Rhodesia


Rhodesia, officially the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970, was an unrecognised country in Southern Africa that existed from 1965 to 1979. Rhodesia served as the de facto successor state to the British colony of Southern Rhodesia following a unilateral declaration of independence issued by the ruling white-minority government. Throughout this fourteen-year period, Rhodesia faced internal conflict and political unrest. Following the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the territory returned to British political control and then subsequently gained internationally recognised independence as Zimbabwe in 1980.
The rapid decolonisation of Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s alarmed a significant proportion of Southern Rhodesia's white population. In an effort to delay the transition to black majority rule, the predominantly white Southern Rhodesian government issued its own Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the United Kingdom on 11 November 1965. The new nation, identified simply as Rhodesia, initially sought recognition as an autonomous realm within the Commonwealth of Nations, but reconstituted itself as a republic in 1970. Following the declaration of independence in 1965, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that called upon all states not to grant recognition to Rhodesia. Two African nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union and Zimbabwe African National Union, launched an armed insurgency against the government upon UDI, sparking the Rhodesian Bush War. Growing war weariness, diplomatic pressure, and an extensive trade embargo imposed by the United Nations prompted Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith to concede to majority rule in 1978. However, elections and a multiracial provisional government, with Smith succeeded by moderate Abel Muzorewa, failed to appease international critics or halt the war. By December 1979, Muzorewa had secured an agreement with ZAPU and ZANU, allowing Rhodesia to briefly revert to colonial status pending new elections under British supervision. ZANU secured an electoral victory in 1980, and the country achieved internationally recognised independence in April 1980, as Zimbabwe.
A landlocked nation, Rhodesia was bordered by Botswana to the southwest, Mozambique to the east, South Africa to the south, and Zambia to the northwest. From 1965 to 1979, Rhodesia was one of two independent states on the African continent governed by a white minority of European descent and culture, the other being South Africa. Rhodesia's largest cities were Salisbury and Bulawayo. Prior to 1970, the unicameral Legislative Assembly was predominantly white, with a small number of seats reserved for black representatives. Following the declaration of a republic in 1970, this was replaced by a bicameral Parliament, with a House of Assembly and a Senate. The bicameral system was retained in Zimbabwe after 1980. Aside from its racial franchise, Rhodesia observed a Westminster system inherited from the United Kingdom, with a president acting as ceremonial head of state, while a prime minister headed the Cabinet as head of government.

Etymology

The official name of the country, according to the constitution adopted concurrently with the UDI in November 1965, was Rhodesia, which derives from Cecil Rhodes. This was not the case under British law, however, which considered the territory's legal name to be Southern Rhodesia, the name given to the country in 1898 during the British South Africa Company's administration of the Rhodesias, and retained by the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia after the end of company rule in 1923.
This naming dispute dated back to October 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became independent from the UK and concurrently changed its name to Zambia. The Southern Rhodesian colonial government in Salisbury felt that in the absence of a "Northern" Rhodesia, the continued use of "Southern" was superfluous. It passed legislation to become simply Rhodesia, but the British government refused to approve this on the grounds that the country's name was defined by British legislation, so could not be altered by the colonial government. Salisbury went on using the shortened name in an official manner nevertheless, while the British government continued referring to the country as Southern Rhodesia. This situation continued throughout the UDI period. The shortened name was used by many people including the British government in the House of Commons.

History

Background

Until after the Second World War the landlocked British possession of Southern Rhodesia was not developed as an indigenous African territory, but rather as a unique state that reflected its multiracial character. This situation certainly made it very different from other lands that existed under colonial rule, as many Europeans had arrived to make permanent homes, populating the towns as traders or settling to farm the most productive soils. In 1922, faced with the decision to join the Union of South Africa as a fifth province or accept nearly full internal autonomy, the electorate cast its vote against South African integration.
In view of the outcome of the referendum, the territory was annexed by the United Kingdom on 12 September 1923. Shortly after annexation, on 1 October 1923, the first constitution for the new Colony of Southern Rhodesia came into force. Under this constitution, Southern Rhodesia was given the right to elect its own thirty-member legislature, premier, and cabinet—although the British government retained a formal veto over measures affecting natives and dominated foreign policy.
Over the course of the next three decades, Southern Rhodesia experienced a degree of economic expansion and industrialisation almost unrivalled in sub-Saharan Africa. Its natural abundance of mineral wealth—including large deposits of chromium and manganese—contributed to the high rate of conventional economic growth. However, most colonies in Africa, even those rich in natural resources, experienced difficulty in achieving similar rates of development due to a shortage of technical and managerial skills. Small, rotating cadres of colonial civil servants who possessed little incentive to invest their skills in the local economy were insufficient to compensate for this disadvantage. Southern Rhodesia had negated the issue by importing a skilled workforce directly from abroad in the form of its disproportionately large European immigrant and expatriate population. For example, in 1951 over 90% of white Southern Rhodesians were engaged in what the British government classified as "skilled occupations", or professional and technical trades. This made it possible to establish a diversified economy with a strong manufacturing sector and iron and steel industries, and circumvent the normal British protectionist policy of supporting domestic industry in the metropole while discouraging industry in the colonies abroad. As the white population increased, so did capital imports, especially in the wake of the Second World War. This trend, too, stood in sharp contrast to most other colonial territories, which suffered a major capital deficit due to revenues simply being repatriated to the metropole, leaving little capital to be invested locally. The considerable investment made by white Rhodesians in the economy financed the development of Southern Rhodesia's export industries as well as the infrastructure necessary to integrate it further with international markets.
In August 1953, Southern Rhodesia merged with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the two other British Central African territories, to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – a loose association that placed defence and economic direction under a central government but left many domestic affairs under the control of its constituent territories. As it began to appear that decolonisation was inevitable and indigenous black populations were pressing heavily for change, the federation was dissolved at the end of December 1963.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965)

Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia, the British government had adopted a policy of no independence before majority rule, dictating that colonies with a significant, politically active population of European settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of majority rule. White Rhodesians balked at the premise of NIBMR; many felt they had a right to absolute political control, at least for the time being, despite their relatively small numbers. They were also disturbed by the chaos of the post-colonial political transitions occurring in other African nations at the time, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A vocal segment of the white populace was open to the concept of gradually incorporating black Rhodesians into civil society and a more integrated political structure in theory, although not without qualification and equivocation. A greater degree of social and political equality, they argued, was acceptable once more black citizens had obtained higher educational and vocational standards. The second faction in the white community was wholly unwilling to concede the principle, much less the practice, of equality to the black population. Both groups remained opposed to majority rule in the near future. However, once Rhodesia had been introduced as a topic for discussion in international bodies, extension of the status quo became a matter of concern to the British government, which perceived the scrutiny as a serious embarrassment to the United Kingdom.
After the federation was dissolved in December 1963, British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home insisted that preconditions on independence talks hinge on what he termed the "five principles" – unimpeded progress to majority rule, assurance against any future legislation decidedly detrimental to black interests, "improvement in the political status" of local Africans, an end to official racial discrimination, and a political settlement that could be "acceptable to the whole population". Harold Wilson and his incoming Labour government took an even harder line on demanding that these points be legitimately addressed before a timetable for independence could be set.
In 1964, growing white dissatisfaction with the ongoing negotiations played a major role in the ousting of Winston Field as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Field was succeeded by Ian Smith, chairman of the conservative Rhodesian Front Party and an outspoken critic of any immediate transition to majority rule. Smith, the colony's first Rhodesian-born leader, soon came to personify resistance to liberals in British government and those agitating for change at home. In September 1964, Smith visited Lisbon, where Portuguese prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar promised him "maximum support" if he should declare independence. Aside from a common interest in maintaining security ties in southern Africa, Salazar expressed a great deal of anger at Britain's refusal to support Portugal during the Indian annexation of Goa in 1961, admonishing Smith not to trust the British government. A Rhodesian Trade Office was opened in Lisbon in order to co-ordinate breaking the anticipated sanctions in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence later that year, which encouraged Smith not to compromise. In its turn, the Rhodesian Trade Office in Lisbon functioned as a de facto embassy and caused tension with London, which objected to Rhodesia conducting its own foreign policy. As land-locked Rhodesia bordered the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, Salazar's promise of "maximum support" from Portugal in breaking the anticipated sanctions gave Smith more grounds for self-confidence in his talks with London. Smith ruled out acceptance for all five of the British principles as they stood, implying instead that Rhodesia was already legally entitled to independence—a claim that was overwhelmingly endorsed by the predominantly white electorate in a referendum.
Emboldened by the results of this referendum and the subsequent general election, the Rhodesian government threatened to declare independence without British consent. Harold Wilson countered by warning that such an irregular procedure would be considered treasonous, although he specifically rejected using armed force to quell a rebellion by English "kith and kin", or white Rhodesians of predominantly British descent and origin, many of whom still possessed sympathies and family ties to the United Kingdom. Wilson's refusal to consider a military option further encouraged Smith to proceed with his plans. Talks quickly broke down, and final efforts in October to achieve a settlement floundered; the Smith government remained unwilling to accept the five principles of independence, and the British government argued it would settle for nothing less.
On 11 November 1965 the Cabinet of Rhodesia issued a unilateral declaration of independence. The UDI was immediately denounced as an "act of rebellion against the Crown" in the United Kingdom, and Wilson promised that the illegal action would be short-lived. However, given its self-governing status Rhodesia had no longer been within the United Kingdom's direct sphere of influence for some time, and the façade of continued British rule was rendered a constitutional fiction by UDI. In light of these circumstances, Wilson quickly realised his ability to assert direct leverage over the incumbent Rhodesian government was limited.
On 12 October 1965, the United Nations General Assembly had noted the repeated threats of the Rhodesian authorities "to declare unilaterally the independence of Southern Rhodesia, in order to perpetuate minority rule", and called upon Wilson to use all means at his disposal to prevent the Rhodesian Front from asserting independence. After UDI was proclaimed, UN officials branded the Rhodesian government as an "illegal racist minority regime" and called on member states to voluntarily sever economic ties with Rhodesia, recommending sanctions on petroleum products and military hardware. In December 1966, the UN further iterated that these sanctions were mandatory, and member states were explicitly barred from purchasing Rhodesian export goods, namely tobacco, chromium, copper, asbestos, sugar, and beef.
