Operation Ladbroke
Operation Ladbroke was a glider landing by British airborne troops during the Second World War near Syracuse, Sicily, that began on 9 July 1943 as part of Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily. The first Allied mission using large numbers of the aircraft, the operation was carried out from Tunisia by glider infantry of the British 1st Airlanding Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Philip Hicks, with a force of 136 Hadrians and eight Airspeed Horsas. The objective was to establish a large invasion force on the ground near the town of Syracuse, secure the Ponte Grande Bridge and ultimately take control of the city itself with its strategically vital docks, as a prelude to the full-scale invasion of Sicily.
En route to Sicily, sixty-five gliders released too early by the American towing aircraft crashed into the sea, drowning approximately 252 men. Of the remainder, only eighty-seven men arrived at the Pont Grande Bridge, although they successfully captured the bridge and held it beyond the time they were to be relieved. Finally, with their ammunition expended and only fifteen soldiers remaining unwounded, the Allied troops surrendered to Italian forces. The Italians, having gained control of the bridge, sought to destroy the structure, but were frustrated by troopers of the 1st Airlanding Brigade who had removed the previously attached explosive charges. Other troops from the brigade, who had landed elsewhere in Sicily, aided further by destroying communications links and capturing gun batteries.
Background
By December 1942, with Allied forces advancing through Tunisia after landing there the month before in Operation Torch, the North African Campaign was coming to a close; with victory there imminent, discussions began among the Allies regarding the nature of their next objective. Many Americans argued for an immediate invasion of Northern France, while the British, as well as then-Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, argued that the island of Sardinia was the best subsequent target of the Allied forces. In January 1943 the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt settled at the Casablanca Conference on the island of Sicily, whose invasion and occupation could potentially provide the Allies with Mediterranean shipping routes and airfields nearer to mainland Italy and Germany. The codename Operation Husky was decided upon for the Allied invasion of Sicily, and planning for Husky began in February. Initially the British Eighth Army, under the command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery, were to land on the south-eastern corner of the island and advance north to the port of Syracuse. Two days later the U.S. Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, would land on the western corner of the island and move towards the port of Palermo.In March it was decided that the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, under Major General Matthew Ridgway, and the British 1st Airborne Division, under Major-General George F. Hopkinson, would be dropped by parachute and glider just prior to the amphibious landings; they would land a few miles behind the beaches and neutralize their defenders, thereby aiding the landing of the Allied ground forces. However, in early May these directives were radically changed at the insistence of the Eighth Army commander, General Montgomery; he argued that with Allied forces landing separately at either end of the island, the defending Axis forces would have the opportunity to defeat each Allied army in turn before both could unite. Instead, the plans were altered to land both the Eighth and Seventh Armies simultaneously along a stretch of coastline on Sicily's south-eastern corner. At the same time, the plans for the two airborne divisions, the British 1st and U.S. 82nd, were also adjusted; Montgomery believed that the airborne troops should be landed near Syracuse, so that they could seize the valuable port. The commander of the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery, Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor, further asserted that dropping behind the island's beaches and overcoming its defences was not a suitable mission for the airborne troops, as they were only lightly armed and vulnerable to the 'friendly fire' of the planned Allied naval bombardment. In the revised blueprint for the airborne divisions, a reinforced regimental combat team from Major General Ridgway's U.S. 82nd Airborne Division would be dropped by parachute north-east of the port of Gela to block the movement of Axis reserves towards the Allied beachheads. Major General Hopkinson's British 1st Airborne Division was now to conduct three brigade-size airborne operations: the Ponte Grande road bridge south of Syracuse was to be captured by the 1st Airlanding Brigade, under Brigadier Philip Hicks, the port of Augusta was to be seized by Brigadier Ernest Down's 2nd Parachute Brigade, and finally the Primasole Bridge over the River Simeto was to be taken and secured by Brigadier Gerald Lathbury's 1st Parachute Brigade.
