2026 northeastern Syria offensive


On 13 January 2026, the Syrian transitional government launched an offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the territories of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Initially focused on eastern Aleppo Governorate, around the towns of Deir Hafer and Maskanah, the offensive expanded on 17 January to Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakah Governorates.
On 18 January, the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa unilaterally announced a 14-point ceasefire agreement with the SDF, negotiated through the US envoy Tom Barrack, under which the SDF is set to be integrated into the Syrian government, and the governorates of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor immediately handed over to the government, together with the administration of prisoner-of-war camps for Islamic State members, all border crossings and oil fields. The SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi acknowledged the agreement later that day, saying that he would visit Damascus to discuss the deal. Clashes persisted the next day, with both sides accusing the other of violating the ceasefire. Media outlets reported that the meeting between Abdi and al-Sharaa had gone poorly, with no agreement being reached.
On 20 January, the Syrian government announced a ceasefire, starting at 20:00 local time. The army would not enter the city centres of al-Hasakah and Qamishli or Kurdish villages. Sharaa granted the SDF four days to work out an integration plan. On 24 January, after initial disclaimers, the Syrian government declared a 15-day extension of the ceasefire, effective from 23:00 local time, to support the US operation to transfer Islamic State detainees from SDF prisons to Iraq. On 30 January, the government announced that it had reached a comprehensive agreement with the SDF, which includes a ceasefire, gradual military and administrative integration, and the deployment of Interior Ministry forces in al-Hasakah and Qamishli.

Background

In December 2024, an offensive spearheaded by the Turkish-sponsored Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham ended with the fall of the Assad regime and brought the HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa to power as president of Syria in January 2025. The second administration of Donald Trump that also commenced in January 2025 saw the United States accept Syria as a Turkish sphere of influence, as President Trump renewed his push to withdraw US troops from the country. The "new era" in US–Turkish relations was marked by an increased US sympathy to Turkish complaints against the Syrian Democratic Forces and by the appointment of Tom Barrack as the US ambassador to Turkey and Syria, assumed in May 2025. In May 2025, during a visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump lifted the US economic sanctions against Syria.
Representatives of the Syrian Democratic Forces were not invited to the Syrian National Dialogue Conference of late February 2025, called by the Syrian transitional government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa as a consultative measure for the provisional Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic that was ratified on 13 March 2025. On 10 March 2025, following a three-month offensive by Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army against the SDF, the STG and the SDF signed an agreement concerning the integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions, whose implementation was delayed by further negotiations and fighting. The SDF continued to push for the federalization of Syria and presided over a gathering of Syria's minorities in al-Hasakah in August 2025. The conference's call for amending the transitional constitution drew condemnation from Damascus.
The territory controlled by DAANES was excluded by the Syrian transitional government from the parliamentary selection process in October 2025, with the allocated seats remaining empty, although in December 2025 Sharaa's electoral commission decided to appoint subcommittees to conduct the selection process in "some areas" of the Al-Hasakah and Raqqa governorates. In November 2025, while hosting Sharaa in Washington, D.C., Trump admitted Syria to the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, undermining SDF's position as the US strategic ally in the country.
On 4 January 2026, an SDF delegation led by the commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi met Syrian officials in Damascus for a new round of talks on integration per the March 2025 agreement. Brigadier General Kevin J. Lambert, the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, took part in the discussions per SDF media; it was not clear whether the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa was personally involved. Both sides announced that further talks would follow. The form of the agreed integration remained contested, with Damascus demanding individual absorption of SDF fighters into existing Syrian Army units. The government issued no official statement about the meeting, whereas the Syrian state television alleged that the meeting delivered no "tangible results" regarding the implementation of the existing agreement. According to the Kurdish side, the meeting achieved "a positive outcome" but was terminated abruptly by the Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani.
On 5 and 6 January, Syria's foreign minister al-Shaibani and General Intelligence Service director Hussein al-Salama met in Paris for a round of talks, mediated by the US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, with representatives of Israel, which had invaded Syria in 2024: ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's military secretary Roman Gofman and acting national security adviser Gil Reich. Under US guidance, the sides made first steps towards a projected broad security and economic cooperation pact similar to the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty that would eventually see the restoration of Golan Heights to Syria. The Syrian officials presented a plan to recapture some territory from the SDF, which they had previously accused Israel of backing, and met with no objection from the Israelis, despite Barrack's previous belief that Israel favoured Syria's division into cantons for strategic reasons. The Syrians also received from Turkey an assurance of American approval for their operation against the SDF, on the condition that "Kurdish civilians were protected".
On 6 January, the Syrian transitional government launched an offensive to capture the Kurdish inhabited Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood of Aleppo. Following days of clashes the Syrian army and SDF reached a ceasefire agreement on 10 January, under which the SDF withdrew from the neighborhood to northeastern Syria.
Before the larger operations took place, on 16 January, Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree in an attempt to ease tensions with the SDF, declaring the Kurds as a "basic part of Syrian people", also declaring Kurdish as a national language, and granting further rights to the Kurdish minority. On 28 January, Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab ordered the immediate implementation of a decree covering those who were formerly stateless, annulled the 1962 Hasakah census measures, and set 5 February 2026 as the deadline to finalize the process.

