Wolfpack Eisbär
Gruppe Eisbär was a force of German U-boats that operated from 23 August 1942 in the South Atlantic during the Second World War. The group was to operate off Cape Town, which was considered to be vulnerable. Some of the most experienced U-boat commanders including Harald Gelhaus, Werner Hartenstein and Carl Emmermann participated in the operation.
During the voyage south, the group temporarily was diverted to attack Convoy SL 119 that had been attacked by gruppe Iltis. sank on 27 August and sank the liner on 12 September, which began the Laconia Incident. U-156 was replaced in gruppe Eisbär by and the group was redirected to the waters around South Africa.
The Allies were preoccupied with Operation Torch and the campaign in north-west Africa, giving priority to the protection of troop convoys that left the Allied navies with few escort vessels to reinforce the South Atlantic Station. Merchant ships were sent to Durban instead of Cape Town and routed far to the south, across the South Atlantic to South America, thence to sail up the east coast, crossing the Atlantic from the US to Britain.
Gruppe Eisbär sank 23 ships off Cape Town and Durban along and eleven ships in transit, for the loss of. The 34 ships sunk averaged 8.5 ships per boat, one of the most successful U-boat operations of the war. The U-cruisers sank 27 ships of 161,407 GRT, an average of 6.75 ships per U-boat. Ammiraglio Cagni sank one ship making 28 ships and 163,400 GRT. About 2,690 crew, passengers, Italian internees and military personnel on the ships were killed.
Background
From mid-July 1942, to tie down Allied convoy escorts and to sink more ships in distant waters, four to six U-boats and a U-tanker operated in the middle-Atlantic, west of Freetown in Sierra Leone. On 7 August, a U-boat was allowed freedom of manoeuvre to commit reprisals against Brazil for its support of the Allied naval war, despite its neutral status but this gave Brazil a pretext to declare war on 28 August. As in 1941, an extension of operations to the South Atlantic was planned by the Naval War Staff for the summer of 1942, to exert strategic pressure.The sudden appearance of a U-boat group off South Africa was to inhibit the transport of Allied reinforcements to the Middle East and interrupt trade with India. To deny the Allies time for counter-measures, SKL wanted to conceal the voyage of the boats to the south for as long as possible. The U-boat commanders received orders to avoid contact with all merchant ships south of the Equator and only to attack valuable targets such as big warships.
Rear-Admiral Karl Dönitz the commander, U-boats disagreed with SKL because the strategic pressure that could be exerted was insufficient justification for a long-range operation. Dönitz wanted priority to remain with the tonnage war, with sinkings as the measure of success. The southern voyage of the boat should be used offensively, as far as 15° South. SKL, basing its strategic calculations on the widening war, refuse to relent until 6 September, when gruppe Eisbär received freedom of action against merchant shipping as far as 5° South.
At a review of naval operations in September 1942, Dönitz described to Hitler the declining prospects for U-boat operations off the east coast of the US, due to the introduction of convoys and increased air reconnaissance. The U-boats were to return to the North Atlantic, the coast of West Africa and to Cape Town in the South Atlantic. In 1941 the Germans had attempted to attack ships around South Africa but were defeated by the interception of German U-boat supply ships. For operations in 1942, Dönitz had available long-range Type IX submarines and supply boats to substitute for commerce raiders used earlier in the war. In mid-August the four Type IXC U-boats of gruppe Eisbär had sailed from France, followed at intervals by a second wave of four of the new and larger Type IXD2 submarines.
German plan
Dönitz and the commanders due to operate in Gruppe Eisbär intended that around 5 October 1942, and would conduct a reconnaissance of Table Bay near Cape Town, getting past the minefield sown by the German commerce raider Doggerbank earlier in the year and the defensive minefields laid by the British, using captured charts. In the early hours of 8 October, during the new moon, an attack on the expected fifty ships anchored there would be made. Outside the bay,, and would lie in ambush for fleeing ships. The boats might then raid the Indian Ocean, depending on circumstances.Royal Navy
Submarine Tracking Room
At the tracking room at the Admiralty, Commander Rodger Winn, kept watch over the deployment of U-boats and on 2 August, before the departure of the four Type IXC U-boats of Gruppe Eisbär, Winn speculated that the U-boats off Freetown and a possible move to Ascension Island might foreshadow a move further south. Winn thought that the departure of Gruppe Eisbär and its Milch Cow support boat, was for operations in far waters; Winn guessed that they were bound for the waters off South Africa. The departure of Gruppe Eisbär in mid-August and the sailing at intervals of four of the new and larger U-cruisers of the Type IXD2 class from 21 September, bore out Winn's analysis when was sunk on 12 September and U-156 began signalling for assistance on the international frequency. Survivors rescued by U-boats were transferred to Vichy rescue ships; Winn thought that the attack on Laconia was not conclusive but on 21 September, he warned the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic, that the arrival of U-boats in the south 'seemed imminent'. On 28 September Winn reported that the whereabouts of the U-boats was unknown but that two fishermen had reported seeing the landing of men from a U-boat about north of Cape Town.In early October, in a blunder by the censor, German news reported that U-boats were operating in the Far East. On 5 October, Winn reported that by mid-October, U-boats might operate in the Mozambique Channel and two days later a ship was sunk off Cape Town. The Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic had reduced the shipping at Cape Town by making Durban, on the east coast, the last stop for ships bound for Britain from the Indian Ocean. For the duration of Operation Torch, ships were routed far to the south of Cape Town and then north-west to Brazil, Trinidad and the US, to join convoys across the north Atlantic. Unknown to the British, gruppe Eisbär was not going to operate as a rudel in the South Atlantic but to disperse after the raid on Table Bay.
South Atlantic Station
In late 1942, the demands of Operation Torch, especially the duration of the campaign in Algeria and Tunisia, that ended in May 1943 and required more supplies from more convoys, stretched the Allied escort effort. The west Africa–south Africa–east Africa route continued without convoy for much longer; ships were sent on devious courses to evade U-boats but they had eventually to cross the South Atlantic. The naval forces of the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic were not adequate for an anti-U-boat campaign. Four destroyers and a few corvettes were based at Cape Town on loan from the Eastern Fleet based at Mombasa. There were not enough escorts or aircraft to convoy ships on the Cape to Freetown route up the west coast of Africa or the Cape to Suez route up the east coast. The British and the Americans diverted twelve British anti-submarine warfare trawlers from the Western Approaches and eighteen from US waters, along with six more destroyers and four corvettes from the Eastern Fleet. Four Catalina flying boats of 209 Squadron were transferred to Cape Town and Durban. The transfers took time and the trawlers from US waters did not arrive until December.Prelude
Convoy SL 119
Convoy SL 119 was found by of gruppe Iltis and directed the rest of the wolfpack,, and, along with the gruppe Eisbär boats in the vicinity, diverted by Dönitz from the voyage to the South African coast, comprising the Type IXC U-boats,, U-172 and U-504. U-566 sank two ships with a total of 14,085 GRT on 28 August before being damaged by depth charges; U-107 was forced to retire and on 29 August the other boats were also ended their attacks. U-156 sank on 27 August and on 12 September sank Laconia causing the Laconia incident.Raeder and SKL
Dönitz was overruled by Generaladmiral Erich Raeder the Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine and SKL. Gruppe Eisbär was redirected southwards to Cape Town, refuelling from the tanker south of Ascension Island. U-68 had sunk the British ship on 12 September and the Dutch ship .Operations
Cape Town
On the night of 6/7 October, U-68 had been in position for five days, photographing the bay. Emmermann in U-172 had a Metox radar detector and moved towards Table Bay on the surface, placing most of the crew on the deck, wearing life jackets, in case a mine was set off. Emmermann kept the boat on the surface for several hours so that the crew could take turns on deck to watch the peaceful scene as the other boats lay in wait outside the bay. The bay was seen to be empty and covered by searchlights and radar, precluding the likelihood of the attack achieving surprise. Emmermann submerged U-172 before dawn and watched through the periscope in brilliant sunshine.Outside the bay, U-159 sank the British. The captains of U-68 and U-172 contacted BdU to request that the plan be abandoned but Dönitz wanted them to continue. At midnight on 8 October when the attack was due to begin, Cape Town had not been blacked out and the authorities were ignorant of the attack on Boringia. Having received a garbled reply, Emmermann 'assumed that BdU had agreed to the cancellation and that he had freedom of action' from on 7 October.
U-172 sank the US ship and then the Panamanian. U-172 sank with a torpedo and U-68 used seven torpedoes to sink the Greek freighter and the Dutch, both of which managed to transmit distress signals. At dawn the destroyers, and and, with the corvette sailed and spent much of the day rescuing survivors. Every aircraft that was airworthy went aloft to reconnoitre. The next morning, when tried to rescue the 28 survivors of Boringia it was torpedoed and another seven members of the crew of Boringia were killed along with 53 from Clan Mactavish. Aircraft on anti-submarine patrol guided to the area to rescue survivors who were landed at Cape Town.
Other attacks
U-159 had gone into action off Cape Town on and sank the US ship on 9 October then survived a depth-charge attack by a South African aircraft. U-159 moved to the south-east and sank, and, all British, by the end of the month. On 7 November, the US ship,, to the south-east of the Cape of Good Hope, was destroyed when its cargo of ammunition exploded, the sound being heard away at the Cape Point lighthouse. The next ship sunk was a US schooner,, by gunfire, the survivors making a -voyage to Angola.By this time, U-159 was on the return leg of its voyage and refuelled from U-461 before sailing for St Paul's Rocks, about to the north-east of Brazil, then raiding along the Brazilian coast. U-159 sank the liner, from which 120 of the 130 crew and passengers survived, twelve of whom were rescued by, which U-159 sank on 15 December. was sunk on 16 December and then U-159 sailed for Lorient in France.
On 8 October, U-172 had sunk the Panamanian and the Greek Pantelis. Anti-submarine vessels from Cape Town attacked the U-boat, which escaped with minor damage. On 10 October the troopship, en route from Suez to Britain, was sunk in a storm. BdU sent U-172 to Brazilian coastal waters and in mid-November, it sank and in the South Atlantic, then off the Brazilian coast then sank the US off St Paul's Rocks, before refuelling for the voyage home.
On 8 October, after U-68 had sunk the Greek Koumoundouros and the Dutch Gaasterkerk, it sank the US tanker and the British liner. On 9 October, the US ship was sunk, followed by the emigré-manned. On 29 October, short of fuel, U-68 began the journey home and on 6 November, about south of Saint Helena sank with the loss of 104 crew and passengers. The captain, Karl-Friedrich Merten, surfaced and gave the survivors a compass course for Saint Helena.
U-504 commenced operations off Cape Town on 17 October then headed up the east coast of South Africa and sank. All but three of the crew of Empire of Chaucer survived, the captain and 11 men being rescued by Empire Squire, after 23 days fifteen men were rescued by SS Nebraska and another 14 landed at Bredasdorp in the Western Cape, after a two-week voyage. On 23 October, was sunk off East London and on 26 October U-504 sank the US ship, followed on 31 October by the British east of Durban and off Madagascar. U-504 sank the Brazilian east of Port Elizabeth on its return voyage.
U-cruiser attacks
U-178 sank the troopship on the voyage to the south, rounded the cape and began operations off Durban. After failing to catch a tanker and using two torpedoes to no effect on a freighter, the U-boat barely escaped an attack from an aircraft. On 1 November an attack on what was thought to be but was the British succeeded, in which 150 of the 400 people on board were killed. Ibbeken circumnavigated Madagascar, sinking the Norwegian and the 5,200 GRT British ship but engine trouble led to less success than anticipated. Off Durban, the British Louise Moller was sunk but the British 6,300 GRT Adviser was damaged and later towed into Durban. ASW aircraft made two attacks on U-178, after which the captain sailed far offshore to repair its engines, then began the return journey to France. As U-178 rounded the Cape an attack sank the US ship Jeremiah Wadsworth, returning on 9 January 1943 with six recognised sinkings of 47,000 GRT.U-177 and U-181 reached Cape Town at about the same time and on 2 November, U-177 attacked the Greek with four torpedoes, missing with two, but the two that hit set off the cargo of ammunition and the ship exploded, showering the submarine with débris, injuring a lookout. For the next ten days the submarines searched off Cape Town, U-177 attacked the 2,600 GRT US freighter during a five-hour chase and missed with five torpedoes. U-177 surfaced and engaged the ship with its deck gun but the Americans fired back and escaped. From 19 November U-177 patrolled off Lourenço Marques and over 26 days sank six ships and a tanker of 44,800 GRT. was a troopship with 899 passengers, 765 interned Italian civilians and 134 South African troops, torpedoed on 18 November. When Gysae realised he signalled Dönitz who forbade rescue attempts. Two passengers were taken prisoner and about 400 survivors were in boats and on rafts. Dönitz notified the Portuguese who sent from Mozambique, that rescued 192 people, 43 of them South African troops. About 750 people were killed; 120 bodies were washed ashore at Durban and many of the 630 missing died in shark attacks. U-177 returned to France on 22 January after 128 days, with eight ships confirmed sunk of 49,371 GRT.
On 3 November, U-181 sank the American with two of four torpedoes, 34 of the crew of fifty being killed. U-181 sank with three crew killed and 46 rescued on 8 November, the Norwegian vessel on 10 November and the American on 13 November. Two days later the destroyer forced U-181 to dive to, dropping 30 depth charges over a nine-hour attack. The corvettes and arrived and continued the hunt, Jasmine dropping five depth charges, before U-181 escaped in the noise of the depth charge explosions and the dark, to make repairs. After repairing the damage U-181 moved about to Lourenço Marques and from 19 November to 2 December sank eight ships of 23,800 GRT, using all 355 rounds of deck gun ammunition that caused many casualties and risked U-181 being caught on the surface. Lüth kept back two torpedoes and reached France on 18 January after a voyage of 129 days, having sunk twelve ships of 58,381 GRT.
U-179 had not been diverted to Convoy SL 119 and on the afternoon of 8 October, while south of Cape Town, dived to avoid a Ventura maritime reconnaissance bomber of the South African Air Force. Before night fell was torpedoed then U-179 dived to after seeing another aircraft. The crew of the freighter managed to launch all six lifeboats that were spotted by another Ventura. Many other ships were under attack and sending distress calls but Active was diverted to rescue the survivors and took on board the crew, less one man, by The destroyer got a radar contact to the south-east, followed by an Asdic contact then a sighting. Active accelerated to, opened fire and then dropped depth-charges that brought the U-boat to the surface, after which it sank out of view. No wreckage was found but a large oil slick formed.
Ammiraglio Cagni sank the Greek ship on 29 November but a greater ASW effort being made off the Cape of Good Hope led the commander, Carlo Liannazza, to sail for home, refuelling near the equator from U-459 and returning to BETASOM.
Aftermath
Analysis
In 2000, Clay Blair called the gruppe Eisbär operation one of the most successful U-boat efforts of the war. Four Type IX boats sank 23 ships off Cape Town and Durban along with eleven ships in transit to and from the cape for a total of 34 ships, an average of 8.5 ships per boat, a greater monthly success than the best month of attacks off the US coast. The U-cruisers that operated off Cape Town and Durban sank 27 ships of 161,407 GRT, an average of 6.75 ships per U-boat. The ship sunk by Ammiraglio Cagni raised the total to 28 ships and 163,400 GRT.In the latter half of 1942, roughly fifty U-boats operated around the Azores, Canary Islands, Freetown Sierra Leone, further south and around Cape Town and Durban. The U-boats sank about 150 ships of around 900,000 GRT for the loss of three U-boats and their crews, fifty ships for each U-boat, that was called an "extraordinary achievement" by Blair and an embarrassing failure for the British anti-submarine effort in southern waters. Since the position of ship losses were not disclosed by the Allies, the impression that north Atlantic convoys were being massacred was increased.
In 2000, Werner Rahn, a German military historian and one of the authors of Germany and the Second World War wrote that though the British had discovered the southward movement of the boats and had taken such defensive measures as they could by rerouting ships, the U-boats sank 15 ships in five days from 7 October. By November, 156,235 GRT had been sunk, 28 per cent of all U-boat sinkings in October. The U-boats began their return journeys from the South Atlantic in early November. Gruppe Eisbär was followed by a second wave of Type IXD2 U-cruisers, with a range of at obviating the need to refuel and take on supplies.
The U-cruisers sailed along the African coast into the Indian Ocean as far north as Lourenço Marques and by mid-December 1942, had sunk 25 ships. BdU tried to keep a standing patrol in the area for the next few months but the British introduction of convoy made it impossible to maintain the rate of sinking. Rahn wrote that strategically, Gruppe Eisbär and the U-cruisers were at least six months too late. The sinkings off Cape Town and in the Indian Ocean did little to obstruct the reinforcement of the British in Egypt and the offensive that followed the defence of El Alamein because the bulk of it has already arrived.
In 2005, Richard Woodman wrote that for the loss of U-179 the German long-range submarines exposed the vulnerability of British shipping, that was necessarily dispersed all over the globe. Woodman speculated about what might have happened if Dönitz had had the bigger, long-range U-boats at the start of the war. The sinking of U-179 from gruppe Eisbär was the only result of the anti-submarine effort made in the region, because the U-boats did not follow Rudeltaktik but operated individually in an orgy of destruction.