Battle of Mogadishu (1993)

The Battle of Mogadishu, also known as the Black Hawk Down Incident, was part of Operation Gothic Serpent. It was fought on 3–4 October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, between forces of the United States—supported by UNOSOM II—against Somali National Alliance fighters and other insurgents in south Mogadishu.
The battle took place during the UNOSOM II phase of the United Nations intervention in the Somali Civil War. The UN had initially dispatched forces to alleviate the 1992 famine, but then shifted to attempting to restore a central government and establishing a democracy. During June 1993, UNOSOM suffered significant losses when the Pakistani troops were attacked while inspecting a SNA radio station and weapons-storage site. The UN blamed SNA leader General Mohammed Farah Aidid and began military operations against him. In July 1993, U.S. forces conducted the Bloody Monday raid, killing many elders and prominent members of Aidid's clan, the Habr Gidr. That raid, combined with other incidents involving significant civilian casualties, fueled support for the insurgency against UNOSOM and led to the first deliberate attacks on American forces. This, in turn, led U.S. president Bill Clinton to initiate Operation Gothic Serpent in order to capture Aidid.
On 3 October 1993, U.S. forces planned to seize two of Aidid's top lieutenants during a meeting deep in the city. The raid was only intended to last an hour but morphed into an overnight standoff and rescue operation extending into the daylight hours of the next day. While the goal of the operation was achieved, it was a pyrrhic victory and spiraled into the deadly Battle of Mogadishu. As the operation was ongoing, Somali insurgents shot down three American Black Hawk helicopters using RPG-7s, with two crashing deep in hostile territory, resulting in the capture of an American pilot. A desperate defense of the two downed helicopters began and fighting lasted through the night to defend the survivors of the crashes. Through the night and into the next morning, a large UNOSOMII armored convoy consisting of Pakistani, Malaysian and American troops pushed through the city to relieve the besieged troops and withdrew incurring further casualties but rescuing the survivors.
No battle since the Vietnam War had killed so many U.S. troops. Casualties included 18 dead American soldiers and 73 wounded, with Malaysian forces suffering one death and seven wounded, and Pakistani forces two injuries. Somali casualties, a mixture of insurgents and civilians, were far higher; most estimates are between 133 and 700 dead.
After the battle, dead US troops were dragged through the streets by enraged Somalis, an act that was broadcast on American television to public outcry. The battle led to the end of Operation Gothic Serpent and UNOSOM II military operations, which the insurgency saw as victory. By early 1995, all UN forces withdrew from Somalia. Fears of committing large numbers of US troops to Somalia in the years following the battle led to the CIA using warlords as proxies against the Somali Islamic Courts in the 2000s. This aversion to large-scale military intervention in the country, and Africa more broadly, is commonly referred to as the "Somalia Syndrome".

Background

Throughout the 1980s, the Somali Rebellion escalated, eventually culminating in the full outbreak of the Somali Civil War and the collapse of the regime of President Siad Barre at the start of 1991. Food shortages began in mid-1990, the final year of Siad Barre's rule. By early 1991, the formal economy collapsed as rebel groups toppled the Somali Democratic Republic. A severe drought hit southern Somalia in 1991–1992, while the civil war disrupted traditional coping mechanisms as law enforcement disintegrated. This led to the emergence of the 1992 famine, the primary cause of which was the war's devastation of infrastructure and farmland in the inter-riverine regions.
The main rebel faction that had toppled the regime was the United Somali Congress, which divided into two armed factions: one led by Ali Mahdi Muhammad, who later became president; and the other by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, which became known as the Somali National Alliance. After losing control of Mogadishu, remnants of former President Barres forces created the Somali National Front and withdrew south into the nations breadbasket. Serious damage was inflicted in Somalia's agricultural regions during fighting between the SNF and Aidid's forces, before the latter drove the SNF far into the south of the country.

