1991 Soviet coup attempt


The 1991 Soviet coup attempt, also known as the August Coup, was a failed attempt by hardliners of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to forcibly seize control of the country from Mikhail Gorbachev, who was Soviet president and General Secretary of the CPSU at the time. The coup leaders consisted of top military and civilian officials, including Vice President Gennady Yanayev, who together formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency. They opposed Gorbachev's reform program, were angry at the loss of control over Eastern European states and fearful of the New Union Treaty, which was on the verge of being signed by the Soviet Union. The treaty was to decentralize much of the central Soviet government's power and distribute it among its fifteen republics. Boris Yeltsin's demand for more autonomy to the republics opened a window for the plotters to organize the coup.
The GKChP hardliners dispatched KGB agents who detained Gorbachev at his dacha but failed to detain the recently elected president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The GKChP was poorly organized and met with effective resistance by both Yeltsin and a civilian campaign of anti-authoritarian protesters, mainly in Moscow. The coup collapsed in two days, and Gorbachev returned to office while the plotters all lost their posts. Yeltsin subsequently became the dominant leader and Gorbachev lost much of his influence. The failed coup led to both the immediate collapse of the CPSU and the dissolution of the USSR four months later.
Following the capitulation of the GKChP, popularly referred to as the "Gang of Eight", both the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and President Gorbachev described its actions as a coup attempt.

Background

Since assuming power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev had embarked on an ambitious reform program embodied in the twin concepts of perestroika and glasnost. These moves prompted resistance and suspicion on the part of hard-line members of the nomenklatura. The reforms also caused nationalist agitation on the part of the Soviet Union's non-Russian minorities to grow, and there were fears that some or all of the union republics might secede. In 1991, the Soviet Union was in a severe economic and political crisis. Scarcity of food, medicine, and other consumables was widespread, people had to stand in long lines to buy even essential goods, fuel stocks were as much as 50% lower than the estimated amount needed for the approaching winter, and inflation exceeded 300% per year, with factories lacking the cash needed to pay salaries.
In 1990, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Armenia had already declared the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, a violent attempt to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union by force took place. About a week later, a similar attempt was engineered by local pro-Soviet forces to overthrow Latvian authorities.
Russia declared its sovereignty on 12June 1990 and thereafter limited the application of Soviet laws, in particular those governing finance and the economy, on Russian territory. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted laws that contradicted Soviet laws.
In the unionwide referendum on 17 March 1991, boycotted by the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, a supermajority of residents in the other republics expressed the desire to retain the renewed Soviet Union, with 77.85% voting in favor. Following negotiations, eight of the remaining nine republics approved the New Union Treaty with some conditions. The treaty was to make the Soviet Union a federation of independent republics called the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, with a common president, foreign policy, and military. Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were to sign the Treaty in Moscow on 20August 1991.
British historian Dan Stone wrote the following about the plotters' motivation:
The coup was the last gasp of those who were astonished at and felt betrayed by the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe and the swift destruction of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon that followed. Many feared the consequences of Gorbachev's German policies above all, not just for leaving officers unemployed but for sacrificing gains achieved in the Great Patriotic War to German revanchism and irredentism – after all, this had been the Kremlin's greatest fear since the end of the war.

