Fatah–Hamas conflict


The Fatah–Hamas conflict is an ongoing political and strategic conflict between Fatah and Hamas, the two main Palestinian political parties in the Palestinian territories, leading to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The reconciliation process and unification of Hamas and Fatah administrations remains unfinalized and the situation is deemed a frozen conflict.
The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights has found that over 600 Palestinians were killed in the fighting from January 2006 to May 2007. Dozens more were killed or executed in the following years as part of the conflict.

Overview

Hamas was founded in 1987, soon after the First Intifada broke out, as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. It is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamist fundamentalist organization, which is regarded, either in whole or in part, as a terrorist organization by several countries and international organizations, including by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, Paraguay, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Tensions between Fatah and Hamas began to rise in 2005 after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004. After the legislative election on 25 January 2006, which resulted in a Hamas victory, relations were marked by sporadic factional fighting. This became more intense after the two parties repeatedly failed to reach a deal to share government power, escalating in June 2007 and resulting in Hamas' takeover of Gaza. A major issue was control over the border crossings, especially the Rafah Border Crossing.
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh formed a new PA government on 29 March 2006 comprising mostly Hamas members. Fatah and other factions had refused to join, especially as Hamas refused to accept the Quartet's conditions, such as recognition of Israel and earlier agreements. As a result, a substantial part of the international community, especially Israel, the United States and European Union countries, refused to deal with the Hamas government and imposed sanctions. Following the abduction by Hamas militants of Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006 in a cross-border raid via a tunnel out of Gaza, Israel detained nearly a quarter of PLC members and ministers on the West Bank during August 2006, intensified the boycott of Gaza and took other punitive measures.
Calls for the implementation of the Cairo Declaration, including the formation of a unity government and the cessation of violence between Fatah and Hamas, were made in the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement of 8 February 2007. The Hamas government was replaced on 17 March 2007 by a national unity government headed by Haniyeh comprising Hamas and Fatah ministers. In June 2007, Hamas fighters took control of the Gaza Strip and removed all Fatah officials. President Abbas, on 14 June, declared a state of emergency, dismissed Haniyeh's national unity government and appointed an emergency government, and suspended articles of the Basic Law to circumvent the needed PNC approval.
Hamas has been the de facto governing authority of the Gaza Strip since its takeover in June 2007. Since then, it has fought several wars with Israel, and the Palestinian Authority has been split into two polities, each seeing itself as the true representative of the Palestinian people – the Fatah-ruled Palestinian National Authority and the Hamas Government in Gaza.

Preceding events

Involvement of Britain

Documents published in the Palestine Papers reveal that in 2004 the British intelligence MI6 helped draw up a security plan for a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. The plan mentioned as an objective, "encourage and enable the Palestinian Authority to fully meet its security obligations under Phase 1 of the Roadmap". It proposed a number of ways of "degrading the capabilities of rejectionists", naming Hamas, PIJ and the Al-Aqsa Brigades. The plan was described by the Guardian as a "wide-ranging crackdown on Hamas". The supposed plan for a Fatah counter-insurgency against Hamas backfired in June 2006, when Hamas won the 2006 elections.

Israeli disengagement from Gaza

In July 2004, there were clashes between rival Hamas-led sections of the security forces in Gaza and violent protests, which were widely seen as a power struggle ahead of Israel's promised pullout from Gaza.
On 16 February 2005, the Israeli parliament had approved its disengagement from Gaza, which would drastically change the Israeli–Palestinian relations in Gaza. The disengagement plan from 2003 was already adopted by the Israeli Government in June 2004. Israel withdrew from Gaza in September 2005. Control of the Gaza–Egypt border was on the Egyptian side handed over to Egypt. The Fatah-dominated PA had been given control on the Gazan side at the Rafah Border Crossing. The 2005 Philadelphi Accord between Israel and Egypt turned over control of the border to Egypt. From February 2005, a technocrat Fatah-led PA government controlled the Palestinian National Security Forces.
From November 2005 until June 2007, the Rafah Crossing was jointly controlled by Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, with the European Union monitoring the activities from 24 November 2005 on the Gazan side.

2006 elections and Hamas-government

Tensions between Fatah and Hamas intensified after Hamas won the elections of 2006 and the international community increased the pressure on the Palestinian Authority. As a result of the Hamas led government's refusal to commit to nonviolence, recognition of the state of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements, Israel, the Middle East Quartet and several Western states imposed sanctions suspending all foreign aid.
The PA government, which had shared authority over the Security Forces with President Abbas, was no longer in the hands of Fatah. After Abbas and Hamas had engaged in a power struggle but failed to reach an agreement, Abbas appointed, on 6 April 2006, the Fatah-affiliated Abu Shbak head of the Security Forces, by-passing the Hamas Interior Minister. In response, Hamas formed its own security force.
On 25 June 2006, militant groups conducted a cross-border raid into Israel. The Israeli response left Hamas with half its parliamentary bloc and its cabinet ministers in the West Bank in Israeli custody.

