United States Army Air Service
The United States Army Air Service was the aerial warfare service component of the United States Army between 1918 and 1926 and a forerunner of the United States Air Force. It was established as an independent but temporary branch of the U.S. War Department during World War I by two executive orders of President Woodrow Wilson: on May 24, 1918, replacing the Aviation Section, Signal Corps as the nation's air force; and March 19, 1919, establishing a military Director of Air Service to control all aviation activities. Its life was extended for another year in July 1919, during which time Congress passed the legislation necessary to make it a permanent establishment. The National Defense Act of 1920 assigned the Air Service the status of "combatant arm of the line" of the United States Army with a major general in command.
In France, the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force, a separate entity under commanding General John J. Pershing that conducted the combat operations of U.S. military aviation, began field service in the spring of 1918. By the end of the war, the Air Service used 45 squadrons to cover 137 kilometers of front from Pont-à-Mousson to Sedan. 71 pursuit pilots were credited with shooting down five or more German aircraft while in American service. Overall the Air Service destroyed 756 enemy aircraft and 76 balloons in combat. 17 balloon companies also operated at the front, making 1,642 combat ascensions. 289 airplanes and 48 balloons were lost in battle.
The Air Service was the first form of the air force to have an independent organizational structure and identity. Although officers concurrently held rank in various branches, after May 1918 their branch designation in official correspondence while on aviation assignment changed from "ASSC" to "AS, USA". After July 1, 1920, its personnel became members of the Air Service branch, receiving new commissions. During the war its responsibilities and functions were split between two coordinate agencies, the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production, each reporting directly to the Secretary of War, creating a dual authority over military aviation that caused unity of command difficulties.
The seven-year history of the post-war Air Service was marked by a prolonged debate between adherents of airpower and the supporters of the traditional military services about the value of an independent Air Force. Airmen such as Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell supported the independent air concept. The Army's senior leadership from World War I, the United States Navy, and the majority of the nation's political leadership favored integration of all military aviation into the Army and Navy. Aided by a wave of pacifism following the war that drastically cut military budgets, opponents of an independent air force prevailed. The Air Service was renamed the Army Air Corps in 1926 as a compromise in the continuing struggle.
Creation of the Air Service
Background of the wartime Air Service
Although war in Europe prompted Congress to vastly increase the appropriations for the Aviation Section in 1916, it nevertheless tabled a bill proposing an aviation department incorporating all aspects of military aviation. The declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917, putting the United States in World War I, came too quickly to solve emerging engineering and production problems. The reorganization of the Aviation Section had been inadequate in resolving problems in training, leaving the United States totally unprepared to fight an air war in Europe. The Aviation Section consisted of 131 officers, 1087 enlisted men, and approximately 280 airplanes.The administration of President Woodrow Wilson created an advisory Aircraft Production Board in May 1917, consisting of members of the Army, Navy and industry, to study the Europeans' experience in aircraft production and the standardization of aircraft parts. The Board dispatched Major Raynal C. Bolling, a lawyer and military aviation pioneer, together with a commission of over 100 members, to Europe in the summer of 1917 to determine American aircraft needs, recommend priorities for acquisition and production, and negotiate prices and royalties. Congress passed a series of legislation in the next three months that appropriated huge sums for development of military aviation, including the largest single appropriation for a single purpose to that time, $640 million in the Aviation Act, passed July 24, 1917. By the time the bill passed, the term Air Service was in widespread if unofficial usage to collectively describe all aspects of Army aviation.
Although it considered creation of a separate aviation department to act as the centralized authority for decision-making, both the War and the Navy Departments opposed it, and on October 1, 1917, Congress instead legalized the existence of the APB and changed its name to the "Aircraft Board", transferring its functions from the Council of National Defense to the secretaries of War and the Navy. Even so, the Aircraft Board in practice had little control over procurement contracts and functioned mostly as an information provider between industrial, governmental, and military entities. Nor did the "Equipment Division" of the Signal Corps exercise such control. Established by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer as one of the operating components of the Aviation Section, its task was to unify and coordinate the various agencies involved but its head was a commissioned former member of the APB who did nothing to create any effective coordination. Moreover, the largely wood and fabric airframe designs of World War I did not lend themselves to being made with the mass production methods of the automotive industry, which used considerable amounts of metallic materials instead, and the priority of mass-producing spare parts was neglected. Though individual areas within the aviation industry responded well, the industry as a whole failed. Efforts to mass-produce European aircraft under license largely failed because the aircraft, made by hand, were not amenable to the more precise American manufacturing methods. At the same time the Aeronautical Division of the OCSO was renamed the Air Division with continued responsibility for training and operations but with no influence on acquisition or doctrine. In the end the decision-making process in aircraft procurement was badly fragmented and production on a large scale proved impossible.
Construction of Air Fields
The army also adopted infrastructure plans to create air fields known as 'Flying Fields' to train officers and men around aircraft and to setup permanent military instillations. These instillations would be designed by architect Albert Kahn who was a famous for his neo classical architecture in the US at the time. He applied neo classical architecture to major cities across the US notably Detroit. This uniqueness of architecture was also seen in the hangars which were all identical and some are still standing at airbases in the US.Aircraft production failures
The Aircraft Board came under severe criticism for failure to meet goals or its own claims of aircraft production, followed by a highly publicized personal investigation by Gutzon Borglum, a harshly vocal critic of the board. Borglum had exchanged letters with President Wilson, a personal friend, from which he assumed an appointment to investigate had been authorized, which the administration soon denied. Both the U.S. Senate and the Department of Justice began investigations into possible fraudulent dealings. President Wilson also acted by appointing a Director of Aircraft Production on April 28, 1918, and abolished the Air Division of the OCSO, creating a Division of Military Aeronautics with Brigadier General William L. Kenly brought back from France to be its head, to separate supervision of aviation from the duties of the Chief Signal Officer. Less than a month later, Wilson used a war powers provision of the Overman Act of May 20, 1918, to issue Executive Order No. 2862 that suspended for the duration of the war plus six months the statutory responsibilities of the Aviation Section and removed the DMA entirely from the Signal Corps. The DMA was assigned the function of procuring and training a combat force. In addition, the executive order created a Bureau of Aircraft Production, a military organization with a civilian director, as a separate executive bureau to provide the aircraft needed.This arrangement lasted only until the War Department implemented the executive order on May 24 by issuing General Order No. 51 to coordinate the two independent agencies, with an eventual goal of creating a Director of Air Service. It delayed the appointment of a director as long as the BAP operated as a separate executive bureau. In August, the Senate completed its investigation of the Aircraft Board, and while it found no criminal culpability, it reported that massive waste and delay in production had occurred. As a result, the Director of Aircraft Production, John D. Ryan, was appointed to the vacant position of Second Assistant Secretary of War and designated as Director of Air Service, nominally in charge of the DMA. The Department of Justice report followed two months later and also blamed the delays on administrative and organizational deficiencies in the Aviation Section. Ryan's appointment came too late for any effective consolidation of both agencies, continuing an obstructive division of authority that was never resolved during the war.
Following the Armistice, Ryan resigned on November 27, leaving both the BAP and DMA, as well as the original Aircraft Board, leaderless. In addition certain powers, primarily those of dealing legally with the government-owned Spruce Production Corporation, had been delegated to Ryan by name, not to his position as Director of Aircraft Production, and as such could not be legally conferred on any successor. Maj. Gen. Charles Menoher was appointed to the vacancy on January 2, 1919, but the patchwork nature of laws and executive orders that had created the various parts of the Air Service prevented him from exercising all their legal powers and ending the unity of command problems caused by dual authority.