United States non-interventionism
United States non-interventionism primarily refers to the foreign policy that was eventually applied by the United States between the late 18th century and the first half of the 20th century whereby it sought to avoid alliances with other nations in order to prevent itself from being drawn into wars that were not related to the direct territorial self-defense of the United States. Neutrality and non-interventionism found support among elite and popular opinion in the United States, which varied depending on the international context and the country's interests. At times, the degree and nature of this policy was better known as isolationism, such as the interwar period, while some consider the term isolationism to be a pejorative used to discredit non-interventionist policy.
It is key to decipher between the terms isolationism and non-interventionism as they represent two distinct types of foreign policy. Isolationism is the act of completely disengaging from any global affairs such as military alliances, international organisations and economic treaties. Whereas, non-interventionism although also opposed to military engagement, there was still room for diplomatic and economic relations with the rest of the world. This can be seen during the build up to World War II, where non-interventionists opposed direct military involvement in Europe whilst supporting them with economic aid such as the Lend Lease Act.
Due to the start of the Cold War in the aftermath of World War II and the rise of the United States as a global superpower, its traditional foreign policy turned towards American imperialism with diplomatic and military interventionism, engaging or somehow intervening in virtually any overseas armed conflict ever since, and concluding multiple bilateral and regional military alliances, chiefly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Non-interventionist policies have had continued support from some Americans since World War II, mostly regarding specific armed conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Syria, and Ukraine.
Background
, Britain's first Whig prime minister, proclaimed in 1723: "My politics are to keep free from all engagements as long as we possibly can." He emphasized economic advantage and rejected the idea of intervening in European affairs to maintain a balance of power. Walpole's position was known to Americans. However, during the American Revolution, the Second Continental Congress debated about forming an alliance with France. It rejected non-interventionism when it was apparent that the American Revolutionary War could be won in no other manner than a military alliance with France, which Benjamin Franklin successfully negotiated in 1778.After Britain and France went to war in 1792, George Washington declared neutrality, with unanimous support of his cabinet, after deciding that the treaty with France of 1778 did not apply. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton concurred, arguing in Pacificus 2 that the treaty stipulated a defensive alliance, and not an offensive one. Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 explicitly announced the policy of American non-interventionism:
No entangling alliances (19th century)
President Thomas Jefferson extended Washington's ideas about foreign policy in his March 4, 1801 inaugural address. Jefferson said that one of the "essential principles of our government" is that of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." He also stated that "Commerce with all nations, alliance with none", should be the motto of the United States. Extending at times into isolationism, both Jefferson and Madison also practiced the boycotting of belligerent nations with the Embargo Act of 1807.In 1823, President James Monroe articulated what would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, which some have interpreted as non-interventionist in intent: "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense." It was applied to Hawaii in 1842 in support of eventual annexation there, and to support U.S. expansion on the North American continent.
During the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849, the United States adhered to its formal policy of non-intervention while offering diplomatic support to the Hungarian cause. American public opinion overwhelmingly favored the revolutionaries. President Zachary Taylor expressed sympathy for the "Magyar patriots," and the U.S. Congress debated resolutions in their favor. The Austrian Empire's suppression of the revolution—bolstered by Russian military intervention—sparked outrage in the United States and led to a heated diplomatic exchange between Austrian Ambassador Johann Von Hülsemann and Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who defended America’s right to comment on foreign affairs. Though the U.S. declined to recognize Hungarian independence or offer military aid, it secured the release of Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth from Ottoman custody and welcomed him on a celebrated tour of the United States.
After Tsar Alexander II put down the 1863 January Uprising in Poland, French Emperor Napoleon III asked the United States to "join in a protest to the Tsar." Secretary of State William H. Seward declined, "defending 'our policy of non-intervention—straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations,'" and insisted that "he American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."
President Ulysses S. Grant attempted to annex the Dominican Republic in 1870, but failed to get the support of the Radical Republicans in the Senate. The United States' policy of non-intervention was wholly abandoned with the Spanish–American War, followed by the Philippine–American War from 1899 to 1902.
