Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was fought intermittently between 14 August 1987 and 23 March 1988, south and east of Cuito Cuanavale, Angola, by the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola and Cuba against South Africa and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola during the Angolan Civil War and South African Border War. The battle was the largest engagement of the Angolan conflict and the biggest conventional battle on the African continent since World War II. UNITA and its South African allies defeated a major FAPLA offensive towards Mavinga, preserving UNITA's control of southern Angola. A subsequent counteroffensive was launched around the Tumpo River east of Cuito Cuanavale, and succeeded in ending FAPLA advances but failed to completely eliminate all remaining FAPLA positions.
After several failed attempts to take control of Southern Angola in 1986, eight FAPLA brigades mustered for a final offensive—Operação Saludando Octubre—in August 1987 with extensive auxiliary support from the Soviet Union. The FAPLA offensive took the form of a two-pronged, multi-divisional movement southwards towards Mavinga, a major UNITA stronghold and logistics centre. Once Mavinga was in its hands, FAPLA intended to expel the remaining insurgents from Moxico Province and pave the way for a final assault on the UNITA headquarters at Jamba. The Soviet Union supplied FAPLA with over a billion dollars' worth of new military hardware for the purpose of this offensive, and Soviet advisers were attached to each FAPLA unit on the brigade level.
South Africa, which shared a border with Angola through the contested territory of South West Africa, was then determined to prevent FAPLA from gaining control of Mavinga and allowing insurgents of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia to operate in the region. Saludando Octubre prompted the South African Defence Force to underpin the defence of Mavinga and launch Operation Moduler with the objective of stopping FAPLA's advance. After weeks of preliminary skirmishes, the two armies met at the Lomba River on 6 September. Throughout September and October, the SADF repulsed several FAPLA attempts to cross the Lomba and destroyed most of FAPLA's vital bridging equipment. Repeated counterattacks by the SADF's 61 Mechanised Battalion Group resulted in the annihilation of FAPLA's 47 Brigade and the loss of its remaining bridgeheads, forcing the remainder of the FAPLA units to withdraw towards positions east of Cuito Cuanavale.
During the second phase of the campaign, the SADF and UNITA made several unsuccessful attempts to encircle and destroy the surviving FAPLA forces before they could establish new defensive positions east of Cuito Cuanavale, an initiative known as Operation Hooper. However, FAPLA succeeded in concentrating its forces within a cramped perimeter between the Cuito, Tumpo, and Dala rivers known as the "Tumpo Triangle". Here they were protected by the terrain and by extensive minefields. They were also reinforced by Cuban armoured and motorised units, which had become more directly committed to the fighting for the first time since the beginning of Cuba's military intervention in Angola in 1975. Over two months the SADF and UNITA launched six unsuccessful assaults on the Tumpo Triangle under the auspices of Operation Packer. The defending FAPLA and Cuban troops held their lines in the Tumpo Triangle. The SADF and UNITA disengaged in March 1988, after laying a series of minefields southeast of Cuito Cuanavale to dissuade a renewed FAPLA offensive.
Both sides claimed victory. The Cuban and FAPLA commanders had interpreted the SADF's Tumpo Triangle campaign as part of a larger effort to seize the town of Cuito Cuanavale itself, and they presented their stand there as a successful defensive action. The SADF achieved its basic objectives of halting the FAPLA offensive toward Mavinga, and decided not to occupy Cuito Cuanavale itself, which they claimed would have entailed unacceptable losses to their expeditionary force.
Today, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is credited by some with ushering in the first round of trilateral negotiations, mediated by the United States, which secured the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola and Namibia by 1991.
Background
The Angolan Civil War played out against the backdrop of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers tried to influence the outcome of the civil war through proxies.For 13 years until 1974, three armed groups fought for Angola's independence from Portugal: the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola , led by Agostinho Neto; the conservative National Liberation Front of Angola, led by Holden Roberto and supported by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre; and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi.
After the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 in Portugal, the new revolutionary government of Portugal let go of Portugal's African overseas possessions, including Angola. The Treaty of Alvor comprised a series of agreements between the three rebel factions and Portugal that were to pave the way to independence. Under its terms, a transitional government was formed, elections were scheduled for the end of the year, and 11 November 1975 was slated as Angola's independence day. Fighting between the three rebel factions started soon after the transitional government took office on 31 January 1975, with each movement gaining control of their traditional areas of influence by mid-1975: the MPLA in the capital and central Angola, the FNLA in the north and UNITA in the south. The FNLA was defeated in the 1970s and the struggle for control continued between the Soviet-backed MPLA forces and the United States- and South African-backed UNITA movement. The MPLA government of Angola and SWAPO were supported by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other communist states, while UNITA and FNLA were supported by capitalist states, foremost among them the United States and South Africa.
