Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries
The Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was a wartime propaganda, psychological warfare, and communications department of the British Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. It was active during both World Wars, being originally established in February 1918, during the First World War. During that war, the department was known more commonly as Crewe House, eponymously named after the building in which it was established. It was directed by Viscount Northcliffe, and maintained as its leaders high persons of British society, such as H. G. Wells and Hamilton Fyfe.
During the Second World War, the department became known as Electra House, Department Electra House, Department 'EH, or simply EH. The director of the department for the duration of the Second World War was Campbell Stuart. As such, the department was sometimes referred to as CS'. Electra House was the eponymously derived name from the Electra House buildings at No. 84 Moorgate, and on the Victoria Embankment at No. 4 Temple Place. The department's London headquarters were at the Moorgate building, but the building on the Victoria Embankment served as expanded offices and as an emergency site for relocation should the first building be bombed. Both of the Electra House buildings were bombed. As a result of the bombings, the department's Country Headquarters were expanded to Woburn Abbey.
Regarding the nature of propaganda, Campbell Stuart wrote:
"What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide the channels of communication."In 1940, Electra House was merged with the Section for Destruction of the Secret Intelligence Service, and another department in the War Office called Military Intelligence, to form the Special Operations Executive.
Origins
In Britain, two key bodies were formed to manage information during the First World War. One was the News Department created by the Foreign Office to handle the growing demand for war updates from journalists from allied and neutral nations based in London. The other was the Neutral Press Committee, which operated under the Home Office and was linked to the Press Bureau, the main government office for wartime censorship.At the outset of conflict in World War I, a covert propaganda agency was established called the War Propaganda Bureau, led by Charles Masterman. More commonly, it was referred to as Wellington House. Wellington House's mission was to explain Britain's reasons for joining the war and to defend its wartime strategies to neutral countries and its allied Dominions, such as Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. To sway public opinion in neutral nations, especially the United States, Masterman enlisted the help of many prominent authors of the era. This group included famous writers like J.M. Barrie, Arnold Bennett, G.K. Chesterton, Arthur Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, John Masefield, Gilbert Murray, G.M. Trevelyan, H.G. Wells, and Rudyard Kipling. Through their efforts, the Bureau worked to gain international sympathy and support for the British cause by presenting its case through influential literary voices.
In early 1917, the propaganda functions of Wellington House were integrated into a new, larger body known as the Department of Information, which was led by the Minister Sir Edward Carson and the author John Buchan. This department was given authority over both foreign propaganda and the majority of domestic information efforts. The following year, the organization was expanded once more to form the Ministry of Information, an independent department led by Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate. This new ministry directed nearly all of Britain's official propaganda activities. The main exceptions were the National War Aims Committee, a parliamentary body focused on local domestic propaganda, and the military intelligence section known as MI7.
Wellington House was effectively shut down in 1918, when Charles Masterman was promoted to become the nascent Ministry's Director of Publications. At this point, the Ministry actively searched for someone who could effectively manage the war effort's propaganda productions and distributions.
Crewe House
In February 1918, at the express invitation of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the Viscount Northcliffe became the first Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, a role for which his reputation made him a frequent target of the German press. He established his department at Crewe House, the mansion home of Lord Crewe located on Curzon Street in Westminster. Therefore, the department came to be known eponymously as Crewe House. Northcliffe structured this department with two separate branches; the first responsible for producing propaganda, and the second responsible for its distribution. To guide this specialized work, Northcliffe enlisted an Advisory Committee of distinguished journalists and publicists.The Advisory Committee comprised:
- Rudolph Feilding, 9th Earl of Denbigh
- Robert Donald
- Sir Roderick Jones
- Sir Sidney Low
- Sir Charles Nicholson
- James O'Grady
- H. Wickham Steed
- H. G. Wells
Austria-Hungary Section
Crewe House identified Austria-Hungary as the enemy most vulnerable to psychological warfare. The strategy, developed by Viscount Northcliffe with Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson, had two main goals: to support the independence aspirations of the Empire's oppressed nationalities and to encourage their disinclination to fight for the Central Powers.A major obstacle was the secret Treaty of London, which had promised Austrian territories inhabited by Southern Slavs to Italy, undermining Allied credibility. To counter this, a campaign was launched to foster a unified front among these nationalities. This culminated in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Rome, which publicly aligned their cause with the Allies.
An Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was established on the Italian front, producing millions of leaflets, newspapers, and even using gramophone records to target Austro-Hungarian troops. Crewe House later presented their efforts as directly responsible for widespread desertion and unrest within the Austrian army, which significantly delayed a major offensive and contributed to its ultimate failure.
German Section
British propaganda against Germany began slowly, initially viewed with skepticism by military leadership. Early efforts were limited, but a dedicated branch within the War Office's Military Intelligence Directorate was eventually established. This group began producing leaflets for German troops, aiming to counter enemy lies and reveal the truth about the war's progress and Germany's deteriorating home-front conditions. For the German front, he enlisted writer H.G. Wells to define a clear propaganda policy. Wells's key memorandum argued that the Allied aim was not to crush Germany, but to establish a "League of Free Nations." The propaganda was to convince Germans that only by overthrowing their militarist government could they avoid ruin and eventually join this peaceful world order. Hamilton Fyfe later succeeded Wells and continued this work.A major challenge was distribution. After Germany threatened to punish captured airmen, Britain stopped using planes and instead developed paper balloons to carry leaflets. While innovative, this method was dependent on wind direction. Lord Northcliffe repeatedly lobbied to resume aerial distribution, a request that was only granted in the war's final weeks.
The propaganda effort was intensified and centralized at Crewe House. A system was created to produce "priority" news leaflets that could be in German hands within 48 hours of being written. The volume was immense, with millions of leaflets dropped in the last months of the war. The content focused on Allied military successes, the overwhelming arrival of American forces, and the hopelessness of the German cause. The leaflets were designed to be truthful and verifiable, or white propaganda, which gave them credibility. This "intensive" campaign in the final weeks directly attacked the Hohenzollern government and urged German soldiers to consider why they were still fighting.
Victory in Europe and closure of Crewe House
Crewe House did not operate in isolation but relied on seamless coordination with other government departments. Through a system of liaison officers, it maintained vital links with the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, and the Ministry of Information, which provided crucial resources like its wireless service. This collaboration saw unwavering support and efficiency, with even the Treasury facilitating smooth and prompt funding for all necessary expenditures. Contrary to enemy claims of vast spending, the entire intensive propaganda campaign over its final four months was conducted at a relatively modest cost. The total expenditure, including support from other departments, was £31,360, with only £7,946 spent directly by Crewe House, a figure kept low in part because many staff members worked without remuneration. This efficient and collaborative effort proved to be a remarkably successful and cost-effective component of the Allied war strategy.However, some historians challenge the extent of this department's influence. One prominent view is that the idea that Northcliffe's propaganda directly caused the collapse of German home-front morale – a notion later exploited by German propagandists as a stab-in-the-back myth – is not supported by evidence. This perspective argues that the department actually produced very little original political content. Furthermore, even if it had, the significant logistical challenges of distribution meant that few Germans inside the country would have ever seen these leaflets.
According to this analysis, the messages that truly eroded the German will to fight were not covert leaflets, but the public statements and policy positions openly declared by the American President and the British Prime Minister. The department had little time to prove its effectiveness against Germany before the war ended. Northcliffe resigned immediately after the Armistice, and the organization was quickly disbanded, followed by a swift demobilization of Britain's psychological warfare capabilities.