20th century non-interventionism
President Theodore Roosevelt's administration is credited with inciting the Panamanian Revolt against Colombia, completed November 1903, in order to secure construction rights for the Panama Canal.President Woodrow Wilson was able to navigate neutrality in World War I for about three years, and to win 1916 reelection with the slogan "He kept us out of war." The neutrality policy was supported by the tradition of shunning foreign entanglements, and by the large population of immigrants from Europe with divided loyalties in the conflict. America did enter the war in April 1917, however. Congress voted to declare war on Germany, 373 to 50 in the House of Representatives and 82 to 6 in the Senate. Technically the US joined the side of the Triple Entente only as an "associated power" fighting the same enemy, not as officially allied with the Entente.
A few months after the declaration of war, Wilson gave a speech to Congress outlining his aims for conclusion of the conflict, labeled the Fourteen Points. That American proclamation was less triumphalist than the stated aims of some other belligerents, and its final point proposed that a "general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." After the war, Wilson traveled to Europe and remained there for months to labor on the post-war treaty, longer than any previous Presidential sojourn outside the country. In that Treaty of Versailles, Wilson's "general association of nations" was formulated as the League of Nations.
Isolationism between the World Wars
In the wake of the First World War, the non-interventionist tendencies gained ascendancy. The Treaty of Versailles, and thus, United States' participation in the League of Nations, even with reservations, was rejected by the Senate in the final months of Wilson's presidency.Republican Senate leader Henry Cabot Lodge supported the Treaty with reservations to be sure Congress had final authority on sending the U.S. into war. Wilson and his Democratic supporters rejected the Lodge Reservations.
The strongest opposition to American entry into the League of Nations came from the Senate where a tight-knit faction known as the Irreconcilables, led by William Borah and George Norris, had great objections regarding the clauses of the treaty which compelled America to come to the defense of other nations. Senator William Borah, of Idaho, declared that it would "purchase peace at the cost of any part of our independence." Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, denounced the League of Nations as a "gigantic war trust." While some of the sentiment was grounded in adherence to Constitutional principles, most of the sentiment bore a reassertion of nativist and inward-looking policy.
American society in the interwar period was characterized by a division in values between urban and rural areas as Americans in urban areas tended to be liberal while those in rural areas tended to be conservative. Adding to the division was that Americans in rural areas tended to be Protestant of British and/or German descent while those in urban areas were often Catholic or Jewish and came from eastern or southern Europe. The rural-urban divide was seen most dramatically in the intense debate about Prohibition as urban Americans tended to be "wets" while rural Americans tended to be "drys". The way that American society was fractured along an urban-rural divide served to distract public attention from foreign affairs. In the 1920s, the State Department had about 600 employees in total with an annual budget of $2 million, which reflected a lack of interest on the part of Congress in foreign affairs. The State Department was very much an elitist body that recruited mostly from graduates of the select "Ivy League" universities, which reflected the idea that foreign policy was the concern of elites. Likewise, the feeling that the United States was taking in far too many immigrants from eastern and southern Europe-who were widely depicted in the American media as criminals and revolutionaries-led to laws restricting immigration from Europe. In turn, the anti-immigrant mood increased isolationism as the picture of Europe as a place overflowing with dangerous criminals and equally dangerous Communist revolutionaries led to the corresponding conclusion that the United States should have little as possible to do with nations whose peoples were depicted as disagreeable and unpleasant. The same way that Congress had virtually banned all non-white immigration to the United States likewise led an indifference about the fate of non-white nations such as China and Ethiopia. The debate about Prohibition in the 1920s also encouraged nativist and isolationist feelings as "drys" often engaged in American exceptionalism by arguing that the United States was a uniquely morally pure nation that had banned alcohol, unlike the rest of the world which remained "wet" and was depicted as mired in corruption and decadence.
