Siegfried Line campaign
The Siegfried Line campaign was a phase in the Western European campaign of World War II, which involved engagements near the German defensive Siegfried Line.
This campaign spanned from the end of Operation Overlord and the push across northern France, which ended on 15 September 1944, and concluded with the opening of the German Ardennes counteroffensive, better known as the Battle of the Bulge.
Background
German forces had been routed during the Allied break-out from Normandy. The Allies advanced rapidly against an enemy that put up little resistance. But after the liberation of Paris in late August 1944, the Allies paused to re-group and organise before continuing their advance from Paris to the River Rhine. The pause allowed the Germans to solidify their lines—something they had been unable to do west of Paris.By the middle of September 1944, the three Western Allied army groups; the Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group in the north, the United States U.S. 12th Army Group in the center, and the Franco-American 6th Army Group in the south, formed a broad front under the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his headquarters SHAEF.
While Montgomery and Bradley each favored relatively direct thrusts into Germany, General Eisenhower disagreed. Instead, he chose a "broad-front" strategy, which allowed the Allies to gain ground from the beaten Germans in all sectors, allowed the advancing Allied forces to support each other.
The rapid advance through France had caused considerable logistical strain, made worse by the lack of any major port other than the relatively distant Cherbourg in western France. Although Antwerp was seen as the key to solving the Allied logistics problems, its port was not open to Allied shipping until the Scheldt estuary was clear of German forces. As the campaign progressed, all the belligerents, Allied as well as German, felt the effects of the lack of suitable replacements for front-line troops.
There were two major defensive obstacles to the Allies. The first was the natural barriers made by the rivers of eastern France. The second was the Siegfried Line, which fell under the command, along with all Wehrmacht forces in the west, of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt.
Logistics and supply
Although the breakout from Normandy had taken longer than planned, the advances until September had far exceeded expectations. Bradley, for example, by September had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were ahead of their expected position. One effect was that insufficient supplies could be delivered to the various fronts to maintain the advance: demand had exceeded the expected needs.Image:Omaha Mulberry Harbour.jpg|thumb|Mulberry 'A' off Omaha Beach was critical in the early days for Allied supplies.
Much war materiel still had to be brought ashore across the invasion beaches and through the one remaining Mulberry harbour. Although small harbours, such as Isigny, Port-en-Bessin, and Courcelles, were being used, the major forward ports such as Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk and Le Havre either remained in German hands as "fortresses" or had been systematically destroyed. The availability of Cherbourg had been valuable until the breakout, but then the shortage of transport to carry supplies to the rapidly advancing armies became the limiting factor.
Although fuel was successfully pumped from Britain to Normandy via the Pluto pipeline, this still had to reach the fronts, which were advancing faster than the pipelines could be extended. The railways had been largely destroyed by Allied attacks and would take much effort to repair, so fleets of trucks were needed in the interim. In an attempt to address this acute shortage of transport, three newly arrived U.S. infantry divisions—the 26th, 95th, and 104th—were stripped of their trucks in order to haul supplies. Advancing divisions of the U.S. 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans. Another 1,500 British trucks were found to have critical engine faults and were unusable, limiting assistance from that quarter. The Red Ball Express was an attempt to expedite deliveries by truck but capacity was inadequate for the circumstances.
The 6th Army Group advancing from southern France were supplied adequately from Toulon and Marseille because it had captured ports intact and the local railway system was less damaged. This source supplied about 25% of the Allied needs.
At this time the main Allied supply lines still ran back to Normandy, presenting serious logistical problems. The solution was to open the port of Antwerp. This major port had been captured at 90% intact on 4 September, but the occupation of Antwerp was not enough as the 21st Army Group failed to gain sea access by clearing the Scheldt estuary. So the port could not be used until 29 November after a protracted campaign by the Canadian First Army; initially the estuary was weakly held, but the German 15th Army was allowed to dig in there.
The delay in securing this area has been blamed on General Eisenhower as the 21st Army Group commander, Field Marshal Montgomery favored Operation Market-Garden and opening the French Channel ports over clearing the approaches to the port of Antwerp in the Battle of the Scheldt. However, even if the Scheldt Estuary had been secured immediately at the start of September, the port of Antwerp would not solve the supply crisis in that month, for the approaches had been mined by the Germans two months earlier, and when finally taken it took one month to clear it.
