Engineer Special Brigade
The Engineer Special Brigades were brigade-sized amphibious forces of the United States Army developed during World War II and active from 1942 to 1955. Initially designated engineer amphibian brigades, they were redesignated engineer special brigades in 1943. The 1st, 5th, and 6th Engineer Special Brigades were assigned to the European Theater of Operations. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade participated in the landings in Sicily and Italy before joining the 5th and 6th Engineer Special Brigades for the invasion of Normandy.
The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Engineer Special Brigades were assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area, and participated in the campaigns in the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, Leyte, Luzon, the Southern Philippines and Borneo campaign. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade fought in both theaters of the war, participating in the Okinawa campaign near the end of the war. The 2nd Engineer Special Brigade remained active after the war, and served in the Korean War before being inactivated in 1955.
Concept
At the onset of direct American involvement in World War II, it became apparent that the United States would need a large strategic and tactical amphibious warfare capability. In 1941, the amphibious forces were divided into two corps: one in the Atlantic, and one in the Pacific. Both were combined United States Army and United States Marine Corps commands, administered by the United States Navy. The Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division, while the Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, consisted of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Marine Division.In April 1942, the United States and United Kingdom agreed on plans for an emergency invasion of Northwest Europe in the late northern summer of 1942 that would be conducted in the event of signs that the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, or that the Germans were withdrawing from Western Europe, possibly due to an internal coup or collapse. This would be followed by a full-scale crossing of the English Channel in mid-1943. These were envisaged as shore-to-shore operations. The US Navy's policy at this time of only taking volunteers meant that it was short of manpower, and those personnel it had available were mainly allocated warships and the amphibious ships required for ship-to-shore operations. This meant that the landing craft for Sledgehammer would have to be operated by the British and the US Army.
Amphibious Training Center
The Joint Staff then considered the issue of amphibious warfare training. Very large scale operations were contemplated in both Europe and the Pacific, which the Army would have to conduct. To have the Marines carry out all amphibious operations was impractical, as there were limitations on its size, and joint Army-Marine amphibious operations would involve problems of coordination in view of their different organization, doctrine and procedures. The Joint Staff planners therefore felt that the Army should conduct amphibious training. This meant that the Army would have to establish its own amphibious training establishment.The Joint Staff hoped to have twelve Army divisions trained in amphibious warfare by 1 February 1943. Another two infantry divisions and one armored division would receive training overseas. This did not include the 1st, 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, which were already undergoing training, the 3rd on the West Coast and the 1st and 9th on the East coast. In addition, the Army would train enough boat crews to move eight divisions. These would also be available by 1 February 1943. The Joint Staff intended to create three amphibious training centers. The plan was to train four divisions at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, six at Camp Carrabelle, Florida, and two at Fort Lewis, Washington. It was intended that training at Camp Edwards would be conducted between July and November 1942. The Army Ground Forces was given responsibility for the development of amphibious warfare doctrine and the conduct of unit training.
The Army activated its Amphibious Training Center at Camp Edwards on 22 May 1942, with Colonel Frank A. Keating, the chief of staff of the 2nd Infantry Division, assigned to command it. It became active on 15 June 1942. The 45th Infantry Division underwent training at Camp Edwards from 15 July to 20 August 1942. Training concluded with major amphibious maneuvers from 17 to 19 August, during which the division conducted a shore-to-shore operation, embarking from Washburn Island, Massachusetts, and crossing Vineyard Sound to land on Martha's Vineyard, about away. It was followed by the 36th Infantry Division, which arrived on 22 August, and completed its training on 3 October. The final three days saw a repeat of the shore-to-shore exercise the 45th had conducted.
The Amphibious Training Center moved to Camp Carrabelle in October 1942. The first formation to undergo training there was the 38th Infantry Division, which commenced its amphibious warfare training there on 23 November 1942. The final shore-to-shore amphibious maneuver was conducted on 17 to 19 December, but performance was not considered satisfactory by the Amphibious Training Center staff, and it was repeated on 28 to 30 December. Camp Carrabelle was renamed Camp Gordon Johnston 13 January 1943. The 28th Infantry Division commenced training on 28 January 1943, and conducted its landing exercise on 7 to 9 March. This was the last division to be trained by the Amphibious Training Center, although three separate battalions, the 81st Chemical Battalion, 61st Medical Battalion and 462nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, received training there in May 1943.
