Battle of Manzikert
The Battle of Manzikert or Malazgirt was fought between the Byzantine Empire and the Seljuk Empire on 26 August 1071 near Manzikert, Iberia. The decisive defeat of the Byzantine army and the capture of the emperor Romanos IV Diogenes played an important role in undermining Byzantine authority in Anatolia and Armenia, and allowed for the gradual Turkification of Anatolia. Many Turks, travelling westward during the 11th century, saw the victory at Manzikert as an entrance to Asia Minor.
The brunt of the battle was borne by the Byzantine army's professional soldiers from the eastern and western tagmata, as large numbers of mercenaries and Anatolian levies fled early and survived the battle. The fallout from Manzikert was disastrous for the Byzantines, resulting in civil conflicts and an economic crisis that severely weakened the Byzantine Empire's ability to defend its borders adequately. This led to the mass movement of Turks into central Anatoliaby 1080, an area of had been gained by the Seljuk Turks. It took three decades of internal strife before Alexius I restored stability to Byzantium. Historian Thomas Asbridge says: "In 1071, the Seljuqs crushed an imperial army at the Battle of Manzikert, and though historians no longer consider this to have been an utterly cataclysmic reversal for the Greeks, it still was a stinging setback." It was the only time a Byzantine emperor became the prisoner of a Muslim commander, and the first time since Valerian that a Roman emperor was captured alive by an enemy force.
Background
Although the Byzantine Empire had remained strong and powerful in the early Middle Ages, it began to decline under the reign of the militarily incompetent Constantine IX Monomachos and again under Constantine X Doukasa brief two-year period of reform under Isaac I Komnenos merely delayed the decay of the Byzantine army.About 1053, Constantine IX disbanded what the 11th century Byzantine historian John Skylitzes called the "Iberian Army", which consisted of 50,000 men. Skylitzes' contemporaries, the former officials Michael Attaleiates and Kekaumenos, agree that by demobilizing these soldiers, Constantine did catastrophic harm to the empire's eastern defenses. Constantine made a truce with the Seljuks that lasted until 1064, when a large Seljuk army under Alp Arslan attacked the theme of Iberia and took Ani; after a siege of 25 days, they captured the city.
In 1068, Romanos IV Diogenes took power and, after some speedy military reforms, appointed Manuel Komnenos to lead an expedition against the Seljuks. Manuel captured Hierapolis Bambyce in Syria, next thwarted a Turkish attack against Iconium with a counterattack, but was then defeated and captured by the Seljuks. Despite this success, Alp Arslan quickly sought a peace treaty with the Byzantines, signed in 1069; he saw the Fatimids in Egypt as his main enemy and had no desire to be diverted by unnecessary hostilities.
In February 1071, Romanos sent envoys to Arslan to renew the 1069 treaty, as he was keen to secure his northern flank against attack, to which Arslan agreed. Abandoning the siege of Edessa, he immediately led his army to attack the Fatimid-held Aleppo. However, the peace treaty had been a deliberate distraction: Romanos now led a large army into Armenia to recover the lost fortresses before the Seljuks had time to respond.
Prelude
Accompanying Romanos was Andronikos Doukas, son of his rival John Doukas. The army consisted of about professional Byzantine troops from the western provinces and probably about the same number from the eastern provinces. These included long established regular units of the central field army. Under Doukas, the rear guard at Manzikert was largely made up of the private retinues and peasant levies of the border lords. Finally, the large and diverse host included 500 Frankish and Norman mercenaries under Roussel de Bailleul, some Turkic and Bulgarian mercenaries, infantry under the Duke of Antioch, a contingent of Georgian and Armenian troops and some of the Varangian Guard to total around 40,000 men. The quantity of the provincial troops had declined in the years before Romanos, as the government diverted funding to mercenaries who were judged less likely to be involved in politics and could be disbanded after use to save money.File:Alp Arslan on throne Majma al-Tawarikh by Hafiz Abru.png|thumb|upright|left|Depiction of Alp Arslan from the Majma al-Tawarikh by Hafiz Abru circa 1425
The march across Asia Minor was long and difficult. Romanos brought a luxurious baggage train, which did not endear him to his troops. The local population also suffered plundering by his Frankish mercenaries, whom he was obliged to dismiss. The expedition rested at Sebasteia on the Halys River, reaching Theodosiopolis in June 1071. Some of his generals suggested continuing the march into the Seljuk territory and catching Alp Arslan before he was ready. Others, including Nicephorus Bryennius, suggested they wait and fortify their position. It was decided to continue the march. Then they moved to Khnus city. The Byzantine army, which was heading towards the Malazgirt Plain, chose the route of the Kocasu Stream flowing through Khnus as a route to meet its water needs, and the army manufactured the spears to be used in the war from the trees growing in Khnus and its surroundings.
