Single-wing formation
In American and Canadian football, a single-wing formation was a precursor to the modern shotgun formation. The term usually connotes formations in which the snap is tossed rather than handed. Formations with one wingback and a handed snap are commonly called "wing T" or "winged T".
Created by Glenn "Pop" Warner, the single wing was deemed superior to the T formation in its ability to get an extra eligible receiver downfield.
History
Among coaches, single-wing football denotes a formation using a long snap from center as well as a deceptive scheme that evolved from Glenn "Pop" Warner's offensive style. Traditionally, the single-wing was an offensive formation that featured a core of four backs including a tailback, a fullback, a quarterback, and a wingback. Linemen were set "unbalanced", with two on one side of the center and four on the other. This was done by moving the off-side guard or tackle to the strong side. The single-wing was one of the first formations attempting to trick the defense instead of overpowering it.Pop Warner referred to his new offensive scheme as the Carlisle formation because he formulated most of the offense while coaching the Carlisle Indians. The term single-wing came into widespread use after spectators noticed that the formation gave the appearance of a wing-shape. In 1907, Warner coached at Carlisle, a school for Native Americans, where his legacy consisted of at least three significant events. The first was the discovery of Jim Thorpe's raw athletic ability. The second was the use of an extensive passing game that relied on the spiraled ball. Finally, faking backs who started one way, but abruptly headed the opposite way, kept defenses guessing. Since Jim Thorpe had so much raw talent, Coach Warner more than likely designed much of his single-wing offense around this gifted athlete. Thorpe, the proverbial triple threat, was a good runner, passer, and punter.
For much of the history of the single-wing formation, players were expected to play on both sides of the ball. Consequently, offensive players often turned around to play a corresponding location on defense. The offensive backs played defensive backs, just as the offensive linemen played defensive linemen. Unlike teams of today, single-wing teams had few specialists who only played on certain downs.
College football playbooks before the 1950s were dominated with permutations of the traditional single-wing envisioned by Warner. Two-time All-American Jack Crain's handwritten playbook clearly denotes how the University of Texas ran their version of the single-wing circa 1939–1940. University of Texas Coach Dana X. Bible ran a balanced line, which meant that each side of the center had the same number of linemen. The ends were also slightly split.
Slightly splitting offensive ends, called flexing, was in widespread use by Notre Dame's Box variation of the single-wing. Knute Rockne's Notre Dame Box offense employed a balanced line, which had 3 linemen on each side of the center. Another Rockne innovation was a shifting backfield that attempted to confuse the defense by moving backs to alternate positions right before the snap. Another variation of the single-wing saw the quarterback move out as a wingback on the weak side. Besides adding different blocking angles for the quarterback, the double-wing formation facilitated the passing game. Stanford had a variation on the double-wing in which the quarterback stayed right behind the strong side guard, while the tailback became the wingback to the weak side. The fullback, being the only deep back left, took all the snaps and directed the plays.
The advent of the T formation in the 1940s led to a decline in the use of single-wing formations. For example, the single-wing coach Dana X. Bible, upon his retirement in 1946, saw his replacement, Blair Cherry, quickly install the T formation like many other college coaches of the day. Wallace Wade said he was "not convinced that the single wing is not a more potent formation than the T. The single wing we used caused the defense to spread. It called for more intensive coaching on individual assignments."
However, from 1949 to 1957, Henry "Red" Sanders elevated a rarely distinguished UCLA football program to an elite level with his precision single-wing system, winning a National Championship at UCLA in 1954.
The single-wing style of football is still practiced by a small group of teams across the country, almost exclusively at the high school and youth level. The Pittsburgh Steelers were the last NFL team to use the single-wing as their standard formation, finally switching to the T formation in 1952. In 2008, the Miami Dolphins utilized a version of the single-wing offense against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced four touchdowns in a 38–13 upset victory, and again two weeks later, defeating the San Diego Chargers. In college football, by the early 1960s, the only major teams still relying on the single wing were Tennessee, UCLA, University of Pennsylvania and Princeton. Following 1964, only Princeton, which had been particularly known for the single wing under its longtime coach Charlie Caldwell, still used the formation, finally giving it up in 1969 after the retirement of Caldwell's successor Dick Colman.
Sutherland single wing
The Sutherland single-wing was a variation used with great success by Coach Jock Sutherland of the 1930s and 1940s. Note that coach Sutherland mastered many forms of the single-wing, but the formation described here is the one he invented and was named after him.The Sutherland single-wing differs from the traditional single-wing in that the wingback is brought into the backfield as a halfback, flanking the fullback on the other side from the tailback. This allows a more flexible running attack to the weak-side. Both the tailback and halfback are triple threats in this offense. The weakness of this formation is less power than the traditional single-wing and it requires very talented backs to play tailback and halfback effectively.
Sutherland created this formation from the original single-wing he learned from legendary coach Pop Warner at the University of Pittsburgh in the 1910s. Sutherland became the Pitt coach in 1924, where he remained through 1938. Sutherland's Pitt teams were named "National Champions" by various selectors in nine different seasons, including five recognized by the university. Sutherland was the avowed master of the single-wing offense while at Pitt. Sutherland brought his coaching skills to the NFL in 1940 as the coach of the Brooklyn Dodgers. At Brooklyn, he took over a team that had never finished better than second and had only one winning season since 1930. He implemented his offensive ideas and the Dodgers finished with a record of 8–3 and finished only a game behind the Washington Redskins. Sutherland's star was Ace Parker, who played tailback and was NFL MVP. The Dodgers also finished second in 1941, with a 7–4 mark. Later, Sutherland coached the Pittsburgh Steelers in 1946 and 1947. In 1947, Sutherland and his single-wing pushed the Steelers to their first playoff appearance, for the East Conference crown. They were soundly defeated by Greasy Neale's Philadelphia Eagles, running the T-formation, 21–0. Sutherland died suddenly in 1948, but the Steelers continued to use his single-wing until 1953, when they were the last NFL team to switch to the T. Runningback Austin Horton also rushed for 1,245 yards during the Sutherland season.
