Operation Winter Storm
Operation Winter Storm was a German offensive in December 1942 during World War II, in which the German 4th Panzer Army failed to break the Soviet encirclement of the German 6th Army during the Battle of Stalingrad.
In late November 1942, the Red Army completed Operation Uranus, encircling some 300,000 Axis personnel in and around the city of Stalingrad. German forces within the Stalingrad pocket and directly outside were reorganized into Army Group Don and placed under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The Red Army continued to allocate as many resources as possible to the planned Operation Saturn to isolate Army Group A from the rest of the German Army. To remedy the situation, the Luftwaffe attempted to supply German forces in Stalingrad through an air bridge. When the Luftwaffe failed and it became obvious that a break out could succeed only if launched as early as possible, Manstein decided on a relief effort.
Originally, Manstein was promised four panzer divisions. Due to German reluctance to weaken certain sectors by redeploying German units, the task of opening a corridor to the encircled German 6th Army fell to the depleted 4th Panzer Army, under the command of Hermann Hoth. The German force was pitted against several Soviet armies tasked with the destruction of the encircled German forces and their offensive around the lower Chir River.
The German offensive caught the Red Army by surprise and made large gains on the first day. The spearhead forces enjoyed air support and defeated counterattacks by Soviet troops. By 13December, Soviet resistance had slowed the German advance considerably, although German forces took the area surrounding the town of and crossed the river Myshkova. However, on 16 December the Red Army launched Operation Little Saturn and crushed the Italian 8th Army on Army Group Don's left flank, threatening the rear of Manstein's force. Faced with mounting casualties and stiff Soviet opposition, the 4th Panzer Army continued its attempt to open a corridor to the 6th Army on 18–19 December, but was unsuccessful.
Manstein called off the assault on 23 December and by Christmas Eve the 4th Panzer Army began to withdraw to its starting position. Due to the failure of the 6th Army to break out from the Soviet encirclement, the Red Army could continue the "strangulation" of German forces in Stalingrad.
Background
On 23 November 1942, the Red Army closed its encirclement of Axis forces in Stalingrad. Nearly 300,000 German and Romanian soldiers were trapped in the city and vicinity of Stalingrad by roughly 1.1 million Soviet personnel. Adolf Hitler appointed Field Marshal Erich von Manstein as commander of a new Army Group Don. Composed of the German 4th Panzer and 6th Armies, as well as the Third and Fourth Romanian Armies, Manstein's new army group was between German Army Groups A and B. Instead of attempting an immediate breakout, German high command decided that the trapped forces would remain in Stalingrad and hold out. The encircled German forces were to be supplied by air, requiring roughly of supplies per day. The fleet of 500 Luftwaffe transport aircraft was insufficient for the task. Many of the aircraft were hardly serviceable in the rough Soviet winter; in early December, more German cargo planes were destroyed in accidents than by Soviet fighter aircraft. The 6th Army received less than 20 percent of its daily needs. Furthermore, the Germans were still threatened by Soviet forces which still held portions of the Volga River's west bank in Stalingrad.Given the unexpected size of German forces closed off in Stalingrad, on 23 November Stavka decided to strengthen the outer encirclement preparing to destroy the trapped Axis forces. On 24 November, several Soviet formations began to dig in against possible German incursions from the west. The Soviets also reinforced the encircling forces in order to prevent a breakout by the 6th Army and other Axis units. This tied down over half of the Red Army's strength in the area. Planning for Operation Saturn began on 25 November to destroy the Italian 8th Army and cut communications between German forces west of the Don River and those operating in the Caucasus. Planning also began for Operation Koltso, which aimed at reducing German forces in the Stalingrad pocket.
As Operation Uranus concluded, German forces inside the encirclement were too weak to attempt a breakout on their own. Half of their remaining armor had been lost during the defensive fighting and there was a severe lack of fuel and ammunition for the surviving vehicles, given that the Luftwaffe was not able to provide adequate aerial supply. Manstein proposed a counterstrike to break the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, codenamed Operation Winter Storm. On 28 November, Manstein sent Hitler a detailed report on Army Group Don's situation, including the strength of the 6th Army and an assessment of the ammunition for German artillery inside the city.