On 10 March 1943, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General George Marshall, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest King, entered into an agreement that amphibious training would henceforth be a Navy responsibility. The Army Ground Forces was relieved of responsibility for the Amphibious Training Center on 16 March, and it was closed on 10 June.
Training for Operation Downfall
Following the defeat of Germany in May 1945, the US Army implemented a significant shift in its training program, primarily focused on preparing for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands. Requiring large-scale movements and specialized training for the final phase of WWII. This redeployment training program, known as Redeployment Training or Rotation and Redistribution, featured the use of underwater demolitions for obstacle clearance by ESB units and beach defenses.Engineer Amphibian Command
In addition to training combat units in amphibious warfare, the Army also had to train personnel in the operation and maintenance of landing craft. Operating the necessary landing craft was estimated to require 48,000 men, organized into 18 boat operating regiments and seven boat maintenance battalions. Each boat regiment had three battalions, each of three boat companies. It was agreed with the British that boat units deploying to the UK would receive their initial training in the US, and final training in the UK. A consequence was the amphibian engineers' adoption of the British Combined Operations shoulder patch, but with the colors switched to gold on blue. The War Department also authorized the wearing of a pocket patch showing a scarlet seahorse on a white background, these being the colors of the United States Army Corps of Engineers.File:Ogden, Sturdevant, Noce and Trudeau.jpg|thumb|left|Left to right: Brigadier Generals David Ogden, Clarence Sturdevant, Daniel Noce and Colonel Arthur Trudeau at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts in October 1942
The Engineer Amphibian Command was created on 10 June 1942 at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts under the command of Colonel Daniel Noce, with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Trudeau as his chief of staff. Noce was answerable to Brigadier General Clarence Sturdevant, the Assistant Chief of Engineers for training. Additional training facilities were established at Cape Cod. The beach south of Buzzards Bay was selected for shore facilities, and Washburn Island was leased as a training site. Some $1.6 million was spent on dredging and the construction of roads, camps, piers and utilities.
Noce and Trudeau considered how the boat units would operate in combat, and noted the importance of well-trained shore parties to load and unload the boats, and establish supply dumps on the far shore. Since combat engineers were not specifically trained for the task, and would in any case have their hands full dealing with obstacles and fortifications, they felt that a permanent organization was required. They drew up a structure for an engineer shore regiment that would combine the functions of a Navy beach party and the Marine Corps shore party. About half the size of a boat regiment, a shore regiment would consist of three battalions, each with a near shore company and two far shore companies. Each shore regiment would be grouped with a boat regiment, a boat maintenance battalion, and support units to form an engineer amphibian brigade capable of moving an entire infantry division. The proposed organization was approved, and authority was granted to form eight engineer amphibian brigades.
The table of organization and equipment for an engineer amphibian brigade provided for 349 officers, 20 warrant officers, and 6,814 enlisted men. The Army searched its personnel records for men with appropriate marine experience. Arrangements were made to train ships' carpenters and marine mechanics at the Gray Marine Motor Company in Michigan, Higgins Industries in Louisiana, and Evinrude Outboard Motors and the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company in Wisconsin. In all, 3,368 personnel were trained by these companies. Another 1,481 were trained at the Army Ordnance School at Aberdeen, Maryland, the Naval Operating Base at Toledo, Ohio, and the Army Motor School at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The majority, some 33,627 men, were trained at schools run by the Engineer Amphibian Command. Instructors were obtained from the British Army, Royal Navy, and the United States Coast Guard, Marine Corps and United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. Of the 37,651 enlisted men assigned between 10 June 1942 and 31 December 1943, 20,244 came from replacement centers, 11,898 from reception centers and 5,509 from other units; of the 2,899 officers, 634 came from other units, 825 from the Officer Reserve Corps, 965 from Officer Candidate Schools, and 475 through direct commissioning from civilian life.