Double wing
The double-wing is an offensive formation which should not be confused with the Double Wing offense. The double-wing formation is used in many offenses from the youth level through college. The formation was first introduced by Pop Warner around 1912. Just a few offenses that use the formation are the double wing, flexbone and wing T offenses. It was the primary formation used by Ara Parseghian when he ran the wing T at Notre Dame, winning National Championships in 1966 and 1973.The formation is not necessarily the same in all offenses and is a broad term to describe any offense with two wingbacks. In the wing T, the double-wing formation is used to refer to Red, Blue and Loose Red formations.
The double-wing formation in American football usually includes one wide receiver, two wingbacks, one fullback, and one tight end.
Single-wing style of play
The direct snap or toss from the center usually went to the tailback or fullback. However, the quarterback could also take the ball. The tailback was very important to the success of the offense because he had to run, pass, block, and even punt. Unlike today, the quarterback usually blocked at the point of attack. As with his modern-day counterpart, a single-wing quarterback might also act as a field general by calling plays. The fullback was chosen for his larger size so that he could "buck" the line. This meant that the fullback would block or carry the ball between the defensive tackles. The wingback could double-team block with an offensive lineman at scrimmage or even run a pass route.The single-wing formation was designed to place double-team blocks at the point of attack. Gaining this extra blocker was achieved in several ways. First, the unbalanced line placed an extra guard or tackle on one side of the center. Second, a wingback stationed outside end could quickly move to a crucial blocking position. Third, the fullback and especially the quarterback could lead the ball carrier producing interference. Finally, linemen, usually guards, would pull at the snap and block at the specified hole. Line splits were always close except for ends that might move out from the tackle.
The single-wing formation depended on a center who was skilled both at blocking and at tossing the ball from between his legs to the receiving back. The center had to direct the ball to any of several moving backs, with extreme accuracy, as the play started. Single-wing plays would not work well if the back had to wait for the snap because quick defensive penetration would overrun the play. The center was taught to direct the ball to give the tailback or fullback receiver a running start in the direction that the play was designed to go.
The single-wing formation was a deceptive formation with spectators, referees, and defensive players often losing sight of the ball. A backfield player, called a "spinner", might turn 360 degrees while faking the ball to the other backs, or even keeping the ball or passing it. Defensive players were often fooled as to which back was carrying the ball.
The one play that was unique to the single-wing formation was the buck-lateral series. The terminology for this series of plays associates the word "buck" with the intent of the fullback to plunge into the line. In addition, the short toss, or lateral of the ball, can be made to the quarterback or wingback who may take the ball and do other maneuvers including passing the ball. Consequently, when the fullback takes the ball, he appears to be headed to buck the line. Typically, fullbacks were larger players that ran plays intended to smash the defensive front. The fullback's initial move pulls the defensive players toward the expected point of attack. Next, the fullback tosses the ball to another back causing the defense to change pursuit angles, thus losing a step in their catching the ball carrier.
The strong side of the formation, where the extra lineman and wingback lined up, put pressure on the defensive end. Defenses might move extra players to that side or shift the whole defense to compensate. The cut-back play could succeed regardless of how the defense reacted. The cut-back play started like a strong side sweep with offensive guards and quarterback running interference for the tailback. The fullback would fake a smash over the guard hole to occupy the defensive tackles. The play was designed to make the defensive end overreact and try to stay outside to contain the runner. If the defensive end gave ground to the sideline, the tailback would cut-back inside to let his interference push the defensive end out of the play. If the defensive end came too far inside, then the ball carrier would run around him to the outside. After the cut-back play was used in a game, then the offense might run the wingback reverse since both plays started out the same way. At the outset, the defense tries to pursue the sweeping tailback. However, the tailback delivers the ball to the wingback running the opposite way to the weak side. Both the cut-back and the reverse would be set up with quick fullback bucks up the middle, which would cause the defensive line to over-protect their gaps, as opposed to pursuing quickly to the sideline.
Single-wing teams used both a standard punting formation and a quick punt, often kicking on second or third downs. The quick punt, or quick kick, saw the tailback-punter swiftly backing up 5 yards as the ball was in the air from the center to distance himself from rushers. The strategy was to prevent defensive halfbacks, expecting a possession play, from dropping back to return the ball. The standard punt formation was often used for either punting as well as running or passing the ball. Most teams had a litany of plays that they might run from a punt formation.
Prior to 1930, the shape of the football was a prominent oval shape called a prolate spheroid. Due to the shape of the ball, single-wing backs handled the ball more like a basketball, with short tosses and underhand lobs. Gradually, balls were allowed to be elongated enough to produce streamlined passes with a spiral. The spiraled ball could be thrown further with more accuracy, thus increasing the potential for offenses to use the forward pass more frequently.
The single-wing quarterback played a different role than modern-day quarterbacks. While the quarterback may have called the snap count due to his position close to the center of the formation, he may not have called the actual play in the huddle. For much of the history of football, coaches were not allowed to call plays from the sideline. This responsibility may have gone to the team captain. The quarterback was expected to be an excellent blocker at the point of attack. Some playbooks referred to this player as the blocking back. The quarterback also had to handle the ball by faking, handing off, or optioning to other backs.