Battle of Basantar


The Battle of Basantar, also known as the Battle of Shakargarh or Battle of Barapind, was one of the vital battles fought as part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in the western sector of India. The Indian troops won a hard-fought battle that secured this area in the Punjab/Jammu sector. The name Battle of Basantar actually encompasses the entire gamut of battles and skirmishes fought in the Shakargarh sector in the 1971 war.

Location of battle

Basantar river flows in Samba of Jammu & Kashmir. It is a tributary of the Ravi River that flows in the states of Punjab. This battle took place in the Shakargarh Sector or the Shakargarh Bulge that includes Jarpal and surrounding areas. The bulge was close to India's main road link to Kashmir. By contrast, the area was not as vital for Pakistan.
Shakargarh was not easily defensible. Unlike in other places in Punjab, Shakargarh does not have any serious water obstacles, nor boggy patches, and is relatively flat.

Reasoning behind the battle

As the war began on the eastern front, Pakistan decided to open up the western sector to divert Indian troops from the Eastern front in Bangladesh and prolong the war. Shakargarh bulge was a key strategic area for India as it comprised road links between Jammu and Indian Punjab. Therefore, securing the region was crucial for India as Pakistan had a military base nearby in Sialkot and therefore could have easily launched a massive invasion of the Shakargarh region, cutting Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. The Indian Army maintained a base at Pathankot, twenty three miles away from Shakargarh and quickly mobilized forces to defend the region. In an attempt to gain advantage through the element of surprise, the Indian Army, though outnumbered, attacked Pakistani positions in Jarpal area, triggering the Battle of Basantar.

Battle plan

According to David R. Higgins, the Order of Battle was -
Pakistan -
India-
The offensive in this sector was launched a few days after war broke out between the two nations. The Indian I Corps moved into the sector to capture the key areas. The 54th Infantry Division under Maj Gen WAG Pinto and 16th Armoured Brigade moved towards the area. As they advanced they were met series of minefields and by stiff Pakistani resistance. A troop of T-55 tanks with trawls, created and trained by Captain JDS Jind, of the 7th Light Cavalry were attached for trawling with 16 Armoured Brigade at the outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971, during the Indo-Pak war. The entire trawling ahead of 54 Infantry Division, led by 16 Armoured Brigade was done by this troop. This allowed the tanks to move ahead before the "all vehicle safe lane was cleared by the Engineers. Thus, while the Indian division was bogged down as the engineers had not cleared all the mines, 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal of the 17th Poona Horse regiment, in a daring counter-attack, led his three tanks into the minefield area. A fierce tank battle ensued where a Pakistani tank was taken down. After suffering initial setbacks, the 8th Armoured Brigade of the Pakistan Army was called in to help the Pakistani resistance in the area. However, the Indian Army continued the assault and Lt. Arun Khetarpal with his two remaining tanks fought off and destroyed ten tanks before he was killed in action. Following the defeat in the battle, Pakistan launched a massive counter-attack which was planned in five phases:
  • Ph I To capture North Portion of Lalial Res forest and beat back any local counter-attack
  • Ph II to capture Jarpal and Lohal by 0500h 16 dec 71.
  • Ph III To Est Bridge H incl area North of Lalial Forest, Jarpal and Lohal on Ni 15/16 Dec 71.
  • Ph IV To Break out
After days of intense fighting that saw both sides gaining and losing territory, the battle was turning into a stalemate. However, despite being at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage, Indian troops made massive gains during the final days of the battle and also repelled the Pakistani thrust. Towards the tail end of the battle, Pakistan Army's Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja made a frantic attempt to counter-attack the Indian stronghold near Shakargarh by jumping into an old-style cavalry charge with his tanks. Launched in broad daylight in view of the Indian defensive positions which were well secured, the campaign was a disaster. The Indians continued their military thrust deep inside Pakistan and came threateningly close to the Pakistan Army base at Sialkot. Because of being outnumbered by the advancing Indian Army, the Pakistan Army called-in the Pakistan Air Force to repel the Indian attack on the base. Expecting another massive assault by the Indian Army, this time backed by Indian Air Force-support, and in no position to launch any counter-offensive operations in the region, Pakistan offered unconditional surrender which led to ceasefire. India had gained control of more than a thousand square miles before finally settling down to - 1000 km2 of Pakistan territory that included approximately 500 villages. 1 corps has 6 trawls from 7 cavalry under command of Capt. JDS Jind, that cleared 6 of the 9 attempted lanes, paving way for the Indian tanks to advance ahead.

