30 September Movement
The Thirtieth of September Movement was an attempted coup orchestrated by the leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia and its sympathizers within the Indonesian military. In the early hours of 1 October 1965, they assassinated six Indonesian Army generals in an abortive coup d'état. Later that morning, the organization declared that it was in control of media and communication outlets and had taken President Sukarno under its protection. By the end of the day, the coup attempt had failed in Jakarta. Meanwhile, in central Java there was an attempt to take control over an army division and several cities. By the time this rebellion was put down, two more senior officers were dead.
In the days and weeks that followed, the army, socio-political, and religious groups blamed the coup attempt on the Communist Party of Indonesia. Soon a mass purge was underway, which resulted in the imprisonment and deaths of many actual or suspected Communist Party members and sympathizers. Under the New Order and into the 21st Century, the movement has been referred to as the Thirtieth of September Movement/PKI by those wanting to associate it with the PKI.
Investigations and questioning of Suharto's version of the events were long obstructed in Indonesia. There have been several theories about the political background of the coup. The Central Intelligence Agency initially believed that Sukarno orchestrated all of it or at least suspected he had some awareness about the coup beforehand although Sukarno eventually refused to support it, according to a declassified document in 2023. Other outside sources found inconsistencies and holes in the army claims, notably Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey who wrote the Cornell Paper that challenged it, although Anderson admitted in the introduction chapter that the book did not cover the trials after the coup.
Background
From the late 1950s, President Sukarno's position came to depend on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and the PKI. His "anti-imperialist" ideology made Indonesia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and, particularly, China.File:1964-12 1964年11月4日 印尼总统苏加诺访华与周恩来会面.jpg|thumb|The closeness of Sukarno and Zhou Enlai in 1964
In the 1960s, the conflict between the army and the PKI became increasingly intense because the PKI proposed to President Sukarno to support the establishment of a Angkatan kelima. It was a left-wing militia of workers and peasants armed primarily to support the ongoing confrontation with Malaysia. This proposal was opposed by the army generals of the TNI because they feared that the PKI would become the fifth force as a military militia against the TNI in the future if a civil war occurred. The fifth force itself has been trained by the Indonesian air force at Lubang Buaya near Halim Perdanakusuma Airport, the air force headquarters.
By 1965, at the height of the Cold War, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government. With the support of Sukarno and the air force, the party gained increasing influence at the expense of the army, thus ensuring the army's enmity. By late 1965, the army was divided between a left-wing faction allied with the PKI and a right-wing faction that was being courted by the United States.
In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction leaning towards the PKI.
Insurgency on 1 October
Kidnapping and murder of generals
At around 3:15 am on 1 October, seven detachments of troops in trucks and buses dispatched by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, comprising troops from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the Diponegoro, and Brawijaya Divisions, left the movement's base at Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base, just south of Jakarta to kidnap seven generals, all members of the Army General Staff. Three of the intended victims, were killed at their homes, while three more were taken alive. Meanwhile, their main target, Coordinating Minister of Defense and Security and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution managed to escape the kidnap attempt by jumping over a wall into the Iraqi embassy garden. However his personal aide, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, was captured after being mistaken for Nasution in the dark. Nasution's five-year-old daughter, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, was shot by the assault group and died on 6 October. In addition a police officer guarding Nasution's neighbour Johannes Leimena, Police Chief Brigadier Karel Sadsuitubun, was shot and killed by the kidnapping group. A final victim was Albert Naiborhu, General Pandjaitan's nephew, who was killed during the raid on the General's home. The generals and the bodies of their dead colleagues were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya near Halim where those still alive were shot dead. The bodies of all the victims were then thrown down a disused well near the base.Takeover in Jakarta
Later that morning, around 1,000 troops from two Java-based divisions occupied Lapangan Merdeka, the park around the National Monument in central Jakarta, and three sides of the square, including the Radio Republik Indonesia main building and studios. They did not occupy the east side of the square – the location of the armed forces strategic reserve headquarters, commanded at the time by Major General Suharto. At some time during the night, D. N. Aidit, the Communist Party of Indonesia leader and Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani, the Air Force commander both went to the Halim AFB, which pointed to their involvement in the movement.Following the news at 7 am, RRI broadcast a message from Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri, commander of the 1st Honor Guard Battalion, Tjakrabirawa Regiment, to the effect that the 30 September Movement, an internal army organization, had taken control of strategic locations in Jakarta, with the help of other military units. They proclaimed that this was to forestall a coup attempt by a 'Generals' Council' aided by the Central Intelligence Agency, intent on removing Sukarno on Armed Forces Day, 5 October. It was also stated that President Sukarno was under the movement's protection. Sukarno traveled to Halim 'after learning that there were troops near the Palace on the north side of Lapangan Merdeka' and also claimed 'that this was so he could be near an aircraft should he need to leave Jakarta'. Further radio announcements from RRI later that day listed 45 members of the G30S Movement and stated that all army ranks above Lieutenant Colonel would be abolished. While at Halim, the president met with Deputy Prime Minister Johannes Leimena and the navy and police commanders, along with the attorney general and the palace guard chief to plan for a replacement to the post of Commander of the Army which was by now vacant.
The end of the movement in Jakarta
At 5.30 am, Suharto, commander of the Army's Strategic Reserve, was woken up by his neighbor and told of the disappearances of the generals and the shootings at their homes. He went to Kostrad HQ and tried to contact other senior officers. He managed to contact and to ensure the support of the commanders of the Navy and the National Police, but was unable to contact the Air Force Commander. He then took command of the Army and issued orders confining all troops to their barracks.Because of poor planning, the coup leaders had failed to provide provisions for the troops on Lapangan Merdeka, who were becoming hot and thirsty. They were under the impression that they were guarding the president in the palace. Over the course of the afternoon, Suharto persuaded both battalions to give up without a fight, first the Brawijaya battalion, who came over to Kostrad HQ, then the Diponegoro troops, which withdrew to Halim. His troops gave Untung's forces inside the radio station an ultimatum and they also withdrew. By 7 pm Suharto was in control of all the installations previously held by the 30 September Movement's forces. Now joined by Nasution, at 9 pm he announced over the radio that he was now in command of the Army and that he would destroy the counter-revolutionary forces and save Sukarno. He then issued another ultimatum, this time to the troops at Halim. Later that evening, Sukarno left Halim and arrived in Bogor, where there was another presidential palace.
Most of the rebel troops fled, and after a minor battle in the early hours of 2 October, the Army regained control of Halim, Aidit flew to Yogyakarta and Dani to Madiun before the soldiers arrived.
It was only on 4 October that the bodies of all seven casualties were recovered from the well in which they were thrown at Lubang Buaya. They were buried in a state burial on 5 October, Armed Forces Day, preceded by an address by Nasution. All seven Army officers and the police brigadier were, by order of President Sukarno in his capacity as the Commander of the Supreme Operations Command, officially declared the very same day as Heroes of the Revolution posthumously per Decree of the President/Commander of KOTI No. 111/KOTI/1965.