Accession of Serbia to the European Union

Serbia applied to join the European Union in 2009 and has been a candidate for membership since 2012, while negotiations started in 2014 and are still ongoing.

WWW seio.gov.rs

History

Relations between the European Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia got a fresh start following the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, and the EU officially declared the Balkan states potential candidates for membership following the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003.
On 7 November 2007, Serbia initiated a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union. The SAA came into force on 1 September 2013. The European Commission recommended making Serbia an official candidate on 12 October 2011. The Council of the European Union also made the recommendation on 28 February 2012. Serbia received full candidate status on 1 March 2012. In December 2013, the Council of the European Union approved opening negotiations for Serbia's accession. Serbia officially applied for European Union membership on 22 December 2009 and was granted official candidate status on 1 March 2012. Negotiations on accession to the EU started on 21 January 2014.
Until 2020, Serbia had been receiving €2.9 billion of developmental aid from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a funding mechanism for EU candidate countries.
In 2024, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić stated that Serbia would meet all the criteria to join the European Union by 2026 or 2027, however, not promising an immediate accession in either 2026, 2027, or even 2028. These statements reflect his earlier ones, when he stated that Serbia would probably have to wait for six years to join the European Union, in 2030. The 2030 target was later supported by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, during the Bled Strategic Forum, who stated that such enlargement should be ready to proceed by 2030. However, in 2025, during a meeting in Rome regarding the Western Balkans "expansion", Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Antonio Tajani, with the presence of the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, stated that a possible entry year for the nation could be 2029 instead.

Membership talks

No further progress on the opening or closing of chapters have been achieved since December 2021. Benchmarks were met for the opening of all three remaining chapters in cluster 3 in December 2024, but this was postponed due the opening being conditional on "substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the rule of law and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo".

Progression	34 / 34	34 / 34	22 / 34	2 / 34	-
Acquis Chapter	Screening Started	Screening Completed	Chapter Opened	Chapter Closed	-
Overview	34 out of 34	34 out of 34	22 out of 34	2 out of 34	-
1. Free Movement of Goods	2014-06-17	2014-09-12	–	–	-
2. Freedom of Movement For Workers	2014-01-23	2014-03-25	–	–	-
3. Right of Establishment & Freedom To Provide Services	2014-01-30	2014-03-13	–		-
4. Free Movement of Capital	2014-10-13	2014-12-15	2019-12-10	–	-
5. Public Procurement	2014-03-21	2014-05-13	2016-12-13	–	-
6. Company Law	2014-12-11	2015-02-05	2017-12-11	–	-
7. Intellectual Property Law	2014-09-24	2014-11-13	2017-06-20	–	-
8. Competition Policy	2014-03-31	2014-11-05	–	–	-
9. Financial Services	2015-01-21	2015-03-17	2019-06-27	–	-
10. Information Society & Media	2014-05-22	2014-07-02	–	–	-
11. Agriculture & Rural Development	2014-03-18	2014-09-16	–	–	-
12. Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy	2014-02-03	2014-10-24	–	–	-
13. Fisheries	2014-09-30	2014-11-14	2018-06-25	–	-
14. Transport Policy	2014-12-16	2015-02-27	2021-12-14	–	-
15. Energy	2014-04-29	2014-06-12	2021-12-14	–	-
16. Taxation	2014-10-14	2015-03-06	–		-
17. Economic & Monetary Policy	2014-12-02	2015-03-12	2018-12-10	–	-
18. Statistics	2014-05-20	2014-11-26	2018-12-10	–
19. Social Policy & Employment	2014-02-10	2014-06-26	–	–	-
20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy	2014-04-03	2014-07-02	2017-02-27	–
21. Trans-European Networks	2014-04-29	2015-02-27	2021-12-14	–
22. Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments	2014-10-01	2015-01-29	–	–	-
23. Judiciary & Fundamental Rights	2013-09-25	2013-12-10	2016-07-18	–	-
24. Justice, Freedom & Security	2013-10-02	2013-12-13	2016-07-18	–	-
25. Science & Research	2014-10-06	2014-12-01	2016-12-13	2016-12-13	-
26. Education & Culture	2014-02-20	2014-04-04	2017-02-27	2017-02-27	-
27. Environment	2014-09-15	2014-11-21	2021-12-14	–	-
28. Consumer & Health Protection	2014-12-04	2015-02-04	–	–	-
29. Customs Union	2014-03-26	2014-06-04	2017-06-20	–	-
30. External Relations	2014-07-02	2014-10-09	2017-12-11	–	-
31. Foreign, Security & Defence Policy	2014-07-15	2014-10-10	–	–	-
32. Financial Control	2013-10-17	2013-11-26	2015-12-14	–	-
33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions	2015-01-27	2015-03-24	2018-06-25	–	-
34. Institutions	–	–	–	–	-
35. Other Issues: Relations with Kosovo*	2014-01-22	2015-03-25	2015-12-14	–	-
Progression	34 / 34	34 / 34	22 / 34	2 / 34	-

