Russian mafia
The Russian mafia, also known as bratva, is a collective of various organized crime related elements originating and operating in Russia. Any of the mafia's groups may be referred to as an "Organized Criminal Group". This is sometimes modified to include a specific name, such as the Orekhovskaya OPG. Sometimes, the Russian word is dropped in favour of a full translation, and OCG is used instead of OPG.
In December 2009, Timur Lakhonin, the head of the National Central Bureau of Interpol within Russia, stated that "Certainly, there is crime involving our former compatriots abroad, but there is no data suggesting that an organized structure of criminal groups comprising former Russians exists abroad" on the topic of international Russian criminal gangs. In August 2010, Alain Bauer, a criminologist from France, said that the Russian mafia "is one of the best structured criminal organizations in Europe, with a quasi-military operation" in their international activities.
The Russian mafia, according to Mark Galeotti, an expert in modern Russia, is a highly organized and global criminal network that emerged and expanded significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. During this time, Russian criminals sought to establish themselves on the international stage, anticipating political instability and economic collapse in Russia. Their activities initially focused on the illicit trade of goods, such as Afghan heroin, which they transported across Europe to sell to local gangs rather than directly selling on the streets. Over the years, Russian gangsters evolved into skilled intermediaries, working alongside other major criminal organizations, adapting to local markets and focusing on providing services rather than attempting to control entire territories. While the Russian mafia remains focused on making money, their relationships with the state have evolved over time. The Russian government has used criminal networks as a geopolitical tool, leveraging their capabilities for state interests. However, Galeotti emphasizes that the connection between the Russian government and organized crime is not one of direct control, but rather a pragmatic approach where the state sets boundaries for these groups and occasionally enlists their services. This reflects a broader shift from the 1990s, when the political elite and organized crime were more intertwined, to the present day, where the state is attempting to distance itself from direct associations with criminal groups while still utilizing them when necessary.
Terminology
The term "Russian mafia" is a general label used to describe a broad and complex network of organized crime groups that originated in Russia and other former Soviet republics. While this term is widely recognized in both public discourse and media portrayals, particularly in the Western world, it does not reflect the nuanced internal classifications and terminology employed within these criminal structures or by law enforcement and criminologists. In summary, "Russian Mafia" is a convenient umbrella term, the actual structure is more like a loose network of autonomous criminal organizations with their own codes, leaders, and spheres of influence.A central concept in the nomenclature of Russian organized crime is "Vory v Zakone", which translates to "Thieves in Law". This designation refers to a high-ranking, elite status within the criminal hierarchy. Individuals who hold this title are bound by a strict moral code and are expected to reject cooperation with state authorities. Their role is both symbolic and practical, often acting as arbiters and authority figures within the criminal community. They are typically identified by extensive and symbolically significant tattoos that represent their status, personal history, and adherence to the code.
In contrast, the term "Bratva", meaning "brotherhood," is more colloquial and is commonly used within the criminal environment to refer to fellow group members or associates. It does not denote a specific hierarchical status but rather conveys solidarity and group affiliation.
Law enforcement agencies, particularly in Russia and former Soviet states, use more technical terminology. Notably, OPG and OPS are formal terms that translate to "organized crime group" and "organized crime community," respectively. These terms are often employed in legal and investigative contexts to classify and prosecute criminal organizations.
Moreover, many of these groups are named according to their regional origins, such as the Solntsevskaya Bratva, the Tambovskaya Bratva, the Izmaylovskaya gang, among other. While they may operate independently, these groups often maintain alliances or engage in competition, depending on their economic interests.
History
Origins
Background
The main form of organized criminal activity up until the 1930s in Russia was political banditry, represented in the 17th and 18th centuries by peasant gangs led by bandit chieftains, like Stenka Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev, and in the 19th and early 20th centuries by groups pursuing revolutionary and later counter-revolutionary goals, such as the Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionary gangs and Counter-revolutionary gangs. The authorities in power always sought to suppress them completely, sometimes using very brutal methods.By the early 1930s, the activity of politically organized criminal groups had been suppressed by harsh repressive measures. The curtailment of the NEP policy led to the virtual disappearance of economic criminals, who were equated with state criminals and were also subjected to repression. A new criminal world was formed, in which the main unifying force was the tendency for non-political opposition and disobedience to authority, the elite of which were the so-called "Thieves in law", who called themselves the guardians of the criminal traditions of pre-revolutionary Russia.
At the same time, a subculture of a criminal society was formed with its own language, code of conduct, customs and traditions, which included a complete rejection of social norms and rules, including those related to the family and an equally complete ban on any cooperation with government agencies: both in the form of participation in public events held by them, and assistance to judicial and investigative bodies in the investigation of crimes.
