R v Keegstra
R v Keegstra, 3 SCR 697 is a freedom of expression decision of the Supreme Court of Canada where the court upheld the Criminal Code provision prohibiting the wilful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group as constitutional under the freedom of expression provision in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is a companion case to R v Andrews.
Background
James Keegstra was a public high school teacher in Eckville, Alberta, who began in the position in 1968. He also took on many community roles as a deacon and Sunday school teacher, and in 1974 was acclaimed as mayor of the community, a position he held until 1983. Keegstra's anti-semitic teachings had resulted in complaints in the late-1970s but little action was taken by the school board. Keegstra was warned by the board superintendent in December 1981 to stop "teaching these biased and prejudiced views" and stick to teaching the grade 12 social studies curriculum. The school board eventually fired Keegstra in December 1982.In 1984, he was charged under section 281.2 of the Criminal Code that he "..did unlawfully promote hatred against an identifiable group, to wit: the Jewish people, by communicating statements while teaching to students at Eckville High School." The Criminal Code provision, now section 319, makes it a criminal offence to promote hatred: "Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group". During classes, he described Jews as a people of profound evil who had "created the Holocaust to gain sympathy". He also tested his students in exams on his theories and opinions of Jews.
Keegstra held anti-Semitic views and believed in a Jewish conspiracy bent on world domination and annihilating Christianity. He asserted that the current historical information being taught in universities and schools is a trap set by the Jews to mislead the public. He claimed that the education system has failed because of their awareness regarding Jewish conspiracy with the Holocaust. Keegstra believed he was one of the few chosen individuals who were aware of the treachery and wanted to put a stop to it. Keegstra would teach his classes concepts that were not a part of the Alberta Social Studies Curriculum.
Proceedings in the Alberta courts
At the beginning of his trial in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, Keegstra applied to the trial judge to have the charge quashed for violation of his freedom of expression; however, this motion was denied. A jury convicted Keegstra in a three and a half month trial, and he was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.He then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Alberta on the basis that section 319 breached the constitutional right to freedom of expression under section 2 of the Charter. On June 6, 1988, the Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled that section 319 did indeed breach section 2 and could not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether sections 319 and 319 of the Criminal Code violated section 2 and section 11 of the Charter and if so, whether they could be upheld under section 1. By a 4–3 decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the provisions.Majority decision
The majority decision was written by Chief Justice Brian Dickson. He held that the provisions clearly violated section 2 as it was legislation designed to suppress expression. In this, Dickson CJ wrote that freedom of expression within section 2 would not be limited by section 15 and section 27 of the Charter. As Dickson CJ explained, using sections 15 and 27 in this way would contradict "the large and liberal interpretation given the freedom of expression in Irwin Toy" and moreover, "s. 1 of the Charter is especially well suited to the task of balancing".Dickson CJ then turned to the question of section 1 of the Charter. He found that the violation of freedom of expression was justified under section 1 as the law had a rational connection to its objective, it was not overly limiting and the seriousness of the violation was not severe as the content of the hateful expression has little value to protect. He, therefore, allowed the Crown appeal and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal to deal with issues they had not addressed in their decision.