Nicias


Nicias was an Athenian politician and general, who was prominent during the Peloponnesian War. A member of the Athenian aristocracy, he inherited a large fortune from his father, and had investments in the silver mines around Laurion, in south-east Attica.
Following the death of Pericles in 429 BCE, Nicias became the principal rival of Cleon and the democrats in the struggle for political leadership of the Athenian state. Politically a moderate conservative, he opposed the aggressive imperialism of Cleon and Alcibiades. Despite his political views, Nicias served as strategos during the Peloponnesian War, and led a number of expeditions which were mostly successful, although he had a reputation for being over-cautious. Nicias' goal was to conclude a peace with Sparta on terms favourable to Athens, and he was largely responsible for negotiating the short-lived Peace of Nicias in 421.
In 415 BCE, Nicias was appointed commander of Athens' ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. A series of disasters led to the destruction of the Athenian forces, and Nicias was executed by the Syracusans in 413.

Early life and political rise

Nicias was born c.470 BC in Athens. His wealthy, slaveowning family was aristocratic, and strictly adhered to conservative principles politically. He inherited a fortune from his father, Niceratus, and had considerable interests in the silver mines of Laurion. Xenophon wrote that Nicias owned a thousand men in the silver mines, whom he lent out to Sosias, a Thracian, for a return of one obol per head daily. Historian Nicholas Hammond commented that other slaves would have worked in domestic service, agriculture, skilled crafts, or as unskilled labourers.
Nicias' rise to prominence occurred while Pericles was at the head of the Athenian government, and as a noted member of the aristocracy, he became a frequent military and political colleague of Pericles. After Pericles' death in 429 BC, Nicias became an important Athenian politician with the aristocrats looking to him as their leader and, as such, he became the rival of Cleon, who was then the leader of the city's democratic movement. Classical historian J. B. Bury argued, however, that Nicias was unsuitable for the role, since he "had not the qualities of a leader or a statesman". As for how Nicias came to wield influence among the aristocracy, Bury acknowledged his honesty and integrity in that he was impervious to bribes. He was also considered to be respectable, given his family background, and well acquainted with military details; but he was particularly admired for his unscrupulous devotion to religion.
Public generosity was the means by which Nicias acquired popularity. He patronised various charitable causes and city services, especially if there was a religious connection. Plutarch commented on him gaining prestige by his sponsorship of both a statue of Athena and a shrine to Dionysus. Plutarch specifically mentioned Nicias' support for the annual Festival of Delos, as he paid for the construction of a bridge of boats between Delos and Rheneia. This bridge, extravagantly decorated with garlands and tapestry, enabled a richly-dressed chorus to walk across to Rheneia. Nicias donated 10,000 drachma, so the Delians could continue to stage the event, and pray on his behalf. His instructions were engraved on a pillar.

Military career to 424 BCE

Politically and militarily, Nicias was one of Athens' key figures in the Peloponnesian War. According to Richard Crawley's translation, the first mention of Nicias by Thucydides is in the Fifth Year of the War. In the summer of that year, after Athenian forces had suppressed a revolt by Lesbos, Nicias was placed in command of an expedition against Minoa, an island off Megara which had a watchtower used by the Megarians to observe Athenian shipping. Nicias desired to reverse this situation so that Athens could spy on Peloponnesian vessels, and effectively blockade Nisaea, the port of Megara. The expedition was a success and, having built additional fortifications on Minoa, Nicias left a garrison there. While these victories burnished Nicias's military reputation, many of them were the result of luck rather than military acumen, as many of the objectives taken were lightly defended islands, or raids not meant to take territory, and Nicias did not take many chances with his troops.
Next year, Nicias was appointed to command a fleet of sixty ships, carrying two thousand heavy infantry, and attack Melos, Tanagra, and the seaboard of Locris. The Melians refused to join the Delian Confederacy, but the operations were otherwise successful.
The naval Battle of Pylos, in 425 BCE, resulted in a victory for Athens which left some 420 Spartan hoplites stranded on the island of Sphacteria. Desperate to rescue these soldiers, Sparta sued for peace, but the negotiations failed as Sparta could not meet the Athenian terms. Athens then besieged Sphacteria, but without success as the Spartans were entrenched with adequate supplies of food and water. The stalemate caused political crisis in Athens, where many citizens argued that Sparta's offer of peace should have been accepted.
As the main pro-war spokesman, Cleon insisted the reports from Sphacteria were misleading, and that if he were the commander instead of Nicias, he would go there and overcome the garrison. Thucydides reported that a row developed in the assembly, mainly between Cleon and Nicias. Nicias countered the criticism of himself by offering to resign his command so Cleon could lead reinforcements to Sphacteria, an offer Nicias believed Cleon would find some way not to accept, hurting him politically.
Cleon did try to back down but Nicias had swayed the assembly, and Cleon had no choice but to accept the command, although he was ridiculed for promising he could resolve the military situation in just 20 days. He and Demosthenes did exactly that in the ensuing Battle of Sphacteria, taking 292 Spartan prisoners, who became an important bargaining counter in the next few years of warfare. Instead of Cleon, it was Nicias who suffered politically from having his bluff called and his timidity exposed. Plutarch argues that this misjudgement by Nicias had negative political consequences for Athens as well, making demagoguery such as Cleon's more politically acceptable, with the resultant coarsening of political discussion contributing to the city's later downfall.
Nicias quickly recovered from this loss of credibility by leading a force into Corinthian territory, where he carried out a number of raids before seizing the peninsula of Methone in the Argolis, between Troezen and Epidaurus. The isthmus was fortified and Nicias left a garrison in Methone. In 424 BCE, he commanded the force which captured Cythera. This became an important base for operations against Laconia itself. The Athenians now held three key positions in the Peloponnese—Cythera, Methone, and Pylos.
During his years in command, Nicias was cautious, avoiding significant military engagement. According to Plutarch, this was to his benefit, as Nicias was able to avoid the worst of Athens' misfortunes, both military and political. Plutarch held that "Nicias declined all difficult and lengthy enterprises; if he took a command, he was for doing what was safe". However, Plutarch noted that, on the battlefield, Nicias was recognised as a fair combatant, fighting as courageously as any other soldier.