In the 1940s, these traditions eventually led to the "beginning of the end" of this criminal society: during the Great Patriotic War, many of the criminals responded to the authorities' offer to join the Red Army in order to defend their homeland from the Nazi threat. After the victory over the Nazis, they returned to the camps, where the so-called "Bitch Wars" began between them and the "thieves in law" who did not deviate from the traditions of the criminal environment, as a result of which both sides suffered extremely significant losses. The difficult economic situation in post-war society led to an increase in banditry and crime in general, as a result of which the criminal world was replenished with fresh blood, and the new prisoners no longer considered it necessary to honor the old criminal traditions, creating their own codes of conduct that did not exclude mutually beneficial cooperation with the state.
The factor that determined the entry of crime into a new stage was the economic situation of the 1950s and 1960s, when the first signs of the inability of the Soviet planned economy to function within the legal framework given to it began to appear. In order to ensure the necessary economic indicators, methods such as blat and eyewash began to be used; the need arose for so-called pushers—specialists in concluding favorable contracts and "knocking out" scarce goods, raw materials and equipment; phenomena such as shortages, "nesuny" and speculation became common.
The first signs indicating the emergence of organized crime as a social phenomenon appeared in the mid-1960s, when the weakening of control in the economic sphere led to the emergence of opportunities for individuals to concentrate large sums of money in their hands, investing them in illegal production structures; at the same time, traditional professional criminals began to parasitize on these shadow entrepreneurs, and later, to assist them in their activities, receiving their share of the income and thus forming a symbiotic criminal structure.
During this period, a kind of symbiosis arose between the political elite and the criminal world: the political elite used the criminal world to obtain goods and services that were not available legally, in exchange for providing patronage and protection from law enforcement agencies; this symbiosis was partially exposed during the anti-corruption campaign launched by Yuri Andropov after his election as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but this was only the tip of the iceberg.
Late 1980s – present
The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev coincided with a new crisis in the Soviet economy. In order to accelerate economic growth by increasing labor productivity, a campaign against alcohol consumption was launched, which led to a rapid growth in the illegal production and sale of alcohol, providing a large number of "entrepreneurs" working in this area with money.In the late 1980s, during the period of "perestroika" of social relations, these phenomena were further developed as a result of the political and economic reforms undertaken by the state making it possible to legalize and protect criminal capital, and to use the media and other public structures to protect the interests of organized criminal groups. All this was facilitated by the fact that, in the context of the economic crisis and constant reforms, the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies significantly decreased, as a result of which a significant portion of citizens began to turn to "shadow" sources of income. In the early 1990s, these trends only intensified due to the fact that opportunities for cross-border interaction opened up, including through illegal trade and the export of capital abroad, and methods were developed for corrupting state and public structures, and for criminals to promote their own people to government positions.
Organized crime of this period mainly ensured its existence through organized racketeering; in addition, it began to master various forms of legal, semi-legal and illegal economic activity: the hotel business, gambling, prostitution, export of raw materials, and so on. Nevertheless, during this period, crime had not yet subjugated political and social institutions, remaining in a vulnerable position before state bodies.
However, the trends of its development were negative: one of the theses of the economic reform program also played a role here, according to which one of the main sources of resources for the reform should be the conversion and legalization of shadow capital. The activities of foreign states related to the use of criminal groups to protect their interests in the Russian Federation for the formation of a certain socio-political system also had a negative impact. At the same time, "assistance" in the fight against organized crime was expressed in the intensification of the activities of foreign special services on the territory of Russia, in the desire to take the decision on the fate of the leaders of Russian criminal groups outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.
Organized crime became politicized in the 1990s. Organized criminal groups sought to "promote" their trusted persons to government positions of varying importance: for example, during the 1999 legislative election, several hundred cases were identified in which criminal groups nominated their own candidates and provided financial and organizational support to political parties and movements. Where it was not possible to directly promote their people to government positions, organized crime achieved its goals by corrupting government and other employees, including by paying them regular salaries without specifying the services that might be required of them.
There was a merger of legitimate and criminal capital. In the Resolution of the State Duma "On Overcoming the Crisis in the Economy of the Russian Federation and on the Strategy for the Economic Security of the State" adopted in March 1998, it was noted that criminal groups controlled up to 40% of enterprises based on private ownership, 60% of state enterprises and up to 85% of banks. In general, by the beginning of the 21st century, organized crime began to be built on the so-called oligarchic model, striving for the maximum degree of legalization: armed units of criminal organizations received legal registration as detective and security agencies, funds were stored in banks controlled by criminal organizations, and their source became "roof" controlled enterprises.