The United States acted independently to become a major player in the 1920s in international negotiations and treaties. The Harding Administration achieved naval disarmament among the major powers through the Washington Naval Conference in 1921–22. The Dawes Plan refinanced war debts and helped restore prosperity to Germany. In August 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg–Briand Pact, brainchild of American secretary of state Frank Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. This pact that was said to have outlawed war and showed the United States commitment to international peace had its semantic flaws. For example, it did not hold the United States to the conditions of any existing treaties, it still allowed European nations the right to self-defense, and it stated that if one nation broke the Pact, it would be up to the other signatories to enforce it. Briand had sent a message on 6 April 1927 to mark the 10th anniversary of the American declaration of war on Germany in 1917 proposing that France and the United States sign a non-aggression pact. Briand was attempting to create a Franco-American alliance to counter Germany as Briand envisioned turning the negotiations for the non-aggression pact into an some sort of an alliance. Kellogg had no interest in an alliance with France, and countered with a vague offer for a treaty to ban all war. The Kellogg–Briand Pact was more of a sign of good intentions on the part of the US, rather than a legitimate step towards the sustenance of world peace.
Another reason for isolationism was the belief that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh towards Germany and the question of war debts to the United States. American public opinion was especially hostile towards France, which was depicted in the words of the Republican senator Reed Smoot who in August 1930 called France a greedy "Shylock" intent upon taking the last "pound of flesh" from Germany via reparations while refusing to pay its war debts to the United States. In the early 1930s, French diplomats at the embassy in Washington stated that the image of France was at an all-time low in the United States with American public opinion being especially incensed by France's decision to default on its war debts on 15 December 1932. French diplomats throughout the interwar period complained that the German embassy and consulates in the United States waged a slick, well funded propaganda campaign designed to persuade the Americans that the Treaty of Versailles was a monstrous, unjust peace treaty while the French embassy and consulates did nothing equivalent to make the case for France. The effect of German propaganda tended to persuade many Americans it had been a huge mistake to have declared war on Germany in 1917 and it would be wrong for the United States to go to war to maintain the international order created by the Treaty of Versailles.
The economic depression that ensued after the Crash of 1929, also continued to abet non-intervention. The attention of the country focused mostly on addressing the problems of the national economy. Isolationism fit the national mood of the 1930s, as the economic crisis led to a lack of willingness to extend the resources to others, this combined with the ongoing issue of the allies failing to pay back their war debts created disillusionment on the benefit of foreign interventions to actually accomplish anything other than profiting imperialists. The rise of aggressive imperialist policies by Fascist Italy and the Empire of Japan led to conflicts such as the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. These events led to ineffectual condemnations by the League of Nations. Official American response was muted. America also did not take sides in the brutal Spanish Civil War and withdrew its troops from Haiti with the inauguration of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934. In an attempt to influence American public opinion into taking a more favorable view of France, the Quai d'Orsay founded in 1935 the Association our la Constitution aux Etats-Unis d'un Office Français de Renseignements based in New York, a cultural propaganda council designed to give Americans a more favorable image of France. Better known as the French Information Center, the group created a French Cinema Center to distribution of French films in the United States and by 1939 had handled out for free about 5, 000 copies of French films to American universities and high schools. The French Information Center provided briefings to American journalists and columnists about the French point of view with the emphasis upon France as a democracy that had potential powerful enemies in the form of totalitarian dictatorships such as Germany and Italy. Such propaganda did not seek to challenge American isolationism directly, but the prevailing theme was that France and the United States as democracies had more in common than what divided them. By 1939, René Doynel de Saint-Quentin, the French ambassador in Washington reported that image of France was much higher than what it had been in 1932.
During this period, a significant proportion of non-interventionist sentiment in the United States was shaped as a result of women's peace organisations. For instance a key organisation was the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. It was a group of female pacifists who were against the U.S intervention in World War 1. Key African American women activists include Addie Hunton, Mary Church Terrel and Maude White Katz. They were significant as their membership was made up of women from diverse backgrounds such as African American Women. They altered the trajectory of the organisations goals, as they argued that you can challenge U.S Imperialism abroad without solving the domestic issues of race equality at home.