Iran's ballistic-missile program
Iran's ballistic-missile program is the largest in the Middle East and plays a key role in Iran's military strategy. Its diverse short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles serve as a deterrent, support regional proxies, and bolster national defense capabilities.
The program aims to offset its adversaries' military superiority, particularly given Western sanctions that have hampered its ability to maintain and upgrade its air force. The country has adopted a "deterrence by punishment" approach to ward off threats from Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, and according to an Iranian official, all European countries are also in range.
Concerns about the program's potential connection to Iran's nuclear ambitions have led to international scrutiny and sanctions, after which supreme leader Ali Khamenei reportedly authorised the development of miniaturised nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles.
The program is primarily led by two the Aerospace Industries Organization and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which oversee several subordinate missile entities and front companies that procure needed ingredients, components, and equipment from foreign suppliers. The Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization is tasked with advancing the country's ballistic missile capabilities.
History
Iran's missile program originated during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War as a means to deter Iraqi Scud attacks and compensate for its lack of modern air power. In 1984, Iran obtained its first ballistic missiles from Libya and subsequently procured Scud derivatives and launchers from North Korea and China. By the 1990s, Iran had reverse-engineered Scud technology to produce the Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 missiles, as well as Zelzal and Fateh short-range rockets. In the 2000s, Iran introduced longer-range systems and began testing two-stage solid-fueled designs. Key milestones include the public debut of Shahab-3 in 1998 and the solid-fuel Sajjil in 2008. By 2010 Iran was unveiling newer variants and integrating missile tests with its growing space launch program. Throughout this period the program's drivers included deterrence of Israel and Gulf states, asymmetrical warfare doctrine, and prestige, as summed up by experts: "Iran's ballistic missile programme… is an important element of military doctrine, a means of deterrence, and a tool of statecraft".In February 2025, Iran appeared to be rearming its missile program. A ship carrying 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a chemical crucial for solid propellant production in missiles, arrived at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. This shipment could facilitate the production of propellant for about 260 Kheibar Shekan missiles or around 200 Martyr Hajj Qassem Soleimani ballistic missiles. The shipment highlights Iran's continuing dependence on international sources for critical materials.
In June 2025, during the Iran-Israel war, according to The Economist, out of 500 missiles fired by Iran, 6% hit built-up areas.
Iran intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program following the losses it sustained during the 2025 Iran-Israel war, And after the war, production of ballistic missiles quickly resumed. and is reported to have replenished its stockpile to approximately 2000 missiles. And it made significant developments in the capabilities of its missiles. This was done despite the reinstating of United Nations sanctions restricting arms transfers and ballistic missile activity through the JCPOA "snapback" mechanism in late September 2025. The sanctions were intended to prevent Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including delivery of materials which could contribute to such activity.
European intelligence sources and a CNN investigation report that since the reimposition of sanctions, Iran received multiple large shipments of sodium perchlorate from China, totaling approximately 2,000 tons, delivered to the port of Bandar Abbas. This was in addition to an earlier shipment of 1000 tons delivered to Iran from China in February 2025. Sodium perchlorate, while not explicitly banned by the sanctions, falls under the broader prohibition of providing "items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology" which could contribute to Iran's missile program, and is a precursor in the production of ammonium perchlorate, the primary oxidiser in solid-fueled rocket motors used in Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, whose provision to Iran is prohibited explicitly.
Reports that the shipments were facilitated through a network of Chinese suppliers, front companies, and cargo vessels, some already under U.S. sanctions, were corroborated by ship-tracking data and satellite imagery. The reports included evidence of repeated voyages between Chinese ports and Iran and, in some cases, deliberate efforts to obscure vessel movements. Analysts assess that the quantities delivered could allow the production of five hundred missiles, which would demonstrates a determined attempt by Iran to replenish depleted stockpiles.
On 22 December 2025, Iran reportedly conducted ballistic missile tests over Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, Khorramabad and Mahabad. Initially, IRGC aligned media notified the public about the tests, while citing various videos of missile deployment surfacing from many locations, however state-run IRIB News Agency denied the launches had ever taken place, stating that the white trail was "an aircraft contrail at high altitude" and that the images were "inaccurate".
