129th Rifle Division
The 129th Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in August 1939 in the North Caucasus Military District, based on the shtat of the following month. It remained in that District until just before the German invasion began in June 1941, when it was moving by rail through eastern Ukraine to join the 19th Army of Western Front near Vitebsk. On its approach to the fighting front in early July it became strung out along the roads and never made effective contact before the 19th was largely destroyed, so it fell back toward Smolensk where it was reassigned to 16th Army. During the following weeks it fought a series of see-saw battles for the northern part of the city while 16th Army was within a deep pocket. By the end of the month it was clear that Smolensk could not be retaken and the badly depleted division was able to escape, soon being reassigned to 20th Army.
1st Formation
The division was formed at Stalingrad in the North Caucasus Military District in August 1939. Kombrig Yakov Stepanovich Fokanov, who had previously led the 61st Rifle Division, was soon assigned to command, but he left this post in January 1940 to take command of the 18th Reserve Brigade. From July to October it was led by Maj. Gen. Nikifor Gordeevich Khoruzhenko, but on October 25 he left to complete his military education and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Avksentii Mikhailovich Gorodnianskii. At the time of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the division's order of battle was as follows:- 438th Rifle Regiment
- 457th Rifle Regiment
- 518th Rifle Regiment
- 664th Artillery Regiment
- 37th Antitank Battalion
- 210th Antiaircraft Battalion
- 192nd Reconnaissance Company
- 40th Sapper Battalion
- 276th Signal Battalion
- 196th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
- 52nd Chemical Defense Company
- 212th Motor Transport Battalion
- 152nd Field Bakery
- 829th Field Postal Station
- 38th Field Office of the State Bank
Battle of Smolensk
On the day of the German invasion the division was located in the areas of Cherkasy and Bila Tserkva. 19th Army was under command of Lt. Gen. I. S. Konev, and was soon redirected toward the Vitebsk area, where it arrived in piecemeal fashion over several days. In a lengthy after-action report prepared on July 24 by Konev's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. P. N. Rubtsov, the circumstances of this arrival were described in part:Rubtsov went on to note deficiencies in command and control, especially in the use of radio; lack of rear services and reserves; and insufficient reconnaissance. All these would be reflected in the coming battle.The 171st was transferred to Southwestern Front, and was replaced in the Corps' order of battle by the 38th Rifle Division. The 129th officially entered the fighting forces on July 2, when 19th Army became part of Western Front. In a report to the STAVKA late on July 13, the Front commander, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, stated that he had designated a line behind the Dniepr and Sot Rivers in the Yartsevo and Smolensk regions as the concentration area for the 34th Corps and the 127th Rifle Division "to avoid feeding 19th Army's concentrating forces into combat in piecemeal fashion." In the event, the Corps would be strung out along the roads between Vitebsk and Smolensk.
Timoshenko reported on the situation east of Vitebsk on the afternoon of July 16, stating in part that 19th Army had regrouped to prepare to retake that place, and that the 129th was "marching to jumping-off positions for the offensive by 2200 hours, with the head of its column at the intersection of the Moscow and Leningrad highway." By now 19th Army was severely disrupted and would soon be disbanded.
Encirclement west of Smolensk
The XXXXVII Panzer Corps, consisting of 29th Motorized Division in the lead, followed by 18th Panzer Division, had begun advancing from Horki early on July 13. The left wing rifle divisions of that Army were shoved aside and by dusk the town of Krasnyi, 56km southwest of Smolensk, was in German hands. Meanwhile, 17th Panzer had cleared Orsha and was pushing 20th Army into an elongated pocket north of the Dniepr west of Smolensk by July 15. In addition, the pocket contained the 129th and 158th, three divisions of 25th Corps, remnants of 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps, and various other formations totaling 20 divisions of several types and states of repair. However, XXXXVII Panzer was extended over 112km and 18th Panzer, as an example, was attempting to take up blocking positions at Krasnyi with just 12 tanks still operating.16th Army, led by Lt. Gen. M. F. Lukin, was tasked with the defense of the south approaches to the city, but had only two rifle divisions and the 57th Tank Division under command. Despite serious resistance the 29th Motorized reached the southern outskirts of Smolensk on the evening of July 15; a three-day battle for the city center began the next morning with the 152nd and the 129th, which was now under 16th Army. General Gorodnianskii had reinforced his division with a collection of subunits formed from stragglers and now had some 10,000 personnel on strength. Reaching the city from the north at dawn on July 16 the division attempted to throw out the 29th Motorized but was forced to give up their gains in the northern half with heavy losses from continuous attacks and counterattacks. Lukin ordered the effort to continue, and Gorodnianskii regained much of his lost ground in a night attack on July 16/17, but this was lost to further counterattacks during the afternoon.