UNOSOM and UNITAF

In early 1992, as relief agencies initiated operations to respond to the humanitarian crisis, they encountered growing obstacles in delivering aid to the impacted affected inter-riverine region. The disintegration of Somali law enforcement paved the way for armed looters and criminals to steal food from storage sites and supply routes. Many thieves at Mogadishu's sea and airport, the main supply hub, were linked to the rebel forces of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid but were effectively demobilized following the rout of the SNF. With militia leaders lacking funds and Barre's forces no longer presenting a unifying threat, Aidid and Mahdi increasingly lost control over many young fighters, as did clan elders. As a result, many resorted to food theft for survival and income. In response to this deteriorating security situation, UNOSOM I was established in April 1992 under the leadership of Mohamed Sahnoun to help facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. In May 1992 the first UN aid shipment arrived in Mogadishu.'
During August 1992, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Provide Relief, deploying U.S. military transport aircraft to support the UN relief effort in Somalia. That same month, UNOSOM I head Mohammed Sahnoun secured Somali National Alliance approval for 500 peacekeepers, with further deployments requiring the groups consent. However, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali unilaterally announced an expansion to 3,500 troops days later, undermining the local support Sahnoun had built. Overruled by UN headquarters, he failed to delay the deployment.' The large-scale intervention in late 1992 fueled nationalist opposition, bolstering Aidid's SNA, which denounced the UN's perceived colonial approach. By November 1992, largely owing to the mediation efforts of Mohamed Sahnoun, aid was flowing through the Mogadishu port unimpeded, with theft and banditry on the routes to famine zones averaging around 20%. That same month, Sahnoun was replaced by Ismat T. Kittani, who took a confrontational approach, deploying UNOSOM troops into politically sensitive areas and triggering a security crisis with local factions. Kittani claimed 80% of aid shipments were looted, a figure later echoed by the UN Secretariat and the U.S. State Department to justify expanding intervention, though many top UN officials and aid workers disputed the figure. In the view of some top UNOSOM I commanders, the scope of the famine was being exaggerated in order to justify using Somalia as an experiment, as the UN Secretariat believed Somalia represented an ideal candidate for a test case of a UN operation of expanded size and mandate.
On 9 December 1992, American troops began landing on the Somali coastline at Mogadishu under UNITAF. A total 17,800 US Marines and 10,000 US Army infantry were deployed. The famine in Somalia was already concluding as the troops began landing. The United States had various motives for military involvement in Somalia. The US armed forces wanted to prove its capability to conduct major 'Operations Other Than War', while the US State Department wanted to set a precedent for humanitarian military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The United Nations' intervention, backed by U.S. Marines, has been credited with helping end the famine in Somalia, though the starvation had been improving in the worst-affected areas before troops arrived and had the effect of speeding the conclusion of the crisis by about a month. In 1994, the Washington-based Refugee Policy Group NGO estimated that of the approximately 100,000 lives that were saved as a result of international assistance, 10,000 had been after the deployment of US troops.

Mission shift and increasing tensions

On 3 March 1993, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the U.N. Security Council his recommendations for shifting from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He said that since Resolution 794's adoption in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed 37,000 personnel over forty percent of southern and central Somalia. He said the force's presence and operations had improved Somalia's security situation and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There was still no effective government, police, or national army, resulting in serious security threats to U.N. personnel. To that end, the Security Council authorized UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, to achieve national reconciliation so as to create a democratic state.
At the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held on 15 March 1993, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, all 15 Somali parties agreed to the terms set out to restore peace. Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM rapidly deteriorated, resulting in the SNA engaging in "anti-UNOSOM propaganda" broadcasts from Radio Mogadishu.

UNOSOM offensive and Mogadishu insurgency

On 5 June 1993, SNA fighters and Somali citizens at Radio Mogadishu attacked the Pakistani force that was inspecting an arms cache located at the station, out of fear that the United Nations forces had been sent to shut down the SNA's broadcast infrastructure. Radio was the most popular medium for news in Somalia, and consequently control of the airwaves was considered vital to both the SNA and UNOSOM. Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular station with the residents of Mogadishu, and rumors that the United Nations was planning to seize or destroy it had been abound for days before 5 June. On May 31, 1993, Aidid's political rivals met with the top UNOSOM official and attempted to convince him to take over Radio Mogadishu, a meeting Aidid was made well aware of. According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry in the events leading up to the Battle of Mogadishu:

"Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu."

The attack marked a seminal moment in the UNOSOM II operation. The Pakistani forces suffered 24 dead and 57 wounded, as well as one wounded Italian and three wounded U.S. soldiers. On 6 June 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 837, a call for the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible. Though Resolution 837 did not name Aidid, it held the Somali National Alliance responsible. The hunt for Aidid became a major focus of the U.N. intervention through the Battle of Mogadishu. Admiral Jonathan Howe issued a $25,000 warrant for information leading to Aidid's arrest, while UNOSOM forces began attacking targets all over Mogadishu in hopes of finding him. Professor Ioan M. Lewis asserts that the UN made an unwise choice to resort to military force, which led to substantial Somali casualties, rather than attempting to politically isolate Aidid and launch an independent legal inquiry.
In mid-June 1993, American AC-130 gunships began striking SNA targets across the capital and an insurgency began growing against UNOSOM forces. When Somali insurgents and UNOSOM forces skirmished, it proved to be costly to each—especially for the Somali, who were usually outgunned by heavy weaponry. Through the rest of June the insurgency escalated, resulting in growing losses on both sides, in one instance a crowd of protestors were machine gunned by UNOSOM troops resulting in the death of at least 20 civilians. A week after the start of the offensive, U.S. intelligence claimed Aidid's command was badly weakened, SNA morale had collapsed, and most of its arsenal was destroyed. Officials estimated only 300 fighters loyal to Aidid opposed UNOSOM, driven by cash or the drug khat. Instead each major armed confrontation with UN forces was noted to have the effect of inadvertently increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public. The UNOSOM offensive backfired politically, alienating many Somalis, boosting support for Aidid, and drawing international criticism. In response, many UNOSOM II contingents pushed for diplomacy with the SNA, while relief agencies began distancing themselves from the UN. Former Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Ramesh Thakur, observed that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the use of force by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the rhetoric and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a peacekeeping operation as defined in the UN lexicon."