Morgenthau Plan
The Morgenthau Plan was a proposal to weaken Germany following World War II by eliminating its arms industry and civilian industry. This included the removal or destruction of all industrial plants and equipment in the Ruhr and included deporting millions of Germans to various labour camps across Europe to serve as war reparations mainly in the Soviet Union, French Empire, United States and British Empire. It was first proposed by United States secretary of the treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. in a 1944 memorandum entitled Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany.
While the Morgenthau Plan had some influence until 10 July 1947 on Allied planning for the occupation of Germany, it was not adopted. US occupation policies aimed at "industrial disarmament", but contained a number of deliberate loopholes, limiting any action to short-term military measures and preventing large-scale destruction of mines and industrial plants, giving wide-ranging discretion to the military governor and Morgenthau's opponents at the War Department. An investigation by Herbert Hoover concluded the plan was unworkable, and would result in up to 25 million Germans dying from starvation. From 1947, US policies aimed at restoring a "stable and productive Germany" and were soon followed by the Marshall Plan.
When the Morgenthau Plan was published by the US press in September 1944, it was immediately seized upon by the Nazi German government and used as part of propaganda efforts in the final seven months of the war in Europe that aimed to convince Germans to fight on.
Proposals
Morgenthau's memorandum
The original memorandum, written some time between January and early September 1944, signed by Morgenthau, and headed "Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany", is preserved at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. According to Morgenthau's son, senior U.S. Treasury Department official and alleged Soviet spy Harry Dexter White was influential in drafting the memorandum.The main provisions can be summarized as follows:
The Morgenthau Plan, in the sense of the plan drafted by Morgenthau or the plan initialed by Roosevelt, was never implemented. Germany was not made "primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character". However, some commentators, such as Gareau, extend the term to mean "any postwar program designed to effect and preserve German disarmament by significantly reducing German industrial might". JCS-1067, the April 1945 "Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany" specified the Allied objective as being "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world", including, as an essential step, "the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany".
United States
As Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau was initially not involved in the drafting of the plans for Germany. On a trip to Europe at the beginning of August, Harry Dexter White, his most trusted collaborator in the Treasury Department, presented him the memorandum from the State Department. This memorandum left Morgenthau with the impression that the main aim was to rebuild Germany economically to such an extent that after a few years they would be able to pay reparations. For him, it came down to the supposition that after 10 years they would be ready to start World War III.After his return from Europe, Morgenthau informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull that he would immediately take care of Germany's affairs with the following words: "I appreciate the fact that this isn't my responsibility, but I'm doing this as an American citizen, and I'm going to continue to do so, and I'm going to stick my nose into it until I know it is all right." He right away informed the President of his observations and the dangers he saw in the existing memorandum drawn up by Hull. The President showed increased interest in what had been accomplished, but despite all of Morgenthau's hopes, Roosevelt initially did not officially invite him to take part in the drafting of the plans.
Morgenthau now tried to achieve his objective in another way. In a meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson shortly thereafter, he suggested that a committee consisting of Stimson, Hull, and himself should meet to work out a memorandum for the upcoming conference in Quebec. In his next attempt at the President, he once again made clear that implementing the plan as it stood would have undesirable consequences. He also exclusively showed excerpts that he knew would displease the President. The lecture did not miss its aim. Morgenthau's explanations persuaded Roosevelt to write to Hull and Stimson that US occupation policy, which anticipated that "Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium", was excessively lenient. A better policy would have the Germans "fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens", so "they will remember that experience the rest of their lives".
In addition, Roosevelt officially set up a committee consisting of Morgenthau, Stimson, and Hull to deal with the future of Germany. However, due to serious disagreement, the committee was unable to draw up a collaborative memorandum. Morgenthau on one side was drafting plans for how Germany could be ruined industrially, while other parts of the US government were already forging plans for how the country could be rebuilt after Nazi rule. Above all, the American business elite, which was still closely intertwined with German companies during the war, was interested in getting back to business as soon as possible. Hull, on the other hand, was outraged by Morgenthau's "inconceivable intrusion" into foreign policy. Hull told Roosevelt that the plan would inspire last-ditch resistance and cost thousands of American lives. Hull was so upset over the plan that he suffered from insomnia and eating problems and was hospitalized. He said that nothing would be left to Germany but land, and only 60% of the Germans could live off the land, meaning 40% of the population would die. Stimson expressed his opposition even more forcefully to Roosevelt. Hull later resigned for health reasons, though there were anecdotal reports that his resignation was brought about by "the Morgenthau business". So it came about that the Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 6, 1944, and discussed three different memoranda prepared by the State, War, and Treasury Departments.
Second Quebec Conference (September 1944)
At the Second Quebec Conference, a high-level military conference held in Quebec City, 12–16 September 1944, the British and United States governments, represented by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt respectively, reached agreement on a number of matters, including a plan for Germany, based on Morgenthau's original proposal. The memorandum drafted by Churchill provided for "eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar... looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character". However, it no longer included a plan to partition the country into several independent states. This memorandum is also referred to as the Morgenthau Plan.The fact that Morgenthau was able to present his plans in Quebec despite the great resistance within the US government is precisely due to Hull's poor health. In fact, Roosevelt had asked Hull to accompany him to Quebec, but he was unable to do so for health reasons. It was only at the last minute, when the conference was on, that Roosevelt asked Morgenthau to follow him to Quebec. Ultimately, Roosevelt's motivations for agreeing to Morgenthau's proposal may be attributed to his desire to be on good terms with Joseph Stalin and to a personal conviction that Germany must be treated harshly. In a 26 August 1944 letter to Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Roosevelt wrote that "There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians againand those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude. Most decidedly I belong to the latter school, for though I am not bloodthirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war".
British reaction
Churchill was not initially inclined to support the proposal, saying "England would be chained to a dead body". Roosevelt reminded Churchill of Stalin's comments at the Tehran Conference, and asked "Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament." The meeting broke up on Churchill's disagreement but Roosevelt suggested that Morgenthau and White continue to discuss with Lord Cherwell, Churchill's personal assistant.Lord Cherwell has been described as having "an almost pathological hatred for Nazi Germany, and an almost medieval desire for revenge was a part of his character". Morgenthau is quoted as saying to his staff that "I can't overemphasize how helpful Lord Cherwell was because he could advise how to handle Churchill". In any case, Cherwell was able to persuade Churchill to change his mind. Churchill later said that "At first I was violently opposed to the idea. But the President and Mr. Morgenthau from whom we had much to askwere so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it".
Some have read into the clause "from whom we had much to ask" that Churchill was bought off, and note a September 15 memo from Roosevelt to Hull stating that "Morgenthau has presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totalling six and half billion dollars". Hull's comment on this was that "this might suggest to some the quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr. Churchill's adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany".
At Quebec, White made sure that Lord Cherwell understood that economic aid to Britain was dependent on British approval of the plan. During the signing of the plan, which coincided with the signing of a loan agreement, President Roosevelt proposed that they sign the plan first. This prompted Churchill to exclaim: "What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Fala?"
Anthony Eden expressed his strong opposition to the plan and, with the support of some others, was able to get the Morgenthau Plan set aside in Britain.