Planning
As there were insufficient transport aircraft for all three brigades to conduct their operations simultaneously, it was decided that the first operation would be Ladbroke, whose objective was the capture of the Ponte Grande Bridge. The mission, under the command of Brigadier Philip Hicks, was conducted just prior to the amphibious landings, on the night of 9 July, while the remaining two operations took place on successive two nights. The 1st Airlanding Brigade was also given the additional tasks of capturing Syracuse harbour and the urban area that adjoined it, and either destroying or confiscating a coastal artillery battery that was in range of the amphibious landings. When training began for the operation, difficulties immediately arose. The original plan for the airborne operations had called for all three to employ parachutists, but in May Montgomery altered the plan; after determining that airborne troops would be at a considerable distance from Allied ground forces, he believed that the force sent to capture Syracuse would be served best by gliders in order to provide them with the maximum possible amount of firepower. His airborne advisor, Group Captain Cooper of the Royal Air Force, argued that a glider landing conducted at night with inexperienced aircrews was not practical, but the decision was left unchanged.Montgomery's orders raised several issues, the first with the transport aircraft of the Troop Carrier Wings assigned to the airborne operations. When they had arrived in North Africa, it had been decided that the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing would operate with 1st Airborne Division and its counterpart, the 51st, with 82nd Airborne Division. A few weeks later this arrangement was switched, with the 52nd now operating with 82nd Airborne Division and the 51st with 1st Airborne Division; this seemed a logical decision, as each Wing had operational experience with the division it had been paired with. However, the decision to turn the Syracuse assault into a glider-based one was problematic; the 51st had practically no glider experience, whilst the 52nd had much more but was already training for a parachute-based mission. To switch both was impractical and would have led to a number of problems, which left 1st Airborne Division, and thus 1st Airlanding Brigade, with an inexperienced Troop Carrier Wing.
File:Jeep being loaded into waco glider.jpg|thumb|alt=Waco glider with the front cockpit raised and four men pushing a jeep inside|One of the 1st Airlanding Brigade's jeeps being loaded aboard a Waco Hadrian glider
Glider problems
Further problems were encountered with the gliders to be used in the operation, and the glider pilots themselves. Until a few months prior to the operation, there was a notable shortage of serviceable gliders in North Africa. In late March a small number of Wacos arrived at Accra on the Gold Coast, but pilots sent to ferry them to North Africa found that they were in poor condition. Due to neglect and the deleterious effects of tropical weather, the pilots were able to assemble only a small number of Wacos and fly them back on 22 April. On 23 April, a larger number of the American gliders began to arrive in North African ports, but were not immediately available for use as the crates holding them were unloaded haphazardly, instructions were often found to be missing, and those men assigned to assemble the gliders were often inexperienced. However, when the decision was made to conduct a glider-borne assault with 1st Airlanding Brigade, assembly was improved, and by 12 June 346 gliders had been put together and delivered to the Troop Carrier Wings. A small number of Horsa gliders were transported to North Africa for use by the brigade. Thirty took off from England and undertook a trip of approximately in Operation Turkey Buzzard. After attacks from Luftwaffe fighter patrols and experiencing often turbulent weather, a total of 27 Horsas were delivered to North Africa in time for the operation.When sufficient gliders had arrived in North Africa, however, they were not all usable even in training; on 16 June, most of the gliders were grounded for repairs, and on 30 June, large numbers of them had developed weaknesses in their tail-wiring, necessitating another grounding period of three days. Given these problems and delays, 51st Troop Carrier Wing was not able to conduct a large-scale glider exercise until mid-June. On 14 June, fifty-four Wacos were flown over and then released to land at an airfield, and a larger exercise was conducted on 20 June; but even these limited exercises were unrealistic, as they were conducted in broad daylight. The British glider pilots themselves also caused difficulties; although there were a sufficient number of them to conduct the operation, they were highly inexperienced. Detached from the Glider Pilot Regiment for the operation, they had no experience with the Waco gliders and night operations involving them, as British doctrine had deemed such operations impossible. On average, the pilots had eight hours of flight experience in gliders. Few were rated as being 'operationally ready' and none had combat experience. Colonel George Chatterton, the commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment, had protested their participation as he believed they were entirely unfit for any operation. When the training period for the brigade ended with a total of two exercises completed, the glider pilots had an average of 4.5 hours training in flying the unfamiliar Waco, which included an average of 1.2 hours night flying.