Political deadlock

The semi-constitutional and semi-presidential Basic Law gave President and Government a shared political power. Fatah refused to cooperate with Hamas. The powerful Fatah-backed President Abbas was supported by the international community and more or less tolerated by Israel. The Hamas-dominated Palestinian Authority and the parliament on the other hand were boycotted, and international financial aid was rendered via Abbas, bypassing the Palestinian Government. Because Fatah and Hamas did not co-operate, the parliament became dysfunctional and the PA suffered financial distress.

Involvement of US, Israel and Arab states

Several sources speak of considerable involvement by the United States, Israel and Arab states, after Hamas in 2006 announced the formation of its own security service, the Executive Force, which was denounced by Mahmoud Abbas as unconstitutional. The Presidential Guard of Mahmoud Abbas was enlarged and equipped, and its members trained by the US, Egypt and Jordan. Also, a PLC council member for Hamas, Anwar Zaboun, believes that ″Mohammed Dahlan had a big plan to remove the roots of Hamas, the resistance, in Gaza and the West Bank″.
According to the IISS, the June 2007 escalation was triggered by Hamas' conviction that the PA's Presidential Guard, loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, was being positioned to take control of Gaza. The US had helped build up the Presidential Guard to 3,500 men since August 2006. The US committed $59 million for training and non-lethal equipment for the Presidential Guard, and persuaded Arab allies to fund the purchase of further weapons. Israel, too, allowed light arms to flow to members of the Presidential Guard. Jordan and Egypt hosted at least two battalions for training.

Timeline

March 2006 to December 2006: rise of tensions

Following the elections, Hamas announced the formation of its own security service, the Executive Force, appointing Jamal abu Samhadana, a prominent militant, at its head. Abbas had denounced the move as unconstitutional, saying that only the Palestinian president could command armed forces.
The period from March to December 2006 was marked by tensions when Palestinian Authority commanders affiliated to Fatah refused to take orders from the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government. Tensions further grew between the two Palestinian factions after they failed to reach a deal to share government power.

December 2006 to January 2007

Facing international sanctions, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority depended on the import of large amounts of cash to pay its debts. On 14 December 2006, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, carrying tens of millions in donations, was denied by Israel entry into Gaza via the Rafah Border Crossing. Angry Hamas militants stormed the post, which was staffed by European monitors and defended by Abbas' Presidential Guard, responsible for security there. After guards had fired at the Hamas militants, they took over the hall, firing shots into the air. A Hamas official tried to get the militants to disperse. Haniyeh had already cut short his trip due to mounting tensions between Hamas and rival faction Fatah, after three sons of a Fatah security chief were killed days earlier.
The same day, Haniyeh was allowed to return to Gaza without the money, but while crossing the border, gunmen attacked his car, killing one bodyguard. One of Haniyeh's sons was moderately wounded and his political adviser Ahmed Youssef was lightly wounded. At the time, Fatah PLC member and former Fatah security chief Mohammed Dahlan was blamed for this apparent assassination attempt. Peace activist Ellen Rosser also believes that it was Dahlan's men who tried to assassinate Haniyeh. Fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian National Security Forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah. Security units loyal to Mahmoud Abbas and dressed in riot gear used clubs and rifles to beat back the demonstrators before the shooting broke out. At least 20 people were wounded in the clashes, which came shortly after the attempt to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh.
On 16 December, Abbas called for new parliamentary and presidential elections, but his advisor Saeb Erekat said that "elections cannot be held before the middle of next year for legal and technical reasons". A senior Hamas lawmaker called it "a real coup against the democratically elected government". Hamas challenged the legality of holding an early election, maintaining its right to hold the full term of its elected offices. Hamas characterized it as an attempted Fatah coup by Abbas, using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a democratically elected government. Fatah leaders called for the dismissal of the Hamas-led government and the establishment of an emergency cabinet. One Fatah operative said that Abbas had been threatening to call early elections for the past five months and that "more threats are not going to work". The announcement of elections provoked high tensions and gun battles between Hamas and Fatah supporters. Abbas strongly denied allegations that members of Fatah and the Force 17 "Presidential Guard" were behind the assassination attempt on Ismail Haniyeh, and he criticized the kidnapping of Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit.
On 17 December, pro-Fatah gunmen attacked Hamas' Foreign Minister Mahmoud Zahar. Pro-Hamas militiamen retaliated with shots at the home of President Abbas, wounding five guards. A member of Fatah's Force 17 was killed, together with a passing woman. At the end of the day, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a ceasefire, though gunfire continued outside Mohammed Dahlan's house.
Intense factional fighting continued throughout December 2006 and January 2007 in the Gaza Strip. After a month of fighting, which left 33 people dead, President Mahmoud Abbas attempted to incorporate the Hamas-led Executive Force into the security apparatus loyal to the president. Hamas rejected Abbas' order and instead announced plans to double the size of its force. On 6 January 2007, Abbas outlawed the Executive Force and ordered its disbandment. Fighting continued until a cease-fire was implemented on 30 January. The dueling announcements raised the prospect of an intensified armed standoff. Abbas's only means of enforcing the order appeared to be coercive action by police and security units under his command, which were relatively weak in the Gaza Strip, Hamas's stronghold.