The Engineer Amphibian Command estimated that it required 1,000 landing craft and 225 tank lighters, but it was soon discovered that this exceeded the number available. The Navy agreed to turn over 300 36-foot craft from new production in June and July. Initially the Engineer Amphibian Command used whatever landing craft were available: the 36-foot landing craft, personnel ; landing craft, ramp ; landing craft, personnel ; and landing craft, vehicle ; and a small number of the 50-foot landing craft, mechanized. Some were petrol-, and some diesel-powered. The 36-foot boats were later superseded by the landing craft, vehicle, personnel, which combined their attributes.
The shortage of landing craft meant that enough were available for only one boat battalion at a time. The practice of allocating the boats to one battalion at a time, while the only way that all battalions could be trained, annoyed the Amphibious Training Center, as it meant that its ground units were always training with inexperienced boat crews. Tests were carried out with the newly-developed DUKW, and it was decided that each brigade should be equipped with three of them. An important organizational change as a result of experience with training occurred on 5 September, when Noce decided to group the boat and shore engineers into three boat and shore regiments, each with one boat and one shore battalion. Each boat and shore regiment could work with one of the three infantry regiments in an infantry division.
While the Navy was still willing to allow the Army to operate landing craft, it reserved the right to operate ocean-going landing ships. A dispute arose over which category the larger Landing craft, tank belonged to. The LCT was powered by the same Gray marine diesel engine as the LCVP and LCM, so no special training was required to operate or maintain it. The Engineer Amphibian Command was informed on 21 May 1942 that the Navy had agreed that the Army could operate LCTs, but the British then decided that the LCT was a landing ship after all, and on 29 June the Navy announced that it would be operating the LCTs. This came as a blow to the Engineer Amphibian Command, as it meant that it was dependent on the Navy to transport its larger pieces of equipment like the D8 bulldozer.
The Navy also announced that it would take over the operation of all landing craft as soon as possible. The reason for this was that Sledgehammer had been abandoned in favor of an invasion of French Northwest Africa, a ship-to-shore operation, and plans for the 1943 cross-Channel invasion operation were scaled back on 1 July from twelve to eight divisions. The number of engineer amphibian brigades was cut from eight to five; on 17 August it was reduced to just three. Given the additional time, the Navy now believed that it could train all boat crews, but the absorption of the engineer amphibian brigades into the Navy was precluded by the fact that they contained draftees, which the Navy was still refusing to accept.
Uncertainty about the future became acute as the year wore on, as Camp Edwards was unsuitable for boat operations in winter. The Amphibious Training Center moved to Camp Carrabelle, Florida in October, taking the 2nd Engineer Amphibian Brigade with it, but left the 3rd Engineer Amphibian Brigade at Camp Edwards. Up to this point, all plans had revolved around operations in Europe, as the war against Germany had priority, although in planning for amphibious training for twelve divisions, the War Department had also been providing for operations in the Pacific. In the wake of the US victory in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, plans were advanced for offensive operations in the Pacific, particularly in the Solomon Islands.
Amphibious operations in the Southwest Pacific Area depended on the availability of landing craft. The Navy intended to ship only 60 per month to the theater, as they had to be sent deckloaded on ships bound for Australia, as they were too large to fit into ships' holds. Trudeau proposed shipping them as components. In this way hundreds could be carried in a ship's hold. They could be assembled in Australia by the 411th Base Shop Battalion. The decision to ship the 2nd Engineer Amphibian Brigade to Australia freed accommodation at Camp Carrabelle for the 3rd Engineer Amphibian Brigade, although it meant that yet another cycle of training would be conducted with inexperienced boat crews. On 27 November, General Douglas MacArthur asked for two more brigades. He also recommended that their name be changed from "amphibian" to "special".
Voluntary enlistment in the Navy of men aged 18 to 37 ended on 5 December 1942; henceforth men in this age group could be obtained only through the draft. This cleared the way for absorption of the Army boat crews into the Navy. On 8 March 1943, the War and Navy Departments agreed that landing craft should be operated by the Navy, but exempted the three engineer special brigades allocated to SWPA. The 4th Engineer Special Brigade completed its training at Camp Edwards in August 1943, and then moved to Camp Gordon Johnston, where it conducted joint training with the 4th Infantry Division. After it departed for Australia in December 1943, the Engineer Amphibian Command provided instruction to replacement crews before being disbanded in April 1944.