Offensive

Eastern Aleppo offensive

On 13 January, the Syrian army declared Maskanah and Deir Hafer as "closed military zones", accusing the SDF of regrouping in the area and using Iranian-made drones to launch attacks against civilians in Aleppo. The SDF reportedly destroyed three bridges linking SDF-controlled areas with government-held territory east of Aleppo. The Syrian army claimed that it had thwarted an attempt by the SDF to mine and blow up a bridge linking the villages of Rasm al-Imam and Rasm al-Krum, near Deir Hafer. On 14 January, the Syrian Army's Operations Authority announced the opening of a humanitarian corridor, that crosses Deir Hafer toward Hamima, controlled by the Syrian government forces and added that clashes occurred near the Tishrin Dam, the SDF repelled an assault in the city of Zubayda. On 15 January, the SDF closed the Tabqa, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor border crossings with the Syrian government, "until further notice".
On 16 January, SDF commander-in-chief, Mazloum Abdi said on Twitter that the SDF would withdraw from Deir Hafer on 17 January, that this step came "based on calls from friendly countries and mediators, and our demonstration of good faith in completing the merger process and commitment to implementing the terms of the March 10 agreement." Reportedly on the same day, six members of the SDF deserted to the Syrian government forces. The SDF repelled an attack on Tishrin Dam, claiming 10 tanks destroyed, the SOHR later confirmed two. The SDF repulsed numerous attacks near the Sarrin countryside.

Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor offensives

On 17 January, following mediation from the US, the SDF withdrew from Deir Hafer and Maskanah, with the Syrian army entering them a few hours later, with the local people greeting the Syrian army, the SDF reported clashes in, following a "betrayal" by the Syrian government forces and a violation of the agreement. Arab tribal leaders in SDF-held territory in Deir ez-Zor Governorate told Reuters they were ready to take up arms against the Kurdish force if Syria's army issued orders to do so.
The SDF accused the Syrian army of violating the withdrawal agreement by attacking its forces during its withdrawal. Two Syrian army soldiers were killed by the SDF in the ensuing clashes. In response, the Syrian government declared the territory west of the Euphrates, which was under SDF control, as a 'closed military zone', including the areas of southern Raqqa governorate with the city of Tabqa. After the exacerbated tensions, the Syrian army began attacking areas of Tabqa Canton.
On 18 January, Syrian government forces captured Al-Tabqah, Euphrates Dam and the Tabqa Airbase. Additionally, Syrian army captured the entire eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside, along with all its town and villages, as well as the oil and gas fields located in the region including the Al-Omar field, the country's largest, and the Conoco gas field. State-run Syrian Arab News Agency has reported that SDF has blown up a bridge connecting Raqqa and positions south of it, also cutting the water supply. At around noon, tribal forces took control of Raqqa after major clashes, with the Syrian army entering the city after a few hours.
An Associated Press journalist in the area said that local residents greeted the large military convoys of the Syrian transitional government that entered Raqqa, after the withdrawal of SDF forces from the city. Syrian military forces also took control of the oil fields in Raqqa, and of the Conoco gas field and Omar oil field in eastern Deir ez-Zor, after Arab tribal forces allied to the Syrian government advanced through the regions along the Syria-Iraq border. This was after Arab tribal fighters launched an offensive into the eastern bank of Euphrates and captured the al-Shuhayl and al-Busayrah towns.
The SDF repelled an attack by Syrian government forces in the village of Saida, in the rural area of Ayn Issa, while local tribal fighters reportedly captured Al-Shaddadah and Markada in Hasakah governorate. Additionally, tribal forces captured 13 villages to the south of the city of Hasakah.
On 20 January, the CJIT-OIR began targeting government aligned tribal fighters with airstrikes around Al-Hawl refugee camp. The SDF managed to repel numerous assaults on Al-Hawl camp and secured its southern perimeter, but later withdrew from the area, citing "international indifference" towards the issue of ISIS prisoners. The Syrian army reportedly deployed to positions that the formerly pro-SDF Shammari tribal fighters seized in northeastern Hasakah Governorate like the Al-Yaarubiyah border crossing with Iraq and Tell Hamis after they defected to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Syrian and Iraqi media reported that the tribal fighters are members of the Al-Sanadid Forces. Syrian forces also captured the Qara Qozak bridge and Sarrin, near Kobani.
Local sources reported that Syrian Forces took control three villages near Mount Abdulaziz in western Hasakah Governorate on 20 January without SDF resistance. Local sources separately reported that Syrian Forces took control of at least five villages north of the Qara Qozak Bridge without SDF resistance on 21 January. The MoD also advanced from Tal Hamis to take control of Tell Brak in Hasakah Governorate after the SDF withdrew from its positions there on 21 January.