75 Medium Regiment at the Battle of Basantar

was placed in direct support of 16 Armoured Brigade and remained so throughout the operation. The 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade along with 17 Horse sped forward towards Basantar. observation post officers of 75 Medium Regiment with these formations and units engaged a large number of active enemy targets including missile, launching bases and RCLs in area Lagwal. A number of direct hits on enemy tanks were scored by the regiment enhancing the morale of troops.
The Battle of Basantar bridgehead was an outstanding example of a well-integrated all arms battle, which turned the flank of a major enemy fortified obstacle and opened the way for Dhamtal and Zafarwal. The battle involved the breaching of minefield across Basantar about 1600 m in depth, establishing a bridgehead across the minefield clearing enemy pockets of resistance and enlarging the bridgehead, inducting troops across the minefield under heavy artillery fire and finally repulsing a number of enemy counterattacks with armour and infantry supported by air. A heavy concentration of accurate artillery fire was provided by the regiment during this battle.
The regiment, in addition to 2 observation post officers each with the forward Squadrons of 4 Horse and 17 Horse respectively, provided an observation post officer with 18 Rajputana Rifles and one observation post officer each with 47 Infantry Brigade and 91 Infantry Brigade, respectively. The regiment provided intimate medium artillery fire support throughout the battle.
On the morning of 16 December 1971, Captain Satish Chander Sehgal the observation post officer with 17 Horse, who in addition to his duties of observation post officer was performing the duty of the commander of his tank, engaged enemy tanks 200 yards away which were attempting to withdraw behind a smokescreen. He brought down large crumps of medium artillery fire forcing the enemy tanks to withdraw into a forest nearby, he then charged forward and destroyed the enemy tank trying to escape with his tank gun. In the action that pursued, his own tank was hit and caught fire. With utter disregard for his safety, he along with his radio operator, helped to extricate the driver and gunner from the burning tank. While doing so he was hit by enemy machine gun fire and was killed in action.
Thereafter the artillery engagement continued with the remaining forward observers passing corrections to the commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani, over the armour net. The intimate artillery fire support provided by the regiment to the advancing armoured squadrons made a significant contribution in immobilizing the enemy, thereby facilitating the advance across the bridgehead. In support of this action the commanding officer of the regiment also planned and coordinated the artillery fire of 54 Artillery Brigade and 41 Artillery Brigade.
After the battle, the Commander of 16 Armoured Brigade, Brigadier AS Vaidya MVC, came to the gun position of the regiment and told the gunners that he would like to have the Regiment with him again for the next round of battle. It was heartwarming for the gunners to listen to their commander.