Stavka postponed Operation Saturn until 16 December, as Soviet forces struggled to clear German defenders from the lower Chir River. The Red Army's offensive in the area commenced on 30 November, involving around 50,000 soldiers, which forced Manstein to use the 48th Panzer Corps to hold the area. The 5th Tank Army was reinforced by the new 5th Shock Army, drawn from existing formations of the South-Western and Stalingrad Fronts; the 5th Tank Army totaled nearly 71,000 men, 252 tanks and 814 guns. The Soviet offensive succeeded in tying down the 48th Panzer Corps, originally chosen to lead one of the main attacks on the Soviet encirclement. The Soviets were forewarned of the impending German assault when they discovered the 6th Panzer Division unloading at the town of Morozovsk and held back several armies from the attack on the lower Chir River to prepare for a possible breakout attempt by German forces inside Stalingrad.
Comparison of forces
German
The relief operation was originally scheduled to include the LVII Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army, under the command of General Friedrich Kirchner, including the 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, and Army Detachment Hollidt, consisting of three infantry divisions and two armored divisions. In total, it was expected that four Panzer divisions, four infantry divisions and three Luftwaffe Field Divisions were to take part in Operation Winter Storm. They would be tasked with temporarily opening a passage to the 6th Army. The Luftwaffe field divisions—formed of non-combat soldiers, headquarters staffs and unit-less Luftwaffe and Heer personnel—were poorly trained and lacked seasoned officers and enlisted soldiers, as well as sufficient anti-tank and artillery guns. Many of the personnel promised for the relief effort never arrived, partly due to the poor transportation service to the front, while some units originally chosen to be transferred under the command of Army Group Don were retained by their original commands. Other units in Army Group Don were in no shape to conduct offensive operations, due to losses sustained in the past month of combat, while many new formations which had been promised did not arrive on time.On the other hand, the 11th Panzer Division was one of the most complete German armored divisions on the Eastern Front since it had just been transferred out of the German Army's reserve. The 6th Panzer Division was also complete because it had been transferred to Manstein's control from Western Europe. However, the usefulness of the 11th Panzer Division was compromised when the Soviets launched their offensive against forces in the lower Chir River area, as this tied Army Detachment Hollidt down on the defensive. Because of this, and because Manstein believed that a thrust originating from the position of Army Detachment Hollidt would be too obvious, the German field marshal decided to use the 4th Panzer Army and the LVII Panzer Corps as the main components of the relief operation. However, despite attempts by the Germans to build strength for the offensive, their position along the lower Chir River became tenuous; the Soviet breakthrough was only blunted by the arrival of the 11th Panzer Division, which was able to destroy the bulk of two Soviet tank brigades. Consequently, the XLVIII Panzer Corps became embroiled in the defensive battles for the Chir River, as the Soviets pushed in an attempt to overrun the airfield at Tatsinskaya.
Although the LVII Panzer Corps was reluctantly released to Army Group Don, by Army Group A, the 17th Panzer Division was ordered back to its original area of concentration, and did not prepare to go back to Army Group Don until 10 days after it had been asked for. In light of the troubles in building up sufficient forces, and seeing that the Soviets were concentrating more mechanization on the Chir River, Manstein decided to launch Operation Winter Storm using the 4th Panzer Army. Manstein hoped that the 6th Army would launch an offensive of its own, from the opposite side, upon the receipt of the code signal Thunderclap. Manstein was gambling on Hitler accepting that the only plausible method to avoid the demise of the 6th Army was allowing it to break out, and assumed that General Paulus would agree to order his forces to escape the Stalingrad pocket. On 10 December, Manstein communicated to Paulus that the relief operation would commence in 24 hours.
Order of Battle of 4. Panzer Armee (Dec 1942 – Jan 1943)
Data from AxisHistory.Com- 15. Lw. Feld-Division
- LVII Panzer Korps
- * 17. Panzer-Division
- * 23. Panzer-Division
- * 5. SS-Panzer-Division "Wiking"
- * 16. Infanterie-Division
Order of Battle for the XXXXVIII Panzer Korps (January 1st, 1943)
- 6. Panzer-Division
- 306. Infanterie-Division
- Gruppe Pfeiffer
Soviet