At 2300 hours on July 17 Lukin reported that:The 3rd Battalion of the 457th Rifle Regiment was said to be attacking alongside the 1st Battalion of the 46th's 314th Regiment into Korolevka, with support from the assets of 34th Corps. Lukin ordered the assault to resume the next day, reinforcing what was now being called Gorodnianskii's Detachment with the remnants of 158th and 127th Divisions from the disbanded 19th Army.
By day's end on July 18 Smolensk was mostly in German hands, and 16th Army was partially encircled, along with the remnants of the 19th and other formations retreating from the frontier. Despite this success, it was increasingly clear that 29th Motorized and 18th Panzer were incapable of linking up with XXXIX Motorized Corps' 7th Panzer Division advancing from the north to complete the encirclement. Soviet forces were continuing to resist strongly, and the German mobile forces did not have sufficient infantry to seal the gaps. As the V Army Corps and IX Army Corps closed on Smolensk from northwest and southwest respectively to relieve the motorized troops the 129th and 152nd continued to incorporate many company and battalion-size groups from defeated divisions and put them into action in a battle that continued for ten days. Timoshenko had received orders from the STAVKA to hold the city "at all cost." On July 19 Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko took over Western Front, while Timoshenko remained in command of the Western Direction. By this time Lukin had begun moving his two divisions from the west and southwest part of the pocket to concentrate them for the recapture of Smolensk. The 129th still had a foothold in the northern part of the city.
At 2000 hours that day Lukin was finally able to report to Front headquarters on his Army's situation, which included: On July 20 Timoshenko's commissar, N. A. Bulganin, correctly informed Stalin as follows:
By now the armies in the pocket were under control of the commander of 20th Army, Lt. Gen. P. A. Kurochkin. Under his orders Lukin handed his sector west and north of the city to Kurochkin's army and sent the 152nd and 46th to reinforce the 129th. Lukin reported at 2000 hours on July 20 that four battalions of the 129th were "attacking Smolensk from the north, seized the airfield with its left wing and reached the Chernichka River, but facing two battalions of enemy motorized infantry with tanks, supported by massed mortar and automatic weapons fire and 'impudently' operating aircraft." He went on to state that food and ammunition was in short supply and that he had suspended the use of stragglers because "it has a negative influence on the combat steadfastness of the subunits." In his report the following evening he said the same four battalions would again attack the north part of the city overnight; the 457th Regiment, now down to 470 men, was on the northern slope of Hill 251.9.
The fight for the city
16th Army attacked from the north toward Smolensk beginning at 0100 hours on July 21. This led to protracted street fighting through the day in the northern part of the city. 29th Motorized was forced to withdraw most of its forces from the part of the city north of the river. However, Lukin reported that the personnel losses among his forces had reached 40 percent. The fighting continued the next day, as 34th Corps joined the attack from the southeast; although this was unsuccessful the XXXXVII Motorized Corps was forced to send the 17th Panzer Division to assist 29th Motorized, which in turn helped prevent the closing of the pocket. On the evening of July 23, Western Front reported, in part, that the 129th had retaken the northern and northeastern part of the city, reaching the water tower and the cemetery. However, early the next day Lukin's headquarters was forced to report that the Army had failed to completely clear the northern part of Smolensk, and the 129th was "fighting on the approaches to the northern part of the city with its right wing reaching the airfield's hangar and its left wing, Tantsovka." Through this entire battle Army Group Center was making every effort to disengage its motorized and panzer forces in order to renew the advance toward Moscow, but the infantry was slow to move up.The situation within the pocket became increasingly difficult, despite Group Rokossovskii holding open a gap in the Yartsevo area. In the morning of July 26 Western Front reported that 16th Army was attacking into the southeastern part of Smolensk, while also fortifying its positions in the northern part; the division was specifically noted as digging in on the north bank of the Dniepr while mopping up remaining German units. Kurochkin sent a detailed report to Timoshenko at noon on July 27 in which he stated that 16th Army was now facing the 137th Infantry Division within the city. By now the 129th and 152nd had been reduced to a combined total of 6,000 combat infantry. At 2100 hours Lukin reported that the German force in southern Smolensk now included "a probable SS motorized division", two tank battalions, one or two artillery battalions, and the 137th. The two rifle divisions were displaying "organization, energy, and audacity in combat", in particularly the former, "which is composed of detachments formed from 'stragglers from the front' and separate subunits from other previously defeated divisions and which has now become 'one of the more steadfast divisions', in contradiction to his previous stance. By this time the two divisions, along with the 46th, had come under command of 32nd Rifle Corps.
