White Buses
White Buses was a Swedish humanitarian operation with the objective of freeing Scandinavians in German concentration camps in Nazi Germany during the final stages of World War II. Although the White Buses operation was envisioned to rescue Scandinavians, one-half of those taken from the camps to Sweden were of other nationalities. The buses used to transport the prisoners were painted white with red crosses painted on the roof, side, front and back, so that the buses would not be mistaken for military targets by Allied air forces. Those allowed by the Germans to be freed from the concentration camps were transported by the white buses and trucks to the port city of Lübeck, Germany. Swedish ships took them onward to Malmö, Sweden. Danes continued on by land on the white buses to Denmark.
Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte and others negotiated the White Buses operation with German officials, especially Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler. Although estimates of those rescued vary, the Swedish Red Cross estimated that about 300 Swedish volunteers, mostly military personnel, removed 15,345 prisoners from concentration camps in March and April 1945. 7,795 were Norwegian and Danish prisoners and 7,550 were other nationalities. After the German capitulation on 8 May 1945, another 10,000 people were rescued in May and June 1945 by "White Boats."
The operation was a humanitarian success and saved the lives of many who would have died of deprivation or execution in the concentration camps. The operation has been criticized for being too one-sided a rescue operation for Scandinavians, for not helping prisoners of other nationalities to the same extent, and for cooperating with the German Gestapo. The number of Jews among those rescued cannot be determined as the former prisoners were registered by nationality and not ethnic group or religion.
Danish and Norwegian prisoners in Germany
and Norway were invaded by Germany on 9 April 1940. A number of Norwegians were immediately arrested, and two months later the occupying force established the first prisoners' camp at Ulven outside Bergen. As tensions intensified between the Nazi authorities and the resistance, increasing numbers of Norwegians were arrested and detained in Norwegian prisons and camps; and later deported to camps in Germany. The first groups of Norwegian prisoners arrived in Sachsenhausen camp in early 1940.Arrests in Denmark began with the resignation of the coalition government in the summer of 1943.
The Norwegian and Danish prisoners in Germany were divided into various categories, from the so-called civil interned who lived privately and had certain freedoms, to the Nacht und Nebel or "Night and Fog" prisoners who were made to disappear without a trace. As the number of Scandinavian prisoners increased, various groups organised relief work for them. The Norwegian seamen's priests in Hamburg, Arne Berge and Conrad Vogt-Svendsen, visited prisoners, brought them food and brought letters to their families in Norway and Denmark. Vogt-Svendsen also made contact with the civilians interned at Gross Kreutz, the Norwegian families Hjort and Seip. Together with other Scandinavians, the group at Gross Kreutz compiled extensive lists of prisoners and their location. The lists were then sent to the Norwegian government-in-exile in London through the Swedish embassy in Berlin. In Stockholm the Norwegian diplomat Niels Christian Ditleff engaged himself heavily with the fate of the Scandinavian prisoners. By the end of 1944, there were around 8,000 Norwegian prisoners in Germany, in addition to around 1,125 Norwegian prisoners of war.
On the Danish side, Admiral Carl Hammerich had long worked with secret plans for an expedition code-named the Jyllandskorps to save Danish and Norwegian prisoners from the German camps. Hammerich had good connections with the Norwegian seaman's priests, the Gross Kreutz group and with Niels Christian Ditleff in Stockholm. By the beginning of 1945 there were around 6,000 Danish prisoners in Germany. During 1944, the Danes made extensive planning efforts, including the registration of prisoners and plans for transporting resources and making available food, shelter and quarantine for the prisoners, if they succeeded in reaching Denmark. Hammerich visited Stockholm in February, April and July 1944, and discussed the plans with Ditleff.
Preliminary considerations
As the Allied forces approached Germany at the end of 1944, SHAEF decided what to do with Allied prisoners. Within the Norwegian government, Major Johan Koren Christie wrote a memorandum on 23 September; the Norwegian prisoners should "stay put", and wait until they were liberated by the advancing Allied forces. The Gross Kreutz group learned of this policy a month later and reacted swiftly, with Johan Bernhard Hjort writing a report advising against the proposal. His arguments were that the prisoners risked being murdered and that they had to be rescued before Germany was occupied.He wrote:
It is therefore strongly suggested that the Norwegian government considers the possibility that the Swedish government could be induced to intervene to help at least the Norwegian and Danish civil prisoners in Germany, including those in prisons, with the aim of transporting them to Sweden, where they if feasible may stay until the war has ended.
This October 1944 report from Hjort was the first time a Swedish operation for the Scandinavian prisoners is mentioned. At first the proposal was unfavourably received. Rescue of the prisoners was seen as a Norwegian responsibility and the Norwegian government was reluctant to give the Swedes any chance to distinguish themselves at the end of the war.
Norwegian diplomat Niels Christian Ditleff in Stockholm refused to accept the guidelines from the Norwegian government and continued to implore both Swedes and the Swedish foreign department for Sweden to rescue Scandinavian prisoners. In September 1944, Ditleff raised the question with Count Folke Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross, who immediately supported the plan. On 30 November, Ditleff delivered his memorandum "Reasons for a Swedish operation for rescuing prisoners" to the Swedish foreign office, but still on his own initiative. On 29 December, the Norwegian government changed its position and instructed its embassy in Stockholm to discuss the possibility of a Swedish operation aimed at rescuing Scandinavian prisoners.