Main political issues

Obstacles for accession include the requirement to recognize statehood for Kosovo, foreign policy alignment with Russia, democratic backsliding, and domestic policies such as rule of law and media freedom.

Kosovo

The biggest obstacle to Serbia's accession to the EU is its strained relationship with Kosovo, which escalated after the 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence. The Serbian government has declared that the status of Kosovo should not be tied to the EU negotiations. In 2012, the EU Enlargement Commissioner, Štefan Füle, denied that the European Union would insist on Serbia's recognition of Kosovo before it can join the organisation.
In 2013, the governments of Kosovo and Serbia completed the Brussels Agreement, which was hailed as a major step towards normalising relations and enabled the start of EU accession talks with Serbia. Later that year, Kosovo's Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxhaj suggested that the EU should approve the accession of Kosovo and Serbia simultaneously due to concerns that if Serbia was admitted first they could veto Kosovo's membership. However, Serbia's accession negotiations were not halted.
In 2021, the European Parliament adopted a report on Serbia, which, amongst other things, emphasized that the normalization of relationships between Serbia and Kosovo is "a priority and a requirement for EU accession."
In 2024, the opening of remaining chapters in Cluster 3 was postponed partially due to "substantial further progress made by Serbia, in particular in accordance with...the normalisation of relations with Kosovo", further evidencing an expectation that the country address the issue as part of accession negotiations.

Alignment with the EU's foreign policy

Serbia refused to join international sanctions against Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In response, the European Parliament passed a resolution that stated in part it "strongly regrets Serbia’s non-alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, which damages its EU accession process".

Democratic backsliding

Electoral Issues

Serbia’s electoral framework faced criticism for requiring comprehensive reform. Recommendations from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights remained unimplemented, including measures to ensure voter transparency, campaign oversight, and media independence. A parliamentary working group on electoral reform, chaired by a civil society organization representative, failed to reach consensus, leading to the withdrawal of opposition and CSOs by February 2025. Local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić in June 2025 were deemed "neither free nor fair" by domestic CSO observers, citing a climate of fear, institutional pressure, and heavy police presence. Gender representation in politics remained inadequate, particularly at the local level, despite a 40% gender quota for electoral lists.

Parliamentary Challenges

The Serbian Parliament faced issues of limited autonomy, infrequent sessions, and lack of genuine political debate. The government dominated the legislative agenda, with nearly all laws proposed by the executive. Plenary and committee sessions were marked by tensions, offensive language, and occasional verbal and physical incidents. The Speaker was criticized for biased responses during debates. In November 2024, 68 acts, including the state budget, were adopted without discussion, and opposition motions to dismiss the Speaker were excluded from the agenda, violating constitutional rules. Public hearings were limited, with only 11 held in 2025 and two in 2024.

EU Integration

Serbia aimed to meet EU membership criteria by the end of 2026, adopting a revised National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis and a plan for fulfilling EU accession obligations in 2025. However, progress in aligning with the EU acquis was slow, with centralized coordination structures limiting civil society involvement. The Ministry for European Integration served as the focal point for consultations, but the National Convention on the EU, a CSO platform, suspended cooperation with authorities in February 2025, citing a deteriorating environment for civil society and lack of meaningful participation.

Governance

The practical exercise of presidential powers sparked debate, with concerns that the President’s influence exceeded constitutional limits. Following the Novi Sad tragedy, two ministers resigned in late 2024, and the Prime Minister resigned on January 28, 2025. A new government, with no change in political composition or ministerial posts, was appointed on April 16, 2025, including nine women and representatives of national minorities. The autonomy of independent bodies remained limited, with their recommendations often ignored. Local self-government faced challenges, including weak administrative capacity and delays in adopting the Law on Vojvodina’s financing resources.