Manpower
The German armies had lost large numbers of troops in Normandy and the subsequent pursuit. To counteract this, about 20,000 Luftwaffe personnel were reallocated to the German Army, invalided troops were redrafted into the front line and Volkssturm units were formed using barely trained civilians.British manpower resources were limited after five years of war and through worldwide commitments. Replacements were no longer adequate to cover losses and some formations were disbanded to maintain the strength of others. The Canadians were also short of manpower, due to a reluctance to require conscripts to serve outside Canada or Canadian waters. This had arisen from Conscription Crisis of 1917 during World War I; to avoid similar problems in World War II, the National Resources Mobilization Act of 1940 prohibited sending conscripts overseas. However, this provision of the Act was later removed, leading to the Conscription Crisis of 1944.
American losses now called on replacements direct from the United States. They were often inexperienced and not used to the harsh conditions of the latter part of the campaign. There were also complaints about the poor quality of troops released into the infantry from less-stressed parts of the U.S. Army. At one point, after the Battle of the Bulge had highlighted the shortage of infantrymen, the Army relaxed its embargo on the use of black soldiers in combat formations. Black volunteers performed well throughout the phase and prompted a permanent change in military policy.
Campaign
Northern Group of Armies (21st Army Group)
Channel ports
The Channel ports were urgently needed to maintain the Allied armies. By the time that Brussels was liberated, it had become difficult to supply the 21st Army Group adequately. Indeed, one corps—VIII Corps—was withdrawn from active service to free its transport for general use. The Canadian First Army was tasked with liberating the ports during its advance along the French coast. The ports involved were Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk in France, as well as Ostend in Belgium. Adolf Hitler had appreciated their strategic value. He issued a Führer Order declaring them to be "fortresses" that must receive adequate materiel for a siege and be held to the last man.Dieppe was evacuated by the Germans before Hitler's order had been received and, consequently, the Canadians took it with little trouble and with the port installations largely intact. Ostend had been omitted from the Führer Order and was also undefended, although demolitions delayed its use. The other ports were defended to varying degrees, however, and they required substantial work to bring them into use, except for Dunkirk which was sealed off to the rear of the Allied advance.
Market Garden
The first operation of the Rhineland campaign, Market Garden, was commanded by Montgomery and was to secure a bridgehead over the Rhine in the north, at Arnhem, which would outflank the Siegfried Line.Market Garden had two distinct parts. Market was to be the largest airborne operation in history, dropping three and a half divisions of American, British, and Polish paratroopers to capture key bridges and prevent their demolition by the Germans. Garden was a ground attack by the British Second Army across the bridges. It was assumed that the German forces would still be recovering from the previous campaign and opposition would not be very stiff for either operation.
If successful, the Allies would have a direct route into Germany that bypassed the main German defenses and also seize territory from which the Germans launched V-1s and V-2s against London, Antwerp and elsewhere.
General Eisenhower approved Market Garden. On September 10 he gave supply priority to the 21st Army Group and decided to divert the U.S. First Army to the north of the Ardennes to stage limited attacks to draw German defenders south, away from the target sites.
The operation was launched on 17 September. At first, it went well. The U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions took their objectives at Eindhoven, Veghel and Nijmegen. However, the 82nd failed to capture its main objectives, the Nijmegen bridges, and instead its commander focused on the Groesbeek Heights. Although their landings outside Arnhem were on target, the British 1st Airborne Division landing zones were some distance from Arnhem bridge and only on the north side of the river. Problems arose when the British 1st Airborne Division lost vital equipment—jeeps and heavy anti-tank guns—when gliders crashed. There had also been a severe underestimation of German strength in the area. To make matters worse, poor weather prevented aerial reinforcements and drastically reduced resupply. German resistance to the forces driving to Arnhem was highly effective, and a copy of the Allied battle plan had been captured.
In the end, Market Garden was unsuccessful. Arnhem bridge was not held and the British paratroops suffered tremendous casualties—approximately 77% by 25 September. The failure of the 82nd to capture the Nijmegen bridges in a coup de main meant that the British ground forces meant to relieve the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem were delayed for 36 hours, as the Guards Armoured Division, despite arriving in Nijmegen ahead of schedule, was forced to pour its forces to capture the bridges, instead of simply moving across, as had been planned. The allies managed to hold on to the salient in early October by repelling a German counter offensive.