Between 1975 and 1976, Cuban and South African troops participated in the fighting on behalf of the MPLA and UNITA, respectively. According to Cuban leader Fidel Castro, the presence of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces in Angola was in accordance with an "internationalist mission" to combat colonialism and "defend independence". For its part, South Africa perceived Cuban and Soviet interference with the Angolan conflict as an example of regional communist expansionism.
After the Cubans had helped the MPLA gain power in 1975 they considered it necessary to stay in the country until conditions stabilized. The Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries supplied FAPLA with armament, advisors, and specialized technical staff. UNITA managed, with South African and US support, to continue posing a military threat to the MPLA government. UNITA received backing from the US, most notably in the form of Stinger missiles that helped repel the air superiority of the FAPLA forces. South Africa also provided UNITA with arms and training.
South Africa had governed South West Africa under an expired League of Nations mandate since annexing the territory from the German Empire during World War I. In 1966, the South West African Liberation Army launched an armed struggle to free the territory from South African rule. Following the MPLA's ascension to power, SWAPO gained its support and began operating from sanctuaries inside Angola.
The South African government's strategic concern was thus to ensure continued UNITA control over regions bordering South West Africa, so as to prevent the SWAPO guerrillas from receiving Angolan support and gaining a springboard in southern Angola from which to launch attacks into South West Africa. Its security strategy was shaped by the doctrines of pre-emptive interventionism and counter-revolutionary warfare. Following the South African Operation Protea in August 1981, in which it temporarily occupied of Cunene province, UNITA took effective administrative control of most of Cunene in January 1982.
Operation Saluting October
Because of the UNITA insurgency, the central government never managed to gain control of the whole country; UNITA had control of much of southeastern Angola. Whenever it was threatened, South Africa intervened on its behalf. South Africa kept the whole southern border in Angola and at times up to 50,000 km2 of Cunene province occupied and conducted invasions and raids into the country.In 1987, as part of the Angolan government campaign against UNITA and for the control of south-eastern Angola, FAPLA launched Operação Saludando Octubre to drive UNITA forces from their stronghold cities of Mavinga and Jamba in the southeast of the country, north of the Caprivi Strip. As in previous campaigns, planning and leadership was taken over by the Soviets and the higher ranks in the units were taken over by Soviet officers. Combat operations were directed by Lieutenant General Petr Gusev, head of the Soviet military mission in Angola, nominally with the oversight of the Angolan Ministry of Defence. Also instrumental in the operational planning was Gusev's chief of staff, Major General Ivan Ryabchenko. Aside from the Soviets, FAPLA forces were accompanied by a large contingent of East German military advisers serving in various technical and support roles, namely communications. The East German communications personnel would play a key role in monitoring South African and UNITA radio transmissions.
Cuban disagreements with the Soviet and FAPLA general staff in the past had resulted in much of the support roles during Soviet-directed FAPLA offensives being filled by East German advisers instead. Some Cuban military personnel, however, continued to be employed in technical positions alongside the East Germans during Operation Saluting October. On the personal orders of Fidel Castro, Cuban combat forces were explicitly forbidden from participating in Saluting October. "Don't get into such wasting, costly, and finally pointless offensives," Castro had vented to Gusev's staff. "And count us out if you do." Castro and the Cuban general staff in Angola opposed Saluting October on the grounds that FAPLA was being forced to adopt tactics more applicable to Soviet conventional operations in central Europe than an offensive against an irregular fighting force on the broken African terrain. Gusev and Ryabchenko had also planned Operation Saluting October based on their experiences moving similarly sized units in the Soviet Union, and had failed to take into account the logistical disadvantages and technical shortcomings of the FAPLA forces involved.
FAPLA's equipment was upgraded, including 150 T-55 tanks and Mi-24 helicopters. The Soviets dismissed the advice of the Cubans, as in the campaigns before, who warned that the operation would create another opportunity for a South African intervention. It was decided to commence the attack from Cuito Cuanavale.
Taking notice of the massive military build-up, South Africa warned UNITA. The FAPLA campaign was initially successful but also proceeded at an extremely slow pace. The brigades involved in the offensive advanced cautiously, covering just under 4 kilometres a day, and ceased all other activity in the late afternoon to construct elaborate defensive works. This would prove to be a fatal error, as it allowed South Africa to compile detailed intelligence on their movements and make preparations for its own build-up to counter the offensive.
The South African government became aware that UNITA would not be able to withstand the onslaught. On 15 June it decided to intervene and authorised covert support. On 4 August 1987 the SADF launched Operation Moduler which was to stop the Angolan advance on Mavinga to prevent a rout of UNITA. The SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion crossed into Angola from their base at the border town of Rundu.