While Ditleff tried to influence the exiled Norwegian government, the Danes obtained a German permit to retrieve prisoners. The first ones transported back to Denmark were Danish policemen from Buchenwald, with the first transport started on 5 December. By the end of February 1945, the Danes had transported 341 prisoners home, most of them ill. These journeys gave the Danes valuable experience that later benefitted the "White Buses".
Negotiations with Germany
, the personal physical-therapist of Nazi Germany's Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, set the table for the release of internees in German concentration camps. Kersten, resident in Sweden, had previously negotiated with Himmler for the release of several internees in concentration camps and had discussed the ways and means of ensuring the safety of Danish and Norwegians internees with both Norwegian diplomat Ditleff and Himmler.On 5 February 1945, Ditleff proposed officially that Sweden undertake a rescue mission for people interned in German concentration camps and send a delegation to Germany to negotiate the rescue mission. The Swedish Foreign Ministry approved the plan on 10 February, designating diplomat Folke Bernadotte to initiate talks with Nazi Germany to "attempt to obtain the release of Norwegian and Danish internees in Germany and their transportation to Sweden or Denmark." As Germany faced imminent defeat by the Allied forces, the Swedes feared that the Germans might liquidate all prisoners in their concentration camps. From 17 to 21 February, Bernadotte met with senior Nazi officials including Himmler. Bernadotte alluded to the possibility that neutral Sweden might not remain neutral, implying that Sweden might enter the war on the Allied side if relations between the two countries did not improve. That argument had weight, as Sweden was the major supplier of iron ore to Germany. With defeat nearly certain for Germany, Himmler was attempting to ingratiate himself with the Allies and neutral states such as Sweden. Himmler and other German officials agreed in principle to the rescue operation which foresaw that all Norwegian and Danish prisoners of the Germans would be gathered together in one camp for their safety and meeting their humanitarian needs. Himmler estimated the Danish and Norwegian prisoners numbered 2,000 to 3,000; Bernadotte had evidence they numbered 13,000. The Germans said that all resources for the operation must come from Sweden and the Swedish Red Cross. Himmler also demanded that there be no publicity about the operation as Adolf Hitler was opposed to prisoner releases.
Parallel with Bernadotte's attempts, Danish authorities – especially the Danish ambassador in Berlin, Otto Carl Mohr – tried to secure the release of more Danish prisoners. Swedish and Danish aims differed slightly. The Swedes negotiated with Himmler and Schellenberg and concentrated on gathering the prisoners in Neuengamme. The Danes negotiated with Kaltenbrunner and tried to secure permission to have the prisoners released, or possibly interned in Denmark. On 12 March the Danes obtained permission for three transports and until 21 March a total of 262 Danish prisoners of various categories were moved back to Denmark using Danish vehicles. From 21 March there was a break in Danish transports and the Swedes took over.
Swedish aid
Sweden was the only Nordic country that remained neutral during the Second World War.Kersten also acted as an intermediary between the Swedish foreign department and Himmler. Walter Schellenberg, a trusted subordinate of Himmler, had long held the view that Germany would lose the war and encouraged Himmler to explore the possibility of a separate peace treaty with the Western powers; in this Sweden could be a useful intermediary. With Kersten's assistance the Swedish foreign department was able to free 50 Norwegian students, 50 Danish policemen and 3 Swedes in December 1944. An absolute condition for the release of the prisoners was that it should be hidden from the press; if Hitler got to know about it further repatriations would be impossible.
Ditleff sent a new memorandum on 5 February 1945, this time as an official Norwegian request. Sweden was solicited for sending a Red Cross delegation to Berlin to negotiate the position of the Scandinavian prisoners, and if successful to send a Swedish relief expedition. The Swedish foreign minister Christian Günther was in favour and the Swedish government gave permission for Bernadotte, second in command of the Swedish Red Cross:
Bernadotte flew to Berlin on 16 February and met several Nazi leaders such as the foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the RSHA, Himmler and Schellenberg. Himmler, who was one of the most powerful people in Nazi Germany, was initially negative to the transportation of prisoners to neutral Sweden. The prisoners could be trained as police troops, as Sweden already did with other Norwegians and Danes. Bernadotte had to fall back on his secondary proposal – that the prisoners should be assembled in one camp so the Swedish Red Cross could support them. Bernadotte told Himmler he estimated the number of Scandinavian prisoners to be around 13,000 while Himmler held it could not be more than two or three thousand.
During a second meeting with Schellenberg on 21 February, Bernadotte got word from Himmler that he had accepted the proposal to assemble the Scandinavian prisoners in one camp. During the visit to Berlin Bernadotte also had several meetings with the Gross Kreutz group, Didrik Arup Seip, Conrad Vogt-Svendsen, Wanda Hjort and Bjørn Heger. Bernadotte's secondary proposal to Himmler, which he accepted, was prepared by Heger.