Lukin was still determined to recapture the rest of Smolensk, but at 1400 hours on July 29 he sent an operational summary to Timoshenko which would have far reaching consequences. He reported that part of his Army was attacking toward Smolensk and, regarding the 129th specifically the 457th Regiment was along the Stabna River near Muzhilovo and the Isakovo Sovkhoz, 6-7km northeast of the city, while the attached 393rd Regiment was moving to the western edge of Muzhilovo woods. Further, he stated that since 0800 the 152nd had been attacked by a German regiment "with massive artillery and air support" and forced to fall back eastward to the right flank of the 129th at Tserkovishchi, 10km north-northeast of the city along the Stabna River after suffering heavy losses, while the 129th continued to hold "stubbornly". The report clearly indicated that 16th Army was no longer in Smolensk proper, and Timoshenko, under considerable stress, took this to indicated that both it and 20th Army were not only preparing to withdraw from the pocket but actively doing so, abandoning the city. In fact, the V Army Corps had two divisions pushing east over the lower Stabna, leaving Lukin's divisions no choice but to fall back or die in place.
Timoshenko responded to this apparent insubordination by sending both Lukin and Kurochkin a severe warning:He noted that none of their earlier reports had indicated any need to withdraw, and he therefore ordered them to:At 1430 on July 30 Lukin sent fresh orders to his units, in which he stated that 20th Army would attack the northern outskirts of Smolensk early the next day, and his own 46th, 152nd and 129th would attack "decisively" at 0400 with the same objective, while also defending the Kolodnia and Dniepr River line. The 129th would hold on the KolodniaRogachevoNemytka Cooperative line and "take not a single step back - die, but do not withdraw." After being relieved by 73rd Rifle Division overnight on July 30/31 Gorodnianskii was to concentrate near Astragan State Farm and attack toward Smolensk in support of the 46th. Lukin's orders ended with various exhortations to take the city at all costs, that "retreat means death", all of which seemed to be directed more to Timoshenko, although he apparently did not receive a copy.
Soon after midnight on July 31 a new report from Lukin did reach Timoshenko in which he laid out all the difficulties faced by his men, along with criticism of Kurochkin and a large amount of self-justification. Among other matters he claimed that all the heavy machine guns of the 129th and 46th had been destroyed in the fighting while the artillery had run out of ammunition. Timoshenko now had to assuage the anger of the STAVKA with a candid explanation of what had happened at Smolensk, while stating the movements were "without my sanction." After laying out the tremendous pressure faced by 20th Army he wrote:He went on to state that when the Western Direction and Western Front headquarters became aware of the situation, Kurochkin was ordered to halt the withdrawal of the 129th and 152nd, but the following counterattacks on July 29 by the 152nd, 73rd and 46th failed and they fell back eastward with heavy losses. His counterattack orders for July 31 were impossible to carry out, as the divisions of the two armies each had only 1,000-2,000 men remaining, were under heavy attack, short of ammunition and fuel, and dependent on air supply by less than a dozen TB-3s per night.
Withdrawal from the pocket
This appreciation gave both Lukin and Kurochkin effective sanction to reorganize their remaining forces to break out to the east through the corridor that was being held by Group Rokossovskii. This movement put increasing pressure on the blocking positions held by XXXIX and XXXXVII Motorized Corps, which were also under attack from outside the pocket as well as Rokossovskii's troops in between. As early as July 29 a few mobile detachments of 16th Army had reached out to 38th Rifle Division along the Dniepr southwest of Yartsevo.As of August 1 the pocket had been reduced to 20km from east to west and 28km from north to south. 20th Army was defending the northern half, and 16th Army's five divisions were deployed in the southern half. The overall strength of the Soviet forces had declined from over 220,000 in mid-July to under 100,000, with inadequate supplies of fuel and ammunition. Lukin's report at 1900 hours stated that at least one German infantry division had attacked at 0600 with extensive artillery and air support. The report went on to state the 129th was suffering heavy casualties due to continuous attacks on its flanks. Lukin added that the situation was "tense", there was no ammunition for the artillery, and the divisions had lost all or most of their heavy machine guns. Meanwhile, Rokossovskii's group made attempt after attempt to widen the gap into the pocket by forcing back the 7th Panzer Division. Under the circumstances, Timoshenko's only rational course was to save what he could. Late in the day the STAVKA and Western Front tacitly authorized a breakout, although it was referred to as an "attack" toward Dukhovshchina.
At 0900 on August 2 Lukin directed Gorodnianskii to "defend the Peresvetovo and Puzovo sector on the eastern bank of the Bol'shoe Vopets River , to prevent the enemy from penetrating toward Shchiurikovo and Liubkovo." He also instructed all commanders that they were "personally responsible to the Motherland and government for taking all of your weapons with you during the withdrawal..." This was to begin on the night of August 2/3 against strongpoints held by elements of 20th Motorized Division.
