Combined Action Program
The Combined Action Program was a United States Marine Corps counterinsurgency tool during the Vietnam War. It was widely remembered by the Marine Corps as effective. Operating from 1965 to 1971, it placed a 13-member Marine rifle squad, augmented by a U.S. Navy Corpsman and strengthened by a Vietnamese militia platoon of older youth and elderly men, in or adjacent to a rural Vietnamese hamlet. In most cases, the Popular Forces militia members were residents of the hamlet who were either too young or too old to be drafted into the Army of the Republic of Vietnam or the Regional Forces. The entire unit of American Marines and Popular Forces militia members together was designated as a Combined Action Platoon.
The program was said to have originated as a solution to one Marine infantry battalion's problem of an expanding Tactical Area of Responsibility. The concept of combining a squad of Marines with local and assigning them a village to protect proved to be a force multiplier.
While the exact implementation varied with the stage of the war and local command variations, the basic model was to combine a Marine squad with local forces to form a village defense platoon. It was effective in denying the enemy a sanctuary at the local village level. The pacification campaign seemed to work under the CAP concept, and the Marines fully embraced it. Objectively, there is no solid proof that the CAP concept was a resounding success; however, subjectively the evidence suggests otherwise.
"Counterinsurgency operations and, in particular, the establishment of a foreign internal defense lends itself for the greatest utility of employing a CAP-style organization. Recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia suggest a CAP-style organization could accomplish the assigned mission." In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines reinstituted a variant of the CAP.
US Marine background for combined programs
The CAP concept seems to have been at least partially based on Marine pacification programs in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere, during the Banana Wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In these programs, Marine units would pacify and administer regions, while providing training and security for local forces and villages. There are also connections to other pacification programs, such as the Philippine Insurrection."CAP came naturally for the Marine Corps because counterguerrilla warfare was already part of the USMC heritage. From 1915 to 1934, the Corps had a wealth of experience in foreign interventions fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. For example, the Marines organized and trained the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Nacional Dominicana in Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1915 to 1934. In Nicaragua, the Marines organized, trained, and commanded the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. These organizations were nonpartisan, native constabularies the Marines commanded until host-nation forces could competently assume command."
"The historical background of Army and Marine counter-insurgency operations, the perceived enemy center of gravity in Vietnam, the strategic aim, and identified critical enemy factors are key to understanding Marine versus Army operational differences on conducting the "Other War." It was these differences and past Marine experience that contributed to the creation of the U.S. Marines' Combined Action Platoon.
Initial motivation and organization
Opinions differ about exactly how and where Combined Action originated, but it seems to have started in August 1965 as a unit drawn from 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, under William W. Taylor in the Phu Bai area. 3/4's TAOR included six villages and an airfield in a ten square mile area. The unit was overextended, and Taylor's executive officer, suggested that they incorporate local militia units into 3/4's operations. Taylor sent the plan to COL E. B. Wheeler, Commanding Officer of the 4th Marine Regiment, who forwarded it to the III Marine Amphibious Force and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific. Major General Lew Walt and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, both of whom had fought in the Banana War, saw the potential value and agreed to the proposal. GEN Nguyễn Văn Chuân, the local Army of the Republic of Vietnam CO, gave Walt control of the Vietnamese platoons near Phu Bai.Taylor integrated four squads with the local PF units in August 1965. 1stLt Paul Ek was designated as unit commander. The Marines were handpicked volunteers from 3/4, carefully screened by the executive officer, Maj Zimmerman.
"Zimmerman drew upon his knowledge of the British Army's experiences in 19th Century India. While studying British procedures of that era, Zimmerman had developed an appreciation for the British propensity towards "Brigading." He knew that by combining a British unit with one or more native units, the British were not only able to increase the size of their army for a comparatively small investment of British troops, but also succeeded in increasing the quality of the native units. This was in Zimmerman's mind when he developed the plan that called for combining a U.S. Marine rifle squad with a PF platoon to form an integrated self-defense force that was able to protect the village from low level Viet Cong threats. The combining of the Marines and the PFs was seen as optimal since both brought unique qualities to the union. The PFs, a poorly trained and often neglected home guard, brought knowledge of people and terrain. They also brought the emotional benefits associated with defending their homes. The Marines brought the benefits of highly trained, well led, aggressive combat troops."