"Champion of peace" (423–415 BC)

Truce of Laches

In 423, after a decade of fighting had left both sides exhausted, their respective anti-war factions sought to initiate peace talks. In Athens, there was increasing concern about the success of Sparta's most effective general, Brasidas, who was campaigning in Chalcidice, Thrace, and Macedonia. The Athenian general Laches, supported by Nicias, sought to counter this by calling on the ecclesia to seek an armistice. His motion was carried. J. B. Bury argued that this policy was misguided. He supported Cleon's counter-argument that Athens should not have pursued peace "until the success of Brasidas had been decisively checked", and some degree of prestige restored. Bury said the resolve of the Athenians was undermined by Nicias and Laches, whose case rested on "the feelings of the hour", whereas Cleon called on them "to weigh considerations of policy".
However, this "Truce of Laches" had little impact on Brasidas and collapsed within a year. The town of Scione, in Chalcidice, revolted against Athens and swore allegiance to Brasidas. Soon afterwards, the neighbouring town of Mende followed suit. Brasidas was then needed to reinforce his ally Perdiccas against hostile Illyrians in Macedonia. While Brasidas was away, Athens sent Nicias to Chalcidice in command of a large relief force which recaptured Mende and besieged Scione.

Peace of Nicias

The fragile truce was finally ended when Cleon resolved to restore Athenian control of the town of Amphipolis, in Macedonia. In the ensuing Battle of Amphipolis, the Spartans routed the Athenians, but both Brasidas and Cleon were killed—thereby removing the key members of the pro-war factions on both sides. Thucydides wrote that this left Pleistoanax, of Sparta, and Nicias as "the foremost candidates for power in either city", and Bury said they were the "chief authors" of the treaty which followed. Each had their reasons for desiring peace—Pleistoanax sought restoration as King of Sparta, and Nicias wanted to be remembered by posterity as a capable and successful statesman who earned the affection of the Athenian people.
In March 421, Nicias and Pleistoanax concluded the truce known as the Peace of Nicias, which had a fixed term of fifty years. The essence of this treaty was a partial return to the pre-war situation in that most, but not all, wartime gains were to be forfeited. For example, Amphipolis would be restored to Athens, and Pylos to Sparta, while all prisoners-of-war were to be released. Athens would continue to collect tribute from states in the Delian Confederacy, but at the rates originally agreed by Aristides in the 470s. Many of Sparta's allies agreed to sign the peace, but Boeotia, Corinth, Elis, and Megara refused because some of their territorial claims were ignored. This meant the truce could not be expected to endure, and Bury wrote that "the diplomacy of Nicias was a complete failure, so far as it aimed at ensuring an abiding peace".
Problems arose the following year when Sparta's existing truce with Argos was about to expire, and an alliance between Argos and Athens was anticipated. Then, Amphipolis refused to accept Athenian rule. Sparta could not force Amphipolis to reconsider, and so Athens declined to meet its own treaty obligations. Sparta had a greater need for peace than Athens, and particularly desired the release of prisoners taken at the Battle of Sphacteria in 425. Nicias met with Spartan envoys and the two states agreed entrance into a defensive alliance. As a result, all captives were finally released, but Athens retained Cythera and Pylos as compensation for the loss of Amphipolis.