A gap some 10km wide extended between 20th Motorised and 17th Panzer, including several crossing sites over the Dniepr in the Ratchino area. 16th Army moved toward this, with the withdrawing forces running a virtual gauntlet through the gap, often under artillery and air strikes, fording the river in places where it was less than 60cm deep. The operation was largely finished by daybreak on August 5. What remained of 16th Army assembled in the area of Kucherovo, Balakirevo and Tiushino. Lukin reported on the same evening that his divisions were in tatters, moving in various directions after the crossings, and were still engaged in fighting with small German groups; he requested several days for reorganization. However, beginning at 2240 the escaped forces began to be incorporated into the main defensive line. Lukin was moved to command of 20th Army, with most of his 16th Army divisions under this new command, including the 129th. It and the 46th Division were relieved by the 73rd, and the division temporarily handed over its remaining artillery to the 161st Rifle Division before moving to the rear, concentrating in the Bobrovo area as Lukin's reserve by 0800 on August 7.
Dukhovshchina Offensives
While there is little agreement on numbers, it seems that as many as 50,000 soldiers of the two Armies managed to escape from the sack. However, the individual divisions had been weakened to 1,000 - 2,000 personnel on average and were considerably weaker in riflemen. During August 8-15 20th Army fought a series of actions to close the gap between Western Front and Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov's Reserve Front. The main objective was a line from Pridneprovskaya Station and Dobromino Station, 38-45km northwest of Yelnya, while also pinning German forces on the west bank of the Dniepr. The 129th, advancing against Großdeutschland Regiment,:While this was no great success, the remainder of the Army, unsurprisingly, fared poorly. In the aftermath the commander of the 457th Regiment was singled out as an example of "unwillingness to search for the enemy's flanks." The 46th Division was now disbanded with its survivors incorporated into the 129th. At the end of this period the strength of the division was recorded as 739 officers, 719 non-commissioned officers, and 3,614 other ranks plus another 250 newly arrived replacements, armed with 3,763 rifles, 13 heavy machine guns, 31 light machine guns, one antiaircraft machine gun, 16 45mm antitank guns, 18 76mm cannon, 22 122mm howitzers, three 81mm and four 107mm mortars.General Lukin issued fresh orders at 1430 hours on August 16 which directed the 129th to capture a line from Klokovo to Glinka. 20th Army was largely facing the 8th Infantry Division. In the next day's report the 457th Regiment was said to have taken Klemiatino, 24km south-southeast of Solovevo, while the division's other regiments were attacking in the direction of Yakovlevichi. Later that day Timoshenko ordered Lukin to resume his attacks, largely as a diversion from the larger attacks to the north. Specifically, the 129th was to be committed "in the Dobromino and Klokova sector, after leaving one regiment at the boundary with 24th Army to protect the Novyi Iakovlevichi and Glinka axis." Once the 129th and 161st reached the YelnyaSmolensk railroad the remaining three divisions of 20th Army were to be committed. In the event, the 457th had to beat back a counterattack at dawn before attacking toward Marker 228.0, while the attached 343rd and 348th Rifle Regiments advanced on Novyi Yakovlevichi against stiff resistance.
For August 19 the division was to attack from Klemiatino in the direction of Obzhorovka and Alekseevo at 1000 hours with the objective of Vasilevo. From Timoshenko's point of view the main task of 20th Army was to continue to hold its scant bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dniepr so, if the rebuilt 19th Army was able to retake Dukhovshchina, a junction could be made behind German lines. The Front's report at day's end stated that the division had been forced to withdraw on several sectors. It dug in while also regrouping for an attack toward Alekseevo and Vasilevo. The 457th "repelled an enemy attack, supported by mortar fire and accompanied by provocative shouts in the Russian language," while mortar and machine gun fire was exchanged on other sectors. Meanwhile, vehicles and equipment continued to be withdrawn across the east bank of the Dniepr at the bridgeheads.
Early on August 20 the division attacked toward Obzhorovka but was forced out of Klemiatino and into its outskirts at 0700 hours by a battalion-sized counterattack. The next day the 20th Army as a whole was reported as fighting along its previous lines, as the division was ordered to defend along the Ustrom River between Klemiatino and Novoe Brykino Farm to prevent any German penetration into the rear. For August 23 four divisions, reinforced with heavy artillery, were to attack the 263rd Infantry Division and then exploit toward the railroad between Dobromino and Glinka Station. This made little progress, as the 129th got back within striking distance Klemiatino by 1300, and the four were ordered to continue at 1030 hours on August 24. The report from late that day stated that the positions of the 129th had not changed. The next day General Gorodnianskii left the division to take command of the 13th Army. In January 1942 he would be reassigned to the 6th Army, being promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on March 27, but he was encircled with his Army during the Second Battle of Kharkov in late May and, according to different sources, was killed in action or took his own life to avoid capture. There is a gap in Soviet records as to who took over the 129th until September 17, when Maj. Fyodor Dmitrievich Yablokov was put in command.