75 Medium Regiment in direct support of 16 (Independent) Armoured Brigade

In the event of War, the 75 Medium Regiment was placed in direct support of 16 Armoured Brigade and remained so throughout the operation. The regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani, leading the regiment from the front. The regiment moved from its peacetime location to its operational location in area Gagwal.
During the period immediately preceding the war Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani initiated intensive affiliation training, particularly with armoured squadrons. 10 tanks were allotted to the regiment for the observation post officers, and the cavalry officers imparted intensive training to the OP officers in operating the tanks, which later proved to be of major advantage.
  • The following OP officers were provided
  • *Major MS Brar OP officer with 'A' Squadron 4 HORSE
  • *Major A Gopala Krishna OP officer with 'A' Squadron 17 HORSE
  • *Captain Madhu Mahbubani OP officer with 'C' Squadron 4 HORSE
  • *Captain Satish Chander Sehgal OP officer with 'C' Squadron 17 HORSE
  • *Captain Mohan Krishnan OP officer with 47 Infantry Brigade
  • *Captain SV Bhong OP officer with 91 Infantry Brigade
  • *2/Lieutenant AK Mudgal
  • *One OP officer each with 'B' Squadron 4 HORSE and 'B' Squadron 17 HORSE from 70 Medium Regiment.
  • At the Gun Position
  • *Major BS Sahrawat
  • *Major Tyagarajan
  • *Captain Rajesh Kumar
  • *Captain SS Yadav
  • *Captain Sawinder Singh
  • * 2/Lieutenant TN Ram
  • *2/Lieutenant Ashok Arora
  • *2/Lieutenant AK Mudgal
  • *Subedar Major Mohinder Singh
  • * Subedar Narayan Singh
  • * Subedar Jagan Nath
All ranks set about making themselves operationally ready for the task ahead. Ammunition was brought forward to the gun position, gun pits and bunkers dug and local defence coordinated. At the brigade, regiment and battery levels operational conferences/briefings were held and detailed preparations carried out for the on-coming battle. At this stage the OP parties were integrated with respective armoured squadrons/infantry companies.
The pre-emptive strike by the Pakistan air force on the air fields at, Pathankot, Jammu, Srinagar, Adampur and Amritsar on 3 Dec 71 was like a bugle call to the forces in the Samba-Zafarwal sector. The armoured and infantry units moved forward into their battle locations, the radio silence a lull before the storm.
The forces in Samba-Zafarwal sector consisting of 54 Infantry Division with under command 16 Armoured Brigade with 75 Medium Regiment in direct support were unleashed on the enemy. The enemy border posts were soon captured and the offensive resumed under cover of artillery fire. The regiment engaged a number of tanks, RCLs, active machine guns and mortar positions considerably facilitating the advance of the armoured and infantry columns.
  • Action at Thakurdwara
On 6 Dec 71, 4 Horse encountered minefields north of Thakurdwara. The enemy RCLs and machine guns covering the minefields were effectively engaged by Major MS Brar and Captain Madhu Mahbubani. The 600 m deep minefield was breached with trawl tanks closely followed by 'C' squadron 4 Horse. The enemy targets including one mortar position and an air defence gun position in the flanks were effectively engaged at this stage. 'A' squadron 4 Horse closely followed by 16 Dogra were then inducted into the bridgehead taking the enemy completely by surprise. In this speedy engagement the enemy lost 5 tanks in a matter of minutes and staggered back, opening the axis to the advancing forces.
The forces advanced rapidly in the face of heavy enemy artillery fire, arial straffing and machine gun fire; and destroyed a number of enemy tanks, RCLs and machine guns, a number of abandoned tanks were also captured and prisoners taken. A number of hostile batteries and active mortars were also effectively engaged by the regiment at this stage of battle. The success of this engagement was entirely due to the swift forward movement by the armoured tanks and close and intensive fire support provided by the regiment.
  • Action at Chakra
The action at Chakra across the Karir N was a major action which involved the crossing of Karir N, breaching a minefield about 800 m in depth, inducting armour and infantry across the obstacle by night and capturing the fortified defences in area Chakra-Delhra. This action was fought by 47 Infantry Brigade with under command 'C' squadron 4 Horse.
The regiment provided intimate fire support in this action. Captain Madhu Mahbubani the OP officer with 'C' squadron 4 Horse engaged enemy tanks and infantry bunkers. The fire of 54 Artillery Brigade and 41 Artillery Brigade was skillfully coordinated by the commanding officer of the regiment along with Major BS Sahrawat and Captain Rajesh Kumar in support of the attacking troops. The devastating effect of artillery fire made a major contribution in shattering the enemy's will to fight, greatly facilitating the capture of the fortified defences in area Chakra-Delhra. Thereafter, at first light on 11 Dec 71, again the fire of the regiment was brought down on enemy targets, which resulted in the breaking up of the enemy's attack at Chakra.