The British government, having already adopted extensive sanctions of its own, dispatched a Royal Navy squadron to monitor oil deliveries in the port of Beira in Mozambique, from which a strategic pipeline ran to Umtali in Rhodesia. The warships were to deter "by force, if necessary, vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia".
Some Western nations, such as Switzerland and West Germany, which were not UN member states, continued to conduct business openly with Rhodesia – the latter remained the Smith government's largest trading partner in Western Europe until 1973, when it was admitted to the UN. Japan remained the chief recipient of Rhodesian exports outside the African continent, and Iran also supplied oil to Rhodesia in violation of the embargo. Portugal served as a conduit for Rhodesian goods, which it exported through Mozambique with false certificates of origin. South Africa, too, refused to observe the UN sanctions. In 1971, the Byrd Amendment was passed in the United States, permitting American firms to go on importing Rhodesian chromium and nickel products as normal.
Despite the poor showing of sanctions, Rhodesia found it nearly impossible to obtain diplomatic recognition abroad. In 1970, the United States declared it would not recognise UDI "under circumstances". South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's largest trading partners, also refused to extend diplomatic recognition, and did not open embassies in the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, preferring to conduct diplomatic activities through "accredited representatives". This allowed the South African and Portuguese governments to maintain they were continuing to respect British sovereignty while also accepting the practical authority of the Smith administration.
Initially, the Rhodesian state retained its pledged loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II, recognising her as Queen of Rhodesia. When Smith and Deputy Prime Minister Clifford Dupont visited Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, to formally notify him of the UDI, Gibbs condemned it as an act of treason. After Smith formally announced the UDI on the radio, Governor Gibbs used his reserve power to dismiss Smith and his entire cabinet from office, on orders from the Colonial Office in Whitehall. However, Gibbs was unable to take any concrete actions to bring about a return to lawful colonial government. Rhodesian ministers simply ignored his notices, contending that UDI had made his office obsolete. Even so, Gibbs continued to occupy his official residence, Government House, in Salisbury until 1970, when he finally left Rhodesia, following the declaration of a republic. He had effectively been superseded before then; the Smith government stated that if the Queen did not appoint a Governor-General, it would name Dupont as "Officer Administering the Government". Smith had intended to have Dupont named Governor-General, but Queen Elizabeth II would not even consider this advice. With few exceptions, the international community backed Whitehall's assertion that Gibbs was the Queen's only legitimate representative, and hence the only lawful authority in Rhodesia.
In September 1968, the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia ruled that Ian Smith's administration had become the de jure government of the country, not merely the de facto one. To support his decision, Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle used several statements made by Hugo Grotius, who maintained that there was no way that a nation could rightly claim to be governing a particular territory – if it was waging a war against that territory. Beadle argued that due to Britain's economic war against Rhodesia, she could not be described as governing Rhodesia. The ruling set the precedent that despite the UDI, the incumbent Smith government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done".
A Salisbury commission chaired by prominent lawyer W.R. Waley was appointed to study constitutional options open to the Rhodesian authorities as of April 1968, including on the topic of majority rule, but reopening negotiations with the British on a settlement was ruled out early on. The Waley Commission found that in practical as well as legal terms, "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination", pointing out that minority rule was not permanently sustainable. However, Waley also testified that majority rule was not desirable immediately.
Talks aimed at easing the differences between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom were carried out aboard Royal Navy vessels once in December 1966 and again in October 1968. Both efforts failed to achieve agreement, although Harold Wilson added a sixth principle to the five he had previously enunciated: "it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of minority by the majority." Rhodesian resolve stiffened following a failure to reach a new settlement, with more radical elements of the Rhodesian Front calling for a republican constitution.
During a two-proposition referendum held in 1969, the proposal for severing all remaining ties to the British Crown passed by a majority of 61,130 votes to 14,327. Rhodesia declared itself a republic on 2 March 1970. Under the new constitution, a president served as ceremonial head of state, with the prime minister nominally reporting to him. Some in the Rhodesian government had hoped in vain that the declaration of a republic would finally prompt other nations to grant recognition.