Types
Iran's ballistic missile arsenal is estimated to include over 3,000 missiles. This large inventory comprises a diverse array of short-range ballistic missiles, with a range of 300–1000 km, and medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of 1000–3000 km. According to a statement made by Iranian Parliament member of the Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy, Amir Hayat Moghadam, all of Europe, and in particular Britain, France and Germany are in range of Iranian MRBMs, while major US cities such as Washington and New York, beyond range at approximately 10,000 km away, may be targeted by missiles launched from the sea.Short-range ballistic missiles
300–1,000 km rangeSource:
- Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 – Liquid-fueled missiles with ranges of 350 km and 750 km, respectively.
- Qiam-1 – A liquid-fueled SRBM with a range of 750 km and a smart targeting system.
- Fateh-110 family – A series of solid-fueled missiles, including:
- * Fateh-110
- * Fateh-313
- * Zolfaghar
- Hormuz series – Anti-ship SRBMs with ranges of about 300 km.
Medium-range ballistic missiles
Source:
- Shahab-3 variants – Liquid-fueled MRBMs with ranges between 1,200 km and 2,100 km.
- Qasem Basir – An improved Haj Qasem variant, with better precision and evasion mechanisms and a range of 1,200 kilometers.
- Haj Qasem – A solid-fueled MRBM with an estimated range of 1,400 km.
- Kheybar shekan – A precision-strike ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 km.
- Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 – Hypersonic missiles reportedly capable of Mach 13 speeds, with ranges of 1,400 km and 1,500 km, respectively.
- Etemad, meaning "trust" in Persian, capable of traveling 1,700 kilometers.
- Ghadr-110 – A liquid-fueled MRBM with a range of 2,000–3,000 km.
- Sejjil – A two-stage, solid-fueled MRBM with a range of 2,000 km.
- Khorramshahr – A liquid-fueled MRBM that can carry multiple warheads, with a range of 2,000 km.
- Emad – An improved Shahab-3 variant with better precision and a range of 2,000 km.
| Missile | Type | Range | Unit cost | Annual upkeep / maintenance | Notes |
| Fateh-110 | SRBM | ~300 | $110,000 – $2.1 million | ~$20,000 – $100,000 | Cost varies by guidance system and version |
| Zolfaghar | SRBM | ~700 | ~$150,000 | ~$40,000 | Export version used by regional proxies |
| Qiam-1 | SRBM | ~700 | ~$3.5 million | ~$120,000 | Liquid-fueled; requires more logistical maintenance |
| Shahab-3 | MRBM | ~1,300 | ~$3 million | ~$150,000 – $250,000 | Based on North Korean Nodong; extensive IRGC deployment |
| Ghadr-110 | MRBM | ~1,800 | ~$5 million | ~$250,000 | More accurate version of Shahab-3 |
| Sejjil-2 | MRBM | ~2,000 | ~$6 million | ~$200,000 – $300,000 | Solid-fueled; higher storage and propellant upkeep costs |
| Khorramshahr | MRBM | ~2,000 | ~$8 million | ~$300,000 – $400,000 | Large payload; possibly designed with nuclear delivery in mind |
Stock
Iran was assumed to possess more than 3,000 missiles total before the Iran–Israel war. Iran manufactured hundreds of SRBMs for Hezbollah. Yemen’s Houthis possess dozens of ballistic missiles that can hit Saudi Arabia or Israel. Iran-backed Iraqi militias have received "a couple of dozen" short-range ballistic missiles.Iran employs mobile transporter-erector-launchers for most missiles, allowing dispersion. Aerial photos show Iranian TELs carrying Zelzal, Qiam and Sejjil missiles on 6x6, 8x8, or 10x10 chassis. Iran also maintains hardened facilities for missile assembly and storage. Notably, satellite imagery reveals vast new complexes at Khojir and Modarres near Tehran – expanded missile production and storage sites with numerous protective berms and bunkers.