Clandestine cell system
A clandestine cell system is a method for organizing a group of people, such as resistance fighters, spies, mercenaries, organized crime members, or terrorists, to make it harder for police, military or other hostile groups to catch them. In a cell structure, each cell consists of a relatively small number of people, who know little to no information concerning organization assets beyond their cell. This limits the harm that can be done to the organization as a whole by any individual cell member defecting, being a mole, being surveilled, or giving up information after being apprehended and interrogated.
The structure of a clandestine cell system can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization, depending on the group's ideology, its operational area, the communications technologies available, and the nature of the mission. Criminal organizations, undercover operations, and unconventional warfare units led by special forces may also use this sort of organizational structure.
Covert operations vs. clandestine operations
and clandestine operations are not the same when it comes to tradecraft. The modern NATO definition of a covert operation says the identity of the sponsor is concealed, but in a clandestine operation the operation itself is concealed from the participants. Put differently, clandestine means "hidden", and covert means "deniable"—that is to say that the sponsor of a covert action is sufficiently removed from it that the sponsor can claim ignorance in the event the plot is discovered.A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of sleeper agents, that lies dormant until it receives orders or decides to act.
History
World War II French Resistance
In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams were formed to lead unconventional warfare against German units by acts of sabotage and leading local resistance forces. They also acted as a liaison between Allied command and the resistance units. They were composed of two officers one American or British, and the other a native to the area of operations, preferably from the region in which they landed and a third member who was a radio operator. They operated in France and the Netherlands and similar teams operated in South East Asia.On the night of the 5/6 June 1944, the first Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied France
Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates. If the mission was sabotage, reconnaissance, or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. If the team was to carry out direct action it would be necessary to assemble into larger units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known affiliation with Allied powers, and
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French and from anti-Japanese guerrillas during World War II.Provisional Irish Republican Army
The modern Provisional Irish Republican Army has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, as political, technological, and cultural situations have changed in Ireland.Officially, the PIRA was hierarchical, but as British security forces became more effective it changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and for certain of its support cells. Its leadership saw itself as guiding and as building consensus. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2–5 people, tended to be built from people with existing personal relationships. British counterinsurgents could understand the command structure, but not the workings of the operational cells.
The had an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells, so it could summon new ad hoc organizations for any specific operation.
Parallel organizations
The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have chosen to become parallel. In the case of the NLF, except for some individuals with sanctuary in North Vietnam, people in the political organization could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After the war ended, surviving NLF officials held high office.In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt political/social service and covert military wings.
Once an active insurgency began, the secrecy freedom of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency. In such a split organization, public issues can be addressed overtly while military actions are kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine.
External support
Many cell systems receive support from outside the cell. This can include leaders, trainers, and supplies, or a safe haven for overt activities.External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups in Iraq, for example, receive assistance from Iran, but this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early U.S. support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conflict escalated, U.S. participation became overt.
Note that both unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert counterinsurgency mission, only selected host nation leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, for example, U.S. personnel gave covert counterinsurgency assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, this became overt in 1961, and finally ceased operations in 1962.
Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics
Different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells. Also, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, they deemphasize the cell system. They may still use cells for leadership security, but if overt violence by organized units becomes significant, cells become less important. In Mao's three-stage doctrine, cells are still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, but as the insurgency creates full-time military units in Phase III, the main units become the focus, not the cells.Different varieties of insurgency place their cells differently with respect to the existing government. The U.S. Army Field Manual FM3-07 distinguishes between varieties of insurgencies. Drawing on this work, Nyberg describes four types of cell system :
;Traditional: The slowest to form, these are typically indigenous insurgencies that begin with limited goals. These are more secure than others, as they tend to form from people with preexisting social, cultural, or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that has failed to recognize tribal, racial, religious, or linguistic groups. They "perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy." The Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in Iraq are examples of this traditional pattern of insurgency. al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they become strong enough in a given area, they may change to the mass-oriented form.
;Subversive: These are usually driven by an organization that contains at least some of the governing elite, some being sympathizers already in government, and others who penetrate the government. When they use violence, it has a specific purpose, such as coercing voters, intimidating officials, and disrupting and discrediting the government. Typically, there is a political arm that directs the military in planning carefully coordinated violence. "Employment of violence is designed to show the system to be incompetent and to provoke the government to an excessively violent response which further undermines its legitimacy." The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament and street fighters were hardly clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control of the nation was hidden. A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment which allows the insurgents to use both legal and illegal methods to accomplish their goals. Effective government resistance may convert this to a critical-cell model.
;Critical-cell: These come into play when the political climate becomes less permissive than one that allowed. While other cell systems try to form intelligence cells within the government, this type sets up "shadow government" cells that can seize power once the status quo is overthrown. This model includes the classic coup d'etat, and often tries to minimize violence. Examples include the Sandinista takeover of an existing government weakened by external popular revolution, or the Gülen movement in Turkey. "Insurgents also seek to infiltrate the government's institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from within." Clandestine cells form inside the government. "The use of violence remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency's superior organization seizes power, supported by the armed force. One variation of this pattern is when the insurgent leadership permits the popular revolution to destroy the existing government, then emerges to direct the formation of a new government. Another variation is seen in the Cuban revolution and is referred to as the foco insurgency. This model involves a single, armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to establish control and erect new institutions."
;Mass-oriented: While the subversive and -cell systems work from within the government, the mass-oriented system builds a government completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it. Such "insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have a well-developed ideology and carefully determine their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government." The revolution that produced the People's Republic of China, the American Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely difficult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.