athens,
  2. a solemn funeral in the Catholic cathedral in Athens in the presence of the whole of the Greek government,
  3. military honours for the bodies of the victims,
  4. full honours by the Greek fleet to the Italian fleet which would be sent to Piraeus,
  5. capital punishment for the guilty,
  6. an indemnity of 50 million lire within five days of receipt of the note and
  7. a strict inquiry, to be carried out quickly with the assistance of the Italian military attaché.
In addition, Italy demanded that Greece must reply to the ultimatum within 24 hours.
Greece replied to Italy on August 30, 1923, accepting four of the demands which with modifications as follows:
  1. The Piraeus commandant would express the Greek Government's sorrow to the Italian Minister,
  2. a memorial service will be held in the presence of members of the government,
  3. on the same day a detachment of the guard would salute the Italian flag at the Italian legation,
  4. the military would render honors to the remains of the victims when they were transferred to an Italian warship.
The other demands were rejected on the ground that they would infringe the sovereignty and honor of Greece.
In addition, the Greek government declared its complete willingness to grant, as a measure of justice, an equitable indemnity to the families of the victims, and that it didn't accept an enquiry in the presence of the Italian military attaché but it would be pleased to accept any assistance which Colonel Perone might be able to lend by supplying any information likely to facilitate the discovery of the assassins.
Mussolini and his cabinet were unsatisfied with the Greek government's reply and declared that it was unacceptable. The Italian press, including the opposition journals, endorsed Mussolini's demands and insisted that Greece must comply without discussion. Mussolini's decision was received with enthusiasm in all of Italy.

Bombardment and occupation of Corfu

On August 31, 1923, a squadron of the Italian Navy bombarded the Greek island of Corfu and landed between 5,000 and 10,000 troops. Aeroplanes aided the attack. Italian fire was concentrated on the town's Old Fortress, which had long been demilitarized and served as a shelter for refugees from Asia Minor, and on the Cities Police school at the New Fortress, which was also a refugee shelter. The bombardment lasted 15 to 30 minutes. As a result of the bombardment 16 civilians were killed, 30 injured and two had limbs amputated, while according to other sources 20 were killed and 32 wounded. There were no soldiers reported among the victims, all of whom were refugees and orphans. The majority of those killed were children. The Commissioner of the U.K. based charity, Save the Children Fund, described the Italian bombardment as "inhuman and revolting, unjustifiable and unnecessary".
The Corfu's prefect, Petros Evripaios, Greek officers and officials were arrested by the Italians and detained aboard an Italian warship. The Greek garrison of 150 men did not surrender but retired to the island's interior.
Following the landing, the Italian officers feared British citizens may have been wounded or killed, and were relieved to discover that there were no British subjects among the victims. However, the residence of the British officer in charge of the police training school was looted by Italian soldiers.
Mussolini in a speech denounced the Greek government for not understanding that "Corfu had been Venetian for four hundred years", before becoming part of Greece in 1864. Throughout the crisis, Mussolini kept stating that Corfu had been ruled by Venice in a manner that suggested he viewed Corfu as rightfully part of Italy rather than Greece under the grounds that Italy was the heir to the Most Serene Republic of Venice. One of the few groups in Italy who did object to the bombardment were the senior diplomats of the Palazzo Chigi who were not informed. Many of them, including Salvatore Contarini, the Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Minister, were on vacation on the day of the bombardment.
During the crisis, Contarini together with Antonio Salandra, the Italian delegate to the League of Nations, and Romano Avezzana, the Italian ambassador to France, emerged as a force for moderation within the Italian government, constantly working to persuade Mussolini to drop his more extreme demands and to accept a compromise. Mussolini, who only became prime minister on 28 October 1922, was determined to assert his power by proving that he was an unconventional leader who did not follow the normal rules of diplomacy, and the Corfu crisis was the first clash between Mussolini and the traditional elites in Italy, who while not objecting to imperialistic policies, disliked Il Duces reckless style. At the time, Italy was engaging in negotiations with Britain for the cession of Jubaland in East Africa and Jarabub in North Africa to the Italian empire. From the viewpoint of the Palazzo Chigi, the success of these negotiations hinged in part on presenting Italy as a responsible partner to Britain, which was threatened by Mussolini's rash behavior such as the occupation of Corfu.