UMkhonto weSizwe


uMkhonto weSizwe was the paramilitary wing of the African National Congress, founded by Nelson Mandela in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre. Its mission was to fight against the South African government to bring an end to its racist apartheid policies.
After warning the South African government in June 1961 of its intent to increase resistance if the government did not take steps toward constitutional reform and increase political rights, uMkhonto weSizwe launched its first attacks against government installations on 16 December 1961. uMkhonto weSizwe was subsequently banned and classified as a terrorist group by the South African government.
For a time it was headquartered in Rivonia, which was rural at that time but is now an affluent suburb of Johannesburg. On 11 July 1963, nineteen ANC and uMkhonto weSizwe leaders, including Arthur Goldreich, Govan Mbeki and Walter Sisulu, were arrested at Liliesleaf Farm, Rivonia. The arrests were followed by the Rivonia Trial, in which ten leaders of the ANC were tried for 221 militant acts that the prosecution said were designed to "foment violent revolution". Wilton Mkwayi, chief of uMkhonto weSizwe at the time, escaped during the trial.
The organisation was formally disbanded in a ceremony at Orlando Stadium in Soweto, Gauteng, on 16 December 1993, although its armed struggle had been suspended earlier, during the negotiations to end apartheid.

Motivations for formation

According to Nelson Mandela, all of the founding members of the uMkhonto weSizwe, including himself, were also members of the ANC. In his "I Am Prepared to Die" speech, delivered at the conclusion of the Rivonia Trial, Mandela outlined the motivations that led to the formation of uMkhonto weSizwe:
At the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the government met our peaceful demands with force.
This conclusion was not easily arrived at. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form uMkhonto weSizwe. We did so not because we desired such a course, but solely because the government had left us with no other choice. In the Manifesto of uMkhonto published on 16 December 1961, which is exhibit AD, we said:
The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices – submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom.

Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalise and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced even by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or take over the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer with violence.

The manifesto referred to by Mandela, adduced by the prosecution at his trial as Exhibit AD, included the statements:
Our men are armed and trained freedom fighters not "terrorists". We are fighting for democracy—majority rule—the right of the Africans to rule Africa. We are fighting for a South Africa in which there will be peace and harmony and equal rights for all people. We are not racialists, as the white oppressors are. The African National Congress has a message of freedom for all who live in our country.

The aim was to act only against hard targets such as power pylons and avoid any injury or loss of life.

Command structure (1961–1964)

In the six or so months between making the decision to form the organisation and the first acts of sabotage, the MK high command set up regional commands in the main centres. The people chosen to be part of these commands were chosen either because they had the necessary technical or military skills or because they were members of Congress Alliance organisations.

Central (overall) command

  • Nelson Mandela
  • Walter Sisulu
  • Joe Slovo
  • Raymond Mhlaba
  • Wilton Mkwayi

    Johannesburg (later Transvaal) command

  • Jack Hodgson
  • Ahmed Kathrada
  • Denis Goldberg
  • Arthur Goldreich

    Natal command

  • Curnick Ndlovu
  • Ronnie Kasrils

    Western Cape command

  • Looksmart Ngudle
  • Fred Carneson

    Eastern Cape command

  • Vuyisile Mini

    Border command

  • Washington Bongco

    Explosives command

  • Jack Hodgson
  • Harold Strachan

    Ex-officio commanders

  • Lambert Moloi
  • Joe Modise
  • Tom Sebina

    Domestic campaign

1960s–1970s

In June 1961, Mandela sent a letter to South African newspapers warning the government that a campaign of sabotage would be launched unless the government agreed to call for a national constitutional convention. Six months later, on 16 December 1961, Mandela led uMkhonto weSizwe in launching its campaign.
The first target sabotaged was an electrical substation. This was followed by many more acts of sabotage over a year and a half, including attacks on government posts, machines and power facilities, and crop burning. At the Rivonia Trial, the government accused them of committing 193 acts of sabotage in total.
Opinions in the ANC were divided on the viability of launching a military campaign. For this reason, MK did not publicly associate itself with the ANC at first. Its initial attacks were "characterised by their simplicity": reflecting the Africans' lack of military training, and the fact that although many whites had military training, most had not seen service since the Second World War. The state responded with laws that allowed detention without trial and an unlimited power to ban organisations, and also by establishing military and civilian intelligence organisations.
MK began planning a campaign called "Operation O Mayibuye", or "Operation Mayibuye", from Liliesleaf Farm. The South African Heritage Portal describes how they were able to meet there:

"Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, a lawyer, used South African Communist Party funds to buy Liliesleaf Farm in Rivonia in 1961 for use as a secret meeting place. The secret life of the revolutionaries at Liliesleaf had a very brief flowering – the key years were 1961 to mid-1963. Arthur Goldreich lived as the tenant of Liliesleaf with his then wife Hazel and his two sons, Nicholas and Paul. They were white, the 'right colour' to belong in Rivonia, so their presence did not attract attention; this was the perfect cover.... The farm outbuildings became home to various key ANC black members who posed as 'servants' of the white Goldreich family. Here the leaders of a hoped for revolution developed a plan for guerrilla warfare with its own printing press and a secret radio transmitter."

In 1962, Mandela went to Algeria, Egypt, and Ghana to get international backing for the group.
In December 1962, Looksmart Ngudle and Denis Goldberg helped to organise a training camp held at Mamre, outside Cape Town, later recognised as the first MK training centre inside South Africa; however it had to be abandoned early due to Security Police interest.
A lack of familiarity with the necessities of covert military work, and the reliance on high-profile leaders like Nelson Mandela, contributed to the South African state's ability to capture the organisation's leadership at their Rivonia headquarters outside Johannesburg at the end of 1962. This effectively neutralised MK within South Africa for the next decade. However, the organisation had established itself—and its key relationship as a disciplined part of the ANC—and did not disappear.
The early 1970s were a low point for the ANC in many ways, including in the military sphere. Attempts to rebuild uMkhonto weSizwe inside South Africa resulted in many losses, although, as noted by the Military History Journal, some members, including Chris Hani, were able to remain undetected for a long period. Meanwhile, MK cadres had access to a growing range of military training opportunities in Algeria, Egypt and the Soviet Union and other communist-bloc countries.
The Soweto uprising of 1976 led to a large exodus of young black men and women. Anxious to strike back at the apartheid regime, they crossed the border to Rhodesia to seek military training. This enabled uMkhonto weSizwe to rebuild an army — one capable of attacking prestigious targets such as the refineries at Sasolburg.
On 24 February 1977, a bomb exploded at the Daveyton Police Station, causing only superficial damage. On 14 December, guerrillas attacked the Germiston police station. On 10 March 1978, a bomb exploded outside the offices of the Bantu Affairs building in Port Elizabeth, killing one civilian and wounding three others. On 21 August 1978, B. Mayeza, personnel member of the Bureau of State Security was shot dead in Umlazi, Durban. On 9 December 1978, an explosive blast severely damaged the Soweto Community Council building.
On 14 January, seven members clashed with SAP near Zeerust, one member was captured, others escaped over Botswana border. On 23 January, an explosion damaged the railway near New Canada, Gauteng. The next day, a large quantity of explosives on the line were found and defused, between Fort Beaufort and King William's Town, Eastern Cape. In February, Sergeant Benjamin Letlako, a Police Special Branch member, is shot dead in Katlehong. On 15 April, an improvised device was discovered and defused on a railway line near Soweto. In 5 May, guerrillas opened fire in the Moroka Police Station, killing one and wounding three more policemen and three civilians. Next, an explosive device was found in a railway in Eastern Transvaal. On 15 November, members of MK attacked the Orlando SAP Station, leaving two officers dead and other two wounded. In the same day, the house of the Lt Magezi Ngobeni of SAP Special Branch was attacked with grenades, leaving five children wounded. In the next month, a railway near Alice, Eastern Cape was damaged by a blast.