This action was an outstanding example of a well integrated all arms action; the engineers breached the minefield with trawl tanks, the armour in spite of difficult terrain bulldozed their way across and the infantry built up in sufficient strength, all in one night under cover of heavy and accurate concentration of artillery fire provided by the regiment. In this action the enemy suffered heavy casualties including a number of tanks. This action greatly facilitated subsequent advance of the forces.
  • Action at JARPAL
'C' company 3 Grenadiers under command Major Hoshiar Singh with Captain Mohan Krishnan as the forward observation officer came under heavy enemy artillery shelling and machine gun fire followed by a massive counterattack. Captain Mohan Krishnan together with his radio operators L/Naik Onkar Nath, ORA Rajender Pal and technical assistant gunner Rajender Prasad moved forward to a vantage point and brought down heavy crumps of artillery fire on the enemy bunkers, machine gun nests and the advancing enemy, thus breaking up the enemy's counterattack.
The commanding officer of the regiment coordinated the artillery fire, while L/Havildar K Ramachandran, the commanding officer's radio operator sat in a jeep at Lagwal relaying the fire orders of the forward observation officers to the guns and displayed selfless devotion to duty, tenacity and courage throughout the battle despite numerous battle hazards. L/Naik Gopalakrishna and ORA Shyam Narain Rai joined him after last light to help in his tasks. At Bari, L/Havildar Mohan Lal who was manning a step-up station came under enemy artillery shelling. He remained calm and stood fast to his radio set and continued to assist in the passage of fire orders.
The survey officer, Captain SS Yadav with Gunner Mohan Lal the commanding officer's driver were bringing forward important documents to the commanding officer when they came under enemy shelling. Gunner VK Premachandran the dispatch rider accompanying them got a direct shell hit and died instantaneously. Captain SS Yadav went back to arrange for Gunner VK Premachandran's evacuation and Gunner Mohan Lal drove across the area under shelling and reached the commanding officer in time.
  • Regiment Gun Position
Major BS Sahrawat, the second-in-command of the regiment and Captain Rajesh Kumar, the adjutant organized the gun position and the movement of guns by night with skill and ensured quick response of the guns to the frequent calls for fire from the forward observation post officers.
Subedar Major Mohinder Singh at the gun position was busy going from gun to gun encouraging the detachments and inspiring them to give their best. His sincere efforts and leadership made a major contribution in providing the continuous fire support called for by the advancing 16 Armoured Brigade.
2/Lieutenant TN Ram the gun position officer 751, moved forward with his battery at night in the thick of battle and occupied battery gun position at Galar to ensure continuous fire support to the advancing armour and infantry. Subedar Jagan Nath was the Troop leader at Galar where his troop gun position was repeatedly straffed by the enemy aircraft, being the last day before cease fire the enemy air was particularly active against the gun position; he showed courage and high sense of duty by moving from gun to gun ensuring continuous firing of his guns. When he saw an enemy aircraft coming low to straff his guns he picked up a light machine gun in anti-aircraft role and hose piped fire at the enemy aircraft, keeping them at bay and saved the gun position from their straffing. This aircraft was soon shot down by an air defence gun of 64 Air Defence Battery positioned nearby.
After the war, the regiment was awarded the battle honour "Basantar River" in recognition of extraordinary heroism and exemplary combat performance while in direct support of the 16 Armoured Brigade during the Indo-Pak War of 1971 ; and is proudly called "MVC Regiment". For their acts of gallantry, distinguished service of a high order and courageous devotion to duty, the Commander of the armoured brigade Brigadier AS Vaidya MVC was awarded the Bar to MVC, the commanding officer of the regiment Lieutenant Colonel KN Thadani was awarded a VSM, Major MS Brar observation post officer with 'A' squadron 4 Horse was awarded a SM, Captain Satish Chander Sehgal observation post officer with 'C' squadron 17 Horse was awarded a VrC, Captain Madhu Mahbubani observation post officer with 'C' squadron 4 Horse, Captain Mohan Krishnan observation post officer with 'C' company 3 Grenadiers and Subedar Major Mohinder Singh at the gun position were awarded Mentioned in Dispatches.