Force 136


Force 136 was a far eastern branch of the British World War II intelligence organisation, the Special Operations Executive. Originally set up in 1941 as the India Mission with the cover name of GSI, it absorbed what was left of SOE's Oriental Mission in April 1942. The man in overall charge for the duration of its existence was Colin Mackenzie.
The organisation was established to encourage and supply indigenous resistance movements of British ruled India in enemy-occupied territory, and occasionally mount clandestine sabotage operations. Force 136 operated in the regions of the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II which were occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945: Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, Siam, and French Indochina.
Although the top command of Force 136 were British officers and civilians, most of those it trained and employed as agents were indigenous to the regions in which they operated. Burmese, Indians and Chinese were trained as agents for missions in Burma, for example. British and other European officers and NCOs went behind the lines to train resistance movements. Former colonial officials and men who had worked in these countries for various companies knew the local languages, the peoples and the land and so became invaluable to SOE. Most famous amongst these officers are Freddie Spencer Chapman in Malaya and Hugh Seagrim in Burma.

History

SOE was formed in 1940, by the merger of existing Departments of the War Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Its purpose was to incite, organise and supply indigenous resistance forces in enemy-occupied territory. Initially, the enemy was Nazi Germany and Italy, but from late 1940, it became clear that a conflict with Japan was also inevitable.
Two missions were sent to set up the SOE in the Far East. The first was led by a former businessman, Valentine Killery of Imperial Chemical Industries, who set up his HQ in Singapore. A scratch resistance organisation was set up in Malaya, but Singapore was captured on 15 February 1942, soon after Japan entered the war.
A second mission was set up in British India by another former British colonial businessman, Colin Mackenzie of J. and P. Coats, a clothing manufacturer. Mackenzie's India Mission originally operated from the city of Meerut. Its location was governed by the fear that the Germans might overrun the Middle East and the Caucasus, in which case resistance movements would be established in Afghanistan, Persia and Iraq. When this threat was removed late in 1942 after the battles of Stalingrad and El Alamein, the focus was switched to South East Asia.
The India Mission's first cover name was GS I, which made it appear to be a record-keeping branch of GHQ India. The name, Force 136 was adopted in March 1944. From December 1944, the organisation's headquarters moved to Kandy in Ceylon and co-operated closely with South East Asia Command which was also located there.
In 1946, Force 136 was wound up, along with the rest of SOE.

Organisation

Command level

Force 136 was organised into three Groups to conduct covert operations in different parts of Asia.
GroupArea of responsibilityHQ Location
Force 136 HQFar EastBritish Raj, and later moved to Kandy, Ceylon
ABurma and French IndochinaRangoon, Burma
BMalaya and the East IndiesKuala Kangsar, Perak
CChinaHong Kong

Basic level

A typical Force 136 team consisted of 8 agents, including two commanders, two agents in charge of demolition, one wireless telecommunication operator, one agent to cipher and decrypt messages and two scouts.

Training

Force 136 agents received commando/special forces training from the British Military. The training course lasted for three months and included skills such as stalking, silent killing, demolition, jungle patrolling and survival, wireless operations, espionage, parachuting, interpretation and silent swimming.
Known training centres for Force 136 agents were:

Malaya

The Oriental Mission of SOE attempted to set up "stay-behind" and resistance organisations from August 1941, but their plans were opposed by the British colonial governor, Sir Shenton Thomas. They were able to begin serious efforts only in January 1942, after the Japanese Invasion of Malaya had already begun.
An irregular warfare school, 101 Special Training School, was set up by the explorer and mountaineer Freddie Spencer Chapman. Chapman himself led the first reconnaissances and attacks behind Japanese lines during the Battle of Slim River. Although the school's graduates mounted a few operations against the Japanese lines of communication, they were cut off from the other Allied forces by the fall of Singapore. An attempt was made by the Oriental Mission to set up a HQ in Sumatra but this island too was overrun by the Japanese.