MG Walt formalized the program in February 1967, appointing LtCol William R. Corson as the III MAF deputy director for Combined Action. Corson believed CAP should have a separate chain of command, as it was his opinion that the average battalion commander in Vietnam often didn't know or care how to succeed in combined action, since they were trained and oriented toward offensive large-unit warfare. Corson saw CAP as being mobile and offensive in nature, a concept which later took shape in the mobile CAP units. However, Corson eventually became disenchanted with the conduct of the war.
In spite of this rocky start, CAP became an official "hearts and minds" civic action program, and a school of sorts was eventually established near Da Nang. Training was brief and covered a few bare essentials – some Vietnamese phrases, customs, and culture, some civic action precepts, and some military topics – far too short to be of much real good, though a step in the right direction. Upon graduation, you were posted to your unit. Eventually they began issuing certificates showing you had graduated. Initially, CAP Marines were issued a special cloth and leather insignia to be worn from the button on the breast pocket of the uniform jacket. These were later replaced by handsome enameled metal pins, also made to be worn on the breast pocket. These, however, were easily lost, and also made a good aiming point for the enemy. They were usually dispensed with on patrols.
The CAP concept in Vietnam was opposed by some who considered "hearts and minds" programs a waste of money, men, and materiel. CAPs were often ignored at best and despised at worst by many area commands and commanders. The prevailing concept was; "Get 'em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow." This attitude made the CAP Marines' job that much more difficult. However, the concept eventually gained backing from Marine generals Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak and Lew Walt, and with their support, the program expanded. By 1969, despite losses during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the program had expanded to 102 platoons comprising 19 companies and 4 groups, and was even mentioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a speech.
CAPs peaked in 1970, with 4 Groups, and 114 companies, spread through the 5 provinces of I Corps.
Organization
While they were not as highly trained for working with host nation personnel as United States Army Special Forces, in 1965 the US Marine Corps Combined Action Program took on a role of reinforcing and training local village soldiers, although their basic missions differed substantially..This small program had a number of phases. At its inception it was unofficial and did not have a standard organization.
Some units were called "Joint Action Companies". Since, in US military jargon, the word "joint" refers to something pertaining to a combination of forces from different services, and "combined" references a combination of forces from more than one nation, they were, at first, renamed CACs, for "Combined Action Companies."
CAC was changed to CAP, for "Combined Action Platoons". From a purely military standpoint, the units were of platoon, not company, strength. In addition, "cac" is a Vietnamese word for the male generative organ, and the motto included the phrase "suc manh", which means strength. The implications were naturally humorous to the Vietnamese.
In the last phase of development, when Marines were no longer permanently assigned to individual villages, the program was renamed to CUPP, for the "Combined Unit Pacification Program."
CAP has remained the most common name.
Initial structure
To work with the PFs, III MAF instituted the combined action platoon, consisting of a 13-man Marine rifle squad augmented by a U.S. Navy Corpsman and paired with a 15- to 30-man PF platoon to defend one particular village. Each element of the team strengthened the other. The Marines contributed firepower, training, and access to American medical evacuation, artillery and air support. CAPs were generally commanded by a Marine sergeant, but were sometimes commanded by corporals. Patrols were often led by lance-corporals. In some cases such as CAP 1-4-1 in 1969 they were commanded by Lance Corporals.Combined Action Platoons were frequently semi-isolated and usually independent units. Headquarters CAPs were sometimes "double" CAPs – i.e.; two CAP squads, one comprising the HQ personnel, the other the patrol and defense element. They were eventually organized as platoons, which in turn formed companies, which were organized into Combined Action Groups. Eventually there were four CAGs in I Corps.
Originally, the units lived in or near the villages they were affiliated with, eventually in a fortified area. Individual units were assigned to villages in an ostensibly "pacified" area, usually one to a village, though they might serve several other villages in the area. Initially, they were identified by letters and numbers, like line units. Later, numeric designators were used.