Civil Society

Civil society organizations operated in an increasingly hostile environment, facing verbal attacks, smear campaigns, and strategic lawsuits against public participation. Reports emerged of spyware targeting human rights defenders and journalists. In February 2025, police searched the offices of four CSOs, accusing them of money laundering, an action widely perceived as intimidation. A proposed law on foreign influence agents, though not discussed in Parliament, further threatened CSOs. In response, 29 CSOs withdrew from government working groups, and the Council for Cooperation and Development of Civil Society saw frozen memberships due to inadequate responses to attacks on activists.

Security Oversight

The parliamentary Committee for the Oversight of Security Services dismissed allegations of excessive measures, such as the use of a sonic device during a March 15, 2025, protest in Belgrade. The civilian security agency was reported to have detained and questioned activists during the protests, with claims of an attempted "colour revolution." A law granting access to state security files remained unadopted.

Impact and Legacy

The 2024–2025 protests highlighted deep-seated issues in Serbia’s democratic institutions, including electoral integrity, parliamentary effectiveness, and civil society freedoms. The government’s response, oscillating between tolerance and repression, underscored tensions in Serbia’s political landscape. The events also strained Serbia’s EU accession process, with calls for more transparent and inclusive reforms to align with democratic standards.

Public opinion on EU membership

Serbian public support for the country joining the EU has significantly waned over the years, while at the same time leaning toward maintaining strong ties with Russia and China which are seen as reliable allies. Serbia’s EU membership has experienced growing skepticism stemming from slow accession negotiations progress, and the Kosovo dispute.
The European Union's push for Serbia to normalize relations with Kosovo, which is seen in Serbia as including implicit recognition, in particular is a major factor contributing to waning support. The vast majority of the Serbian public view Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, and the EU’s stance is seen as pressuring Serbia to relinquish its sovereignty. Russia and China’s support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo bolsters their favorability over the EU.
The most recent poll, from March 2025, found that if a referendum on joining the EU took place, 38.9% would vote in favour of joining the EU, with 43.2% voting against, and 17.9% unsure or abstaining.
According to the 2025 annual survey of opinion in Serbia, 38% of citizens have a positive attitude towards the EU, while trust in the EU is 38%. It is also revealed that 33% of citizens would vote in favour of Serbia's membership of the EU if a referendum was held, while 41% of citizens believe that EU membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages.

Date	Question	Yes	No	Undecided
2002	Join EU?	68%	13%	19%
2003	Join EU?	72%	8%	20%
2004	Join EU?	71%	12%	17%
2005	Join EU?	64%	12%	24%
2006	Join EU?	70%	12%	18%
2007	Join EU?	69%	15%	15%
2008	Join EU?	61%	13%	26%
2009	Join EU?	65%	14%	21%
2010	Join EU?	57%	18%	25%
2011	Join EU?	51%	28%	21%
2012	Join EU?	41%	31%	27%
2013	Join EU?	51%	22%	27%
2014	Join EU?	44%	25%	31%
2015	Join EU?	48%	28%	24%
2016	Join EU?	47%	29%	24%
2017	Join EU?	52%	24%	24%
2018	Join EU?	55%	25%	20%
2019	Join EU?	54%	24%	22%
2022	Join EU?	43%	32%	25%

Date	Agency	Question	Yes	No	Undecided
2008	Strategic Marketing	How would you vote on a referendum on joining EU?	61%	–	–
2010	Gallup Balkan Monitor	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	63%	–	–
2011	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2012	B92/Ipsos Strategic Marketing	How would you vote on a referendum on joining EU?	49%	34%	5%
2013	Ipsos Strategic Marketing	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	53%	–	–
2014	Eurobarometer	Do you support the enlargement of EU?	58%	26%	16%
2015	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2016	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2017	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2018	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2019	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2021	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2022	Ipsos	How would you vote on a referendum on joining EU?	35%	44%	21%
2023	Smart Plus	How would you vote on a referendum on joining EU?	44%	30%	15%
2024	NSPM	Do you support accession of Serbia to EU?	%	%	%
2025	NSPM	How would you vote on a referendum on joining EU?	%	%	%