Malayan Communist Party

Before the Japanese attacked Malaya, a potential resistance organisation already existed in the form of the Malayan Communist Party. This party's members were mainly from the Chinese community and implacably anti-Japanese. Just before the fall of Singapore, the party's Secretary General, Lai Teck, was told by the British authorities that his party should disperse into the forests, a decision already made by the party's members.
In isolation, the Communists formed the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army. Their first arms and equipment were either donated by STS 101 before they were overrun or recovered from the battlefields or abandoned British Army depots. The MPAJA formed rigidly disciplined camps and units in the forest, supplied with food by networks of contacts among displaced Chinese labourers and "squatters" on marginal land. Chapman had remained in Malaya after Singapore fell, but had no radio or means of contacting Allied forces elsewhere. Nevertheless, the MPAJA still regarded Chapman as the official British authority, and Chin Peng was appointed as a liaison officer with Chapman.
In 1942, Singaporean World War II hero Lim Bo Seng had returned to Malaya from Calcutta and recruited some agents who had made their way to India by 1943. His second-in-command was CPT Tham Sien Yen. Force 136 attempted to regain contact with Chapman in Operation Gustavus, by infiltrating parties which included Lim Bo Seng and former STS 101 members John Davis and Richard Broome by sea into the area near Pangkor Island. Their radio was unable to contact Force 136 HQ in Ceylon and the MPAJA contacts on Pangkor Island were betrayed to the Japanese.
In February 1945, the radio brought in by Gustavus was finally made to work. Chapman was able to visit Force 136 HQ in Kandy and report. By this time, Force 136 had substantial resources, and in the few months before the end of the war, they were able to send 2,000 weapons to the MPAJA and no less than 300 liaison personnel. About half of these were British who had worked or lived in Malaya before the war, the others were Chinese who had made their own way to India or who had been taken there by Force 136 for training. With these resources, the MPAJA was built up to become a substantial guerilla army with about 7,000 fighters. However, Japan surrendered before it had a chance to stage a major uprising.
In isolation in jungle camps for several years, the MCP and MPAJA had purged themselves of many members suspected of treachery or espionage, which contributed to their post-war hard-line attitude and led in turn to the insurgency known as the Malayan Emergency.

Kuomintang

The Kuomintang also had a widespread following in the Malayan Chinese community in the days before the War, but were unable to mount any significant clandestine resistance to the Japanese. This was partly because they were based mainly among the population in the towns, unlike the MCP which drew much of its support from mine or plantation workers in remote encampments or "squatters" on the edge of the forest. Most of the KMT's supporters and their dependents were therefore hostages to any Japanese mass reprisal.
When Lim Bo Seng and other agents from Force 136 attempted to make contact with Kuomintang networks in Ipoh as part of Operation Gustavus, they found that the KMT's underground actions there were tainted by corruption or private feuding.

Malay resistance forces

Three local Malay resistance forces were established by Force 136 after they reached Malaya. Each force was assisted by British Liaison Officers and agents from the SOE. Major Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen, a member of the royal family, traveled to Britain, India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq to recruit Malays who were working or studying overseas before World War II to serve as Force 136 agents.
In September 1942, at a hotel in New Delhi, Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen held a special meeting with Captain Ibrahim bin Ismail of the Johore Military Forces, who was undergoing cadet officer training at the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun, and successfully persuaded him to join Force 136. With this unit established, Major Tengku Mahmood grew increasingly confident in his team's ability to achieve their objectives and, assisted by British officers, was tasked with instructing members in combat techniques including weaponry, jungle operations, espionage, and sabotage. Major Tengku Mahmood Mahyideen served as the Chief Advisor on matters related to the Malay Peninsula.
;Ulu Perak
On 16 December 1944, a group consisting of five Malay SOE Agents, including Bahari Sidek, and two British LOs, Major Peter G. Dobree and Captain Clifford, parachuted into Padang Cermin, near to the dam of Temenggor Lake, Perak. They were a part of Operation Hebrides. Their main goal was to set up a guerrilla force for Ipoh and Taiping areas. Their secondary goal was to set up wireless communications between Malaya and Force 136 HQ in Kandy after the MPAJA had failed to do so. They made contact with the Chief of Temenggor village, Awang Muhammad, and the Chief of Bersia village, Lahamat Piah, who helped them make contact with Captain Mohd Salleh Hj. Sulaiman, who was a District Officer during the pre-war British Administration. Between them, they established a guerrilla force named the Askar Melayu Setia. Based in Kuala Kangsar, Perak, the HQ of this force later became the main HQ for Force 136 in Malaya.
;Kedah
A team of two operatives, Tunku Osman and Major Hasler parachuted into Kg. Kuala Janing, Padang Terap, Kedah on 1 July 1945, as part of Operation Fighter. Their main goal was to set up a guerrilla force in the Northern Malay Peninsula region. They made contact with Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was the Padang Terap's DO during the pre-war British Administration and established a guerrilla force in Kedah.
;Pahang
A team consisting of two Malay SOE Agents, Osman Mahmud and Jamal, a Wireless Telecommunication operator, Mat Nanyan, and their LO, Major J. Douglas Richardson parachuted into Raub, Pahang as part of Operation Beacon. Their main goal was to set up wireless communications between the east coast of the Malay Peninsula and the main Force 136 communication hub in Kuala Kangsar. Their secondary goal was to set up guerrilla forces for East Coast Malaya. After landing, the team made contact with Yeop Mohidin, who was the Kuala Lipis's Assistant DO during the pre-war British Administration, and they established a guerrilla force named Force 136 Pahang, also known as Wataniah Pahang. The Wataniah Pahang was the predecessor for the Rejimen Askar Wataniah, that was established in 1985.
;Terengganu
A team of three agents, including Ibrahim Ismail, parachuted into the western coast of Terengganu, as part of Operation Oatmeal. They failed in their mission after being betrayed, and were later captured by the Japanese.