Preparation

Planning

The KGB began considering a coup in September 1990. Soviet politician Alexander Yakovlev began warning Gorbachev about the possibility of one after the 28th Party Congress in June 1990. On 11December 1990, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov made a "call for order" over the Moscow Programme television station. That day, he asked two KGB officers to prepare measures to be taken in the event a state of emergency was declared in the USSR. Later, Kryuchkov brought Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, Central Control Commission Chairman Boris Pugo, Premier Valentin Pavlov, Vice President Gennady Yanayev, Soviet Defense Council deputy chief Oleg Baklanov, Gorbachev secretariat head Valery Boldin, and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Oleg Shenin into the conspiracy.
When Kryuchkov complained about the Soviet Union's growing instability to the Congress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev attempted to appease him by issuing a presidential decree enhancing the powers of the KGB and appointing Pugo to the Cabinet as Minister of Internal Affairs. Foreign Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze resigned in protest and rejected an offered appointment as vice president, warning that "a dictatorship is coming." Gorbachev was forced to appoint Yanayev in his place.
Beginning with the January Events in Lithuania, members of Gorbachev's Cabinet hoped that he could be persuaded to declare a state of emergency and "restore order," and formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency.
On 17June 1991, Soviet premier Pavlov requested extraordinary powers from the Supreme Soviet. Several days later, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov informed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock Jr. that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. When Matlock tried to warn him, Gorbachev falsely assumed that his own Cabinet was not involved and underestimated the risk of a coup. Gorbachev reversed Pavlov's request for more powers and jokingly told his Cabinet "The coup is over," remaining oblivious to their plans.
On 23July 1991, several party functionaries and literati published a piece in the hardline Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper, entitled "A Word to the People", that called for decisive action to prevent calamity.
Six days later, on 29July, Gorbachev, Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the possibility of replacing hardliners such as Pavlov, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo with more liberal figures, with Nazarbayev as Prime Minister. Kryuchkov, who had placed Gorbachev under close surveillance as Subject 110 several months earlier, eventually got wind of the conversation from an electronic bug planted by Gorbachev's bodyguard, Vladimir Medvedev. Yeltsin also prepared for a coup by establishing a secret defense committee, ordering military and KGB commands to side with RSFSR authorities and establishing a "reserve government" about 70 kilometers from Sverdlovsk under Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov.

Commencement

On 4August, Gorbachev went on holiday to his dacha in Foros, Crimea. He planned to return to Moscow in time for the New Union Treaty signing on 20August. On 15August, the text of the draft treaty was published, which would have stripped the coup planners of much of their authority.
On 17August, the members of the GKChP met at a KGB guesthouse in Moscow and studied the treaty document. Decisions were made to introduce a state of emergency from 19August, to form a State Emergency Committee, and require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or to resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanayev. They believed the pact would pave the way for the Soviet Union's breakup, and decided it was time to act. The next day, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin, and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov flew to Crimea for a meeting with Gorbachev. Yazov ordered General Pavel Grachev, commander of the Soviet Airborne Forces, to begin coordinating with KGB Deputy Chairmen Viktor Grushko and Genii Ageev to implement martial law.
At 4:32pm on 18August, the GKChP cut communications to Gorbachev's dacha, including telephone landlines and the nuclear command and control system. Eight minutes later Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, Head of the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB, allowed the group into Gorbachev's dacha. Gorbachev realized what was happening after discovering the telephone outages. Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov demanded that Gorbachev either declare a state of emergency or resign and name Yanayev as acting president to allow the members of the GKChP "to restore order" to the country.
Gorbachev has always claimed that he refused point-blank to accept the ultimatum. Varennikov has insisted that Gorbachev said: "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!" However, those present at the dacha at the time testified that Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov had been clearly disappointed and nervous after the meeting with Gorbachev. Gorbachev is said to have insulted Varennikov by pretending to forget his name, and to have told his former trusted advisor Boldin "Shut up, you prick! How dare you give me lectures about the situation in the country!" With Gorbachev's refusal, the conspirators ordered that he remain confined to the dacha. Additional KGB security guards were placed at the dacha gates with orders to stop anybody from leaving.
At 7:30pm, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov flew to Moscow, accompanied by Plekhanov. His deputy, Vyacheslav Generalov, remained "on the farm" in Foros.
At 8:00pm, Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo and Soviet Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov gathered in the Kremlin cabinet of the Prime Minister, discussing and editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee. At 10:15pm, they were joined by Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, Varennikov and Plekhanov. It was decided to publicly declare Gorbachev ill. Yanayev hesitated, but the others convinced him that leadership and responsibility would be collective.
At 11:25pm, Yanayev signed a decree entrusting himself with presidential powers.
GKChP members ordered that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs from a factory in Pskov be sent to Moscow, also ordering 300,000 arrest forms. Kryuchkov doubled the pay of all KGB personnel, called them back from holiday, and placed them on alert. Lefortovo Prison was emptied to receive prisoners.