Indefinite monism
Indefinite monism is a philosophical conception of reality that asserts that only awareness is real and that the wholeness of reality can be conceptually thought of in terms of immanent and transcendent aspects. The immanent aspect is denominated simply as awareness, while the transcendent aspect is referred to as omnific awareness.
Awareness in this system is not equivalent to consciousness. Rather, awareness is the venue for consciousness, and the transcendent aspect of reality, omnific awareness, is what consciousness is of.
Explanation of the worldview
In this system, what is real is distinguished from that which exists by showing that everything that we are conscious of exists but is not real since it is contingent upon awareness for its existence. Awareness is the source of its own energetic display -- its omneity. Rather than leading to a solipsistic account of reality, it is claimed through an analysis of consciousness that it is an error on our part to conceive of individuated awareness. That error being found in a conflation of the objects of consciousness with the subject of consciousness within an assumed form of reality of separate physical things. Proceeding from the one necessarily true and unquestionable fact – that we are present to our experiences – an understanding of reality is developed that is neither a materialist nor an idealist conceptualization. This way of viewing the world is referred to as surjective, a metaphorical use of a concept found in mathematical set theory that means a function that works upon every member of a set, where awareness is the function and omnific awareness is the set, in order to distinguish this position from both subjectivity and objectivity.Within this system anything whatsoever can arise from omnific awareness, thus the use of the term “indefinite” in labeling this monism. What does arise as the existents that we are conscious of is conditioned by the affections of awareness for its display. Thus this system does away with the idea of an active, creative force called free will and replaces it with an active volitional component known as affections, that does not itself create anything, whether movement or structure, but instead, constrains the possibilities of what arises naturally. Arguably, the concept of free will necessitates a world of separation as it implies an actor and that which is acted upon. In this conception there is no such separation. Yet our intuitive modeling of the existents of reality as arising from natural processes, as well as our intuitive understanding that we can ‘cause’ things to happen by our ‘will’, are both cleanly supported.