Bonner Fellers
Bonner Frank Fellers was a United States Army officer who served during World War II as a military attaché and director of psychological warfare. He is notable as the military attaché in Egypt whose extensive transmissions of detailed British tactical information were unknowingly intercepted by Axis agents and passed to Nazi German Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel for over six months, which contributed to disastrous British defeats at Gazala and Tobruk in June 1942. After the war, he played a leading role in efforts to exonerate Hirohito and members of the Japanese Imperial Family from war crimes during the Tokyo Tribunal.
Early military career
Bonner Frank Fellers was born in Ridge Farm, Illinois, on February 7, 1896. He studied at Earlham College until he was appointed to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, by the Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon. He entered the Military Academy in June 1916, ten months before the American entry into World War I. The increased need for junior officers during World War I caused Fellers's class to be accelerated and to graduate on November 1, 1918, ten days before the armistice with the German Reich which ended the war. Upon his graduation, Fellers was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps.After the usual post-graduation leave, Fellers attended the Coast Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia, from December 1, 1918, to June 7, 1919. He was then sent to Europe to tour the World War I battlefields in France. He was one of several officers assigned to the 1919 American-Polish Typhus Relief Expedition. He embarked to return to the United States on September 18, 1919, and returned to the Coast Artillery School on November 14. He was promoted to first lieutenant on October 1, 1919 and graduated from the Coast Artillery School Basic Course on September 1, 1920. Fellers served with the 44th Coast Artillery at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, until October 1, 1920, and then with the headquarters of the I Corps Area in Boston, Massachusetts, from October 1920, to May 1921. A tour of duty in the Philippines, where he was stationed on Corregidor.
Fellers returned to I Corps Area headquarters in October 1923 and remained there until August 1924, when he received orders to join the Mathematics faculty at West Point. He managed to get his orders changed to an assignment in the English department instead. While there he married Dorothy Ross Dysart in 1925. They had a daughter, Nancy. This was followed, in 1929, by a second tour of duty in the Philippines, as a battery officer stationed at Fort Mills, from October 4, 1929 to August 21, 1931. He then went to Fort Totten, New York, where he was a battery officer and regimental adjutant with the 62nd Coast Artillery until July 28, 1933. The drastic reduction in the size of the army after the war created limited opportunities for promotion, so Fellers was not promoted to captain until December 3, 1934. In 1935, he graduated from the Command and General Staff School, where he wrote a paper on "The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier", and the Chemical Warfare Service Field Officers Course at Edgewood Arsenal.
During his third tour of duty in the Philippines from September 18, 1935, to February 12, 1939, Fellers served on the staff of the military adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth to Apr. 30, 1938; including assignment to the Office of the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, under General Douglas MacArthur; while there, Captain Fellers interacted with Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, a senior member of MacArthur's staff. His assignments included helping to open the Philippine Military Academy, the Philippines' "West Point," and liaising with Philippine President Manuel Quezon. The Philippines awarded him its Distinguished Service Star for his contributions to its defenses. His citation read:
Fellers graduated from the Army War College on June 21, 1939. He then served as an assistant professor of English at West Point from July 5, 1939, to August 1940 and was promoted to major on July 1, 1940. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the wartime Army of the United States on September 15, 1941, and to colonel the following month. Before the United States joined World War II, Fellers was a member of the America First Committee.
World War II
Italians and Germans access to Fellers's reports
In October 1940,Major Fellers was assigned as military attaché to the U.S. embassy in Egypt. He was assigned the duty of monitoring and reporting on British military operations in the Mediterranean and Middle East Theatre. The British granted Fellers access to their activities and information. He dutifully reported everything he learned to his superiors in the United States, where his reports were read by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the G-2 section of the War Department General Staff.Fellers was concerned about the security of the "Black" of the U.S. State Department, used when he sent his reports by radiogram. His concerns were overridden. Fellers was right to be concerned, as the details of the code had been stolen from the U.S. embassy in Italy in September 1941 in a covert night raid into the embassy by Italian spies from the Servizio Informazioni Militare, the Italian military intelligence service. This enabled the Italians to read the reports, and within eight hours, the most secret data on British "strengths, positions, losses, reinforcements, supply, situation, plans, morale etc" would be in the hands of the German and the Italian military. Around the same time, the Black Code was also broken by German cryptanalysts. The Germans could identify Fellers's report, starting just before the American entry into World War II and lasting until June 29, 1942, when Fellers switched to a newly adopted U.S. code system.
Fellers's deciphered radiograms provided the Axis with detailed, extensive, and timely information about troop movements and equipment. Information from his messages alerted the Axis to British convoy operations in the Battle of the Mediterranean, including efforts to resupply the garrison of Malta. In January 1942 information about numbers and the condition of British forces was provided to Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel, the German commander in Africa, who could thus plan his operations with reliable knowledge of what the opposing forces were. The Germans referred to Fellers as die gute Quelle. Rommel referred to him as "the little fellow."
The deciphered code cost the Allies many lives. For example, in June 1942, the British attempted to resupply Malta, which was under constant air attack and was being starved. The British determined to sail two supply convoys simultaneously in the hopes that if one were to become discovered, attacks upon it would distract the Axis from the other. Codenamed Operation Vigorous and Harpoon; sailing from Alexandria in the east and Gibraltar in the west, respectively, their sailing was timed with an effort by special forces teams to neutralize Axis ships and aircraft. Fellers efficiently reported all of that in his cable, No. 11119 dated June 11, which was intercepted in both Rome and by the German Military High Command Cipher Branch. It read, in part:
NIGHTS OF JUNE 12TH JUNE 13TH BRITISH SABOTAGE UNITS PLAN SIMULTANEOUS STICKER BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST AIRCRAFT ON 9 AXIS AIRDROMES. PLANS TO REACH OBJECTIVES BY PARACHUTES AND LONG RANGE DESERT PATROL.
British and Free French raiders went into action behind the lines in Libya and on the island of Crete. In most of the attacks, the raiders were met with accurate fire from the alerted garrisons and suffered heavy losses, but failed to inflict any damage upon the Luftwaffe. Their only success came when Fellers's unwitting early warnings were not received or were ignored or ineptly handled. Meanwhile, both convoys were located and came under attack. A day after leaving Gibraltar, Convoy Harpoon's six merchant ships and their escorts came under continuous air and surface attack. Only two of the merchant ships survived to reach Malta. Convoy Vigorous was the larger effort. Made up of 11 merchant ships, it suffered such serious losses that it was forced to turn back to Egypt.
Ultra intercepts seen only by the British indicated the Germans were gaining information from a source in Egypt, and British intelligence had considered Fellers as a possible source. On June 10, 1942, the British became convinced Fellers's reports were compromised because an intercept had compared British tactics negatively to American tactics. The British informed the Americans on June 12, who, on June 14, confirmed the finding that Fellers's reports were the source. Fellers switched codes on June 29, which ended the leaks.
Fellers was not found at fault for the interception of his reports, but he was transferred from Egypt on July 7, 1942. His successor as attaché used the US military cipher, which the Germans could not read. Upon returning to the United States, Fellers was decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal for "his "uncanny ability to foresee military development" in the Middle East and the "clarity, brevity and accuracy" of his dispatches. He was also promoted to brigadier general, the first member of his West Point Class of November 1918 to do so, on December 4, 1942.
While assigned to the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, he was, as recalled by a colleague, "the most violent Anglophobe I have encountered." However, that comment may be colored by the context of the American-British intelligence situation of the time. Fellers's North African reports, which his Distinguished Service Medal citation characterized as "models of clarity and accuracy," were bluntly critical of British weapons, operations, and leadership: "The Eighth Army has failed to maintain the morale of its troops; its tactical conceptions were always wrong, it neglected completely cooperation between the various arms; its reactions to the lightning changes in the battlefield were always slow." Such assessments, meant for American officials, were deciphered by the Germans, then intercepted from the Germans by the British Ultra signals intelligence.
Despite his anti-British attitude, Fellers and his reports influenced decisions to bring American supplies and troops to aid the British in North Africa. Throughout his tenure in North Africa, Fellers advocated for increased American support for the British in North Africa, which included both weapons and a commitment of American troops. This was at odds with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. European Command as to the level of weapons support and an American troop landing. The military policy then was that saving the British in North Africa was not strategically required, especially not through a North Africa invasion, which would divert focus from Operation Bolero, a plan for an early European invasion.
President Roosevelt admired Fellers's reports and was influenced by them enough so that on June 29, General George C. Marshall wrote to Roosevelt, "Fellers is a very valuable observer but, his responsibilities are not those of a strategist and his views are in opposition to mine and those of the entire Operations Division." The President invited Fellers to the White House upon his return from Cairo, and they met on July 30, 1942. "Consistent with his previous reporting through 1942, Fellers argued for robust and expeditious reinforcement of British forces in the Middle East." Thus, Fellers's blunt criticism and his analysis of the Middle East's strategic importance may well have influenced Roosevelt's decisions to reinforce the Eighth Army and to support Operation Torch.