Economic impact of the Iran–Israel proxy conflict
The Iran–Israel proxy conflict and the direct hostilities in mid-2025 have strained Iran’s finances, infrastructure, and human capital. Iran has incurred direct costs from military expenditures and war damage, indirect costs from decades of sanctions, and shadow costs such as currency devaluation, high inflation, lost oil revenue, and the erosion of its scientific and military workforce. These pressures have exacerbated pre-existing economic weaknesses in Iran and also had regional spillover effects on energy markets and neighboring economies. During the 2025 war, Israel suffered casualties with thousands injured and displaced and 29 killed. The economic burden of the Israel for the war is estimated at.
Impacts on Iran
Direct financial expenditures
Estimating the direct costs of Iran's nuclear program is complicated by secrecy, but available assessments suggest significant expenditures.| Category | Estimated cost | Source |
| Bushehr nuclear plant | >$10 billion | |
| Broader nuclear infrastructure | >$100 billion | |
| Eurodif take | $1 billion | |
| Hormozgan plant | >$20 billion | |
| Annual operational costs | $250–$300 million | |
| Total spending estimate | >$30 billion |
Indirect economic burdens and opportunity costs
The sanctions and lost economic opportunities outweigh direct spending:| Cost area | Estimated value | Source |
| Lost economic opportunity | $2–3 trillion | |
| Lost oil revenues | >$450 billion | |
| Lost foreign investment | >$100 billion | |
| Rial devaluation | ~95% | |
| Energy renovation cost | ~$54 billion |
Historical context and economic pressures
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran and Israel have been locked in enmity with profound economic implications. Iran’s vehement anti-Israel stance and support for militant proxies prompted waves of sanctions that have constricted its economy since the 1980s. U.S.-led sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program severely curtailed Iran’s oil exports and foreign revenue. By 2022–2023 Iran’s oil export income was only about $50 billion per year, less than 10% of its peak before sanctions. Cumulatively, Iranian officials estimate that international sanctions have cost the country on the order of $300–450 billion in lost oil revenues over a decade. This loss of foreign exchange has gutted Iran’s development spending, leaving infrastructure dilapidated and cutting access to hard currency needed for investment. Even before the latest conflict, Iran’s government warned that the economic situation was more dire than during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War, as sanctions and mismanagement led to infrastructure crises requiring over $500 billion to fix.In lieu of direct war, Iran has long engaged Israel indirectly by funding and arming proxy militias across the region. This strategy carries heavy financial costs. Since 2012, Tehran is believed to have spent over $20 billion bankrolling foreign militias and terrorist groups. Major beneficiaries include Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Iranian support to Hamas, for example, surged to an estimated $350 million per year in recent years as oil revenues recovered. These outlays, often off-budget and funneled via the IRGC’s Quds Force, divert national wealth toward foreign operations. Iran’s leaders openly prioritize financing these groups – described by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as the "backbone of war" – even at the expense of domestic needs. From 2013–2017, Iran increased military and proxy expenditures by over 20%, only to cut back by 22% after oil sanctions returned in 2018. When oil revenue rebounded in 2021–2023, Tehran again boosted funding for the IRGC and militias despite economic hardships at home. This cycle shows how Iran’s proxy warfare strategy imposes a chronic opportunity cost on its economy: resources funneled into regional conflict could otherwise address infrastructure, jobs, and social services, areas where Iran now falls behind its neighbors.
Israel, for its part, has waged a long-running shadow war aimed at undermining Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities – with economic side effects. Between 2010 and 2012, at least four Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated inside Iran, and another, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was killed in 2020, crimes widely attributed to Israel. These assassinations robbed Iran of experienced talent and likely set back certain nuclear research projects. Israel also allegedly carried out cyber-sabotage such as the 2010 Stuxnet attack, which destroyed uranium centrifuges, and a series of mysterious explosions and power outages at facilities like Natanz in 2020 and 2021. Each such incident forced Iran to spend time and money repairing sensitive nuclear infrastructure and adding security, effectively raising the economic cost of its nuclear program. While exact figures are closely guarded, the disruption has been significant – for example, an explosion at Natanz in April 2021 damaged or destroyed thousands of centrifuges, prompting Iranian officials to decry the "nuclear terrorism" that necessitated expensive restoration work. In addition, since 2018 Israeli airstrikes in Syria have repeatedly hit IRGC supply lines and weapons depots intended for Hezbollah, indirectly compelling Iran to expend more resources to maintain its regional reach. Over the past year, Israel even began targeting IRGC operatives directly; several senior IRGC commanders were killed in 2023–2024.