Thinking that Alp Arslan was either further away or not coming at all, Romanos marched towards Lake Van, expecting to retake Manzikert quickly and the nearby fortress of Khliat if possible. Alp Arslan was already in the area, however, with allies and cavalry from Aleppo and Mosul. Alp Arslan's scouts knew exactly where Romanos was, while Romanos was completely unaware of his opponent's movements.
Romanos ordered his general Joseph Tarchaniotes to take some of the regular troops and the Varangians and accompany the Pechenegs and Franks to Khliat. At the same time, Romanos and the rest of the army marched to Manzikert. This split the forces into halves of about 20,000 men each. It is unknown what happened to the army sent off with Tarchaniotesaccording to Islamic sources, Alp Arslan smashed this army, yet Byzantine sources make no mention of any such encounter, and Attaliates suggests that Tarchaniotes fled at the sight of the Seljuk Sultanan unlikely event considering the reputation of the Byzantine general. Either way, Romanos' army was reduced to less than half his planned 40,000 men.
Battle
Alp Arslan summoned his army and delivered a speech while dressed in a white robe similar to an Islamic funeral shroud on the morning of the battle. This was an encouraging message that he was ready to die in battle. Romanos was unaware of the loss of Tarchaneiotes and continued to Manzikert, which he easily captured on 23 August; the Seljuks responded with attacks by horse archers. The next day, some foraging parties under Bryennios discovered the main Seljuk force and were forced to retreat to Manzikert. Romanos sent the Armenian general Basilakes and some cavalry, as Romanos did not believe this was Alp Arslan's full army. The cavalry was routed, and Basilakes was taken prisoner. Romanos then drew his troops into formation and sent the left wing out under Bryennios, who was almost surrounded by the rapidly approaching Turks and forced to retreat. The Seljuk forces hid among the nearby hills for the night, making it nearly impossible for Romanos to counterattack.On 25 August, some of Romanos' Turkic mercenaries came into contact with their Seljuk kin and deserted. Romanos then rejected a Seljuk peace emissary. He wanted to settle the eastern question and the persistent Turkic incursions and settlements with a decisive military victory. He understood that raising another army would be both difficult and expensive. The emperor attempted to recall Tarchaneiotes and his half of the forces, but they were no longer in the area. There were no engagements that day, but on 26 August, the Byzantine army gathered itself into a proper battle formation and began to march on the Seljuk positions, with the left wing under Bryennios, the right wing under Theodore Alyates, and the centre under the emperor. Andronikos Doukas led the reserve forces in the reara foolish mistake by the emperor, considering the dubious loyalties of the Doukas family. The Seljuks were organized into a crescent formation about four kilometres away. Seljuk horse archers attacked the Byzantines as they drew closer; the centre of their crescent continually moved backwards while the wings moved to surround the Byzantine troops.
The Byzantines pressed on despite the arrow attacks and captured Alp Arslan's camp by the end of the afternoon. However, the right and left wings, where the arrows did most of their damage, almost broke up when individual units tried to force the Seljuks into a pitched battle; the Seljuk cavalry simply disengaged when challenged, in the characteristic Parthian tactics of steppe warriors. With the Seljuks avoiding battle, Romanos was forced to order a withdrawal by nightfall. However, the right wing misunderstood the order, and Doukas deliberately ignored the emperor's order to cover the army's withdrawal and marched directly back to the Byzantine camp outside Manzikert. With the Byzantines thoroughly confused, the Seljuks seized the opportunity and attacked. The Byzantine right wing was almost immediately routed, thinking they were betrayed either by the Armenians or the army's Turkish auxiliaries. Some authors suppose that Armenians were the first to flee, and they all managed to get away, while by contrast, the Turkish auxiliaries remained loyal to the end. Other sources suggest that Armenian infantry stoutly resisted and did not turn tail, not abandoning the emperor as many had. When Romanos saw the boldness of the Armenian foot soldiers, he displayed great affection for them and promised them unheard-of rewards. In the end, the emperor's personal troops and these Armenian foot soldiers suffered the heaviest casualties in the Byzantine army. The left wing under Bryennios held out a little longer but was also soon routed. The remnants of the Byzantine centre, including the emperor and the Varangian Guard, were encircled by the Seljuks. Romanos was wounded and taken prisoner by the Seljuks. The survivors were many who fled the field and were pursued throughout the night, but not beyond that; by dawn, the professional core of the Byzantine army had been destroyed, while many of the peasant troops